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Abstract 
This study attempts to answer questions related to the role of culinary and 
dietary discursive practices in the process of religious identity formations and 
thereby of interreligious encounters. Particularly it explores the Muslim-
Christian encounters in Ethiopia in food contexts such as at wedding feasts. 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and Ethiopian Muslims have a unique encounter 
in some socio-cultural settings that involve food/eating because of a peculiar 
religious food taboo of avoiding meat slaughtered by people of the other faith. 
This custom, which has been practiced for many centuries, has been 
disapproved by some as “prejudice”, “a sign of mutual aversion”, and “a 
barrier”! in their relations. It thus seems to be in continuous battle equally 
against sectarian and secular pressures. The overall system built around it, 
however, merits investigation to understand the dynamics of the micro-level 
Christian-Muslim encounters in Ethiopia. The study has thus adopted several 
theoretical approaches in order to explore the virtues of this custom and its 
implication for contemporary pluralist and multi-confessional societies. It has 
employed semiotic analysis, narrative analysis, speech act theory, affect theory, 
and critical discourse analysis, to mention but a few. As a cultural studies 
should do, the research combined texts and “utterances of living speaking 
subjects”: analysis of religious texts and oral literature, and an empirical data 
generated through interview in an instrumental case study in Bahir Dar City.  
Although the taboo has been disregarded by some scholars on the basis of 
secular reasoning and by some sects on that of often-contentious scriptural 
verses, the current study argues that the taboo has the following functions and 
virtues: It has been a cause of reciprocal hospitality and of mutual 
understanding of culinary/dietary differences which would have made 
commensality or food fellowship between the religious-food-taboo-observant 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims very difficult. The taboo has thus resulted in 
a culture of food exchange that forges a community ethos marked by reciprocity 
and empathy. The study also maintains that, apart from its possible historical 
function as a “border maintaining device” between the two religions in Ethiopia, 
the custom built on this food taboo has until the present day been considered, 
among other things, as an index and epitome of managing religious-oriented 
! """!
differences. The study thus concludes that whether the taboo has a scriptural 
foundation or not, Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia have 
transformed over centuries the difficulties in their food fellowship into creative 
food context that is marked by reciprocal hospitality and mutual understanding 
of (dietary/culinary) differences.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! "#!
 !
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
! #!
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A knife is the most permanent, the most immortal, the most ingenious of 
all of man’s creations. The knife was a guillotine, the knife is a universal 
means of resolving all knots, and the path of paradox lies along the blade 
of a knife … 
Yevgeny Zamyatin: We (1993, 113)  
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Preview 
This study is presented in five major chapters that are sandwiched between 
introductory and concluding chapters, structured as follows: Introduction 
(Chapter 1); Conceptualizing commensality and interreligious encounters in 
Ethiopia (Chapter 2); The semiotics of the ‘Christian/Muslim knife’ (Chapter 3); 
Analyzing the affective experiences of the taboo observant (Chapter 4); Food 
and interreligious Discourse in religious texts and oral traditions (Chapter 5); 
Synthesizing the paradox of commensality and difference (Chapter 6); and 
Conclusion (Chapter 7).  
Introduction: This chapter, in a customary mode, gives the background of the 
study and the motivations behind it. It also looks briefly into the history of 
Christianity and of Islam in Ethiopia. Then, it addresses the contemporary 
relationship between the two religions in order to show the significance of the 
current study. Also included in this chapter are the objectives and scopes of the 
study as well as its theoretical and methodological frameworks.      
Conceptualizing Commensality and Interreligious Encounters:  By referring 
to the etymological roots of some culinary concepts in the Ethiopian food 
culture, this chapter conceptualizes Ethiopian commensality vis-à-vis the 
commonly known commensality in Western culture. Then it discusses how 
food contexts like wedding feasts serve as cultural spaces of convergence and 
divergence for Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia. This chapter also builds 
toward one of the central arguments that the study upholds, i.e. whether 
theologically justified or not, this food taboo has not deterred Christians and 
Muslims from converging in food contexts such as at wedding feasts.  
The Semiotics of the ‘Christian/Muslim’ Knife: The task of this chapter is 
exploring the seemingly trivial moment of slaughtering performed with knife 
through a semiotic analysis of its function in the realm of Christian-Muslim 
interactions in food contexts from slaughterhouses to butcheries and restaurants 
to wedding feasts. It conceptualizes the knife, a synecdoche of slaughtering, as 
an important culinary tool that is charged with the power of religious speech 
acts and has a significant semiotic function in Christian-Muslim encounters in 
Ethiopia. It also theorizes slaughtering as a ritual that not only transforms the 
! #""!
neutral natural animal into a sacred cultural food but also invests the meat with 
an intense aura of disgust among followers of the other faith. The slaughtering 
narratives continue to manifest themselves in other public signs, namely in the 
Cross and the Crescent, on butcheries and restaurants, for example. These two 
universal signs are the corollaries of an anterior sign, i.e. the knife that, in the 
discursive realm of food and religious identity in Ethiopia, implicates the 
different slaughtering rituals of Orthodox Christians and Muslims. Thus, the 
chapter attempts to make a semiotic analysis of the knife and its resultant food 
contexts in order to better understand the dynamics of the interreligious 
encounters of these two religious groups. This chapter also tries to point to 
some tentative answers to questions of why, how and when Christians and 
Muslims started to practice separate slaughtering in Ethiopia by exploring 
historical texts.    
Analyzing the affective experiences of the taboo observant: This chapter 
analyzes the empirical data obtained from informants and from personal lived 
experiences of attending wedding feasts in the research area and in other parts 
of the country. In Ethiopia, wedding feasts, apart from being a ritual passage 
for the bride and the groom, are important socio-cultural contexts for 
interreligious encounters. In such an encounter, food plays a central role for 
negotiating and affirming one’s religious identity. According to the tradition, a 
Christian family invites its Muslim neighbors and friends, and a Muslim one its 
Christian neighbors and friends to a daughter’s or a son’s wedding. 
Furthermore, the families of the bride and the groom in both religious 
communities not only invite people from the other religion to the feast but also 
cater them with the latter’s “own” food. However, it seems that wedding 
attendants from the other religion pay an affective price in the shape of implicit 
disgust and loathing in sharing a cultural space due to the taboo in question in 
order to fulfill their socio-cultural obligation. The chapter discusses the 
affective experiences of those who observe the taboo by juxtaposing their 
experiences and personal narratives from different theoretical perspectives.    
Food and interreligious discourse in religious texts and oral traditions: This 
chapter explores the seemingly banal linguistic usages in connection with food 
! #"""!
and religion. These narratives can be useful texts for a cultural inquiry into 
food. Indubitably, food, beyond just filling the belly, has manifold significances 
and significations. Its narratives, encapsulated in the seemingly banal food-
related utterances, routine food practices, and broadly in the everyday 
communicative discourses, are pregnant with vital socio-cultural and 
interreligious implications. In Ethiopia, for example, from the sost gulicha 
(‘three hearthstones’, a culinary object that often symbolizes marriage); ehel 
wuha (‘food [and] water’, which denotes destiny, symbolizing the 
fortuitousness of marital unions); and, bila/karra (‘knife’, referring to Muslim 
and Christian meat and to its slaughtering and culinary practices) to the most 
important, probably the most cherished and staple-food injera (a broad 
leavened bread, usually made from teff flour, which supposedly is everything 
for virtually all Ethiopians and that symbolizes success, prospects, career, etc.) 
are notions we find enveloped and embedded in food and food practices in the 
country. In Amharic, one’s stepmother is injera enat and stepfather injera abat, 
which literally mean ‘bread mother’ and ‘bread father’ respectively. In short, 
the allusive references to or the direct mention of food or culinary or dietary 
stuff in the daily utterances and discourses are, therefore, good sources for food 
and identity analysis. Thus, in this chapter, legends, proverbs, sayings, 
metaphors, etc related to food and religion are analyzed so as to see their 
particular implications for Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia. 
 
Synthesizing the paradox of commensality and difference: The main thematic 
focuses of this study culminate in this chapter, which attempts to synthesize the 
apparent paradox of commensality and difference manifest in food contexts 
between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia. The chapter deals with the 
functions of the system built around the taboo by outlining the virtues beyond 
the observance of the taboo and that of the affective experiences of those who 
observe it. It discusses key points related to the remarkable custom of reciprocal 
hospitality and mutual understanding of dietary differences between the two 
religious groups.  
Conclusion: The study concludes that the Muslim-Christian encounters in 
Ethiopia in food contexts are cultural spaces for not only the manifestation of 
! "$!
separation or divergence but also creative ways of dealing with dietary or 
culinary differences. This part also attempts to square the findings of the study 
with the course of Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia and with that of the 
contemporary global trend of the so-called “the return of the religious”.    
 !
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
Background of the Study: the ‘Eat-iopia’ Narrative 
Many nations in their history have dealt with famine or some form of food 
shortage. But no country in recent times has arguably been haunted by and 
associated with famine and scarcity of food as much as Ethiopia is — so much 
so that the very collocation of ‘food and Ethiopia’ seems to evoke hunger, 
famine, starvation, food scarcity, etc, which have been the dominant discursive 
repertoires in the international media for the past few decades about the 
country. For this, particularly, the 1984 famine has left a legacy and become a 
momentous event that made the current Ethiopian narrative for the decades to 
follow. The question of food, i.e. the scarcity of it, and the humanitarian crisis 
that followed has created what Paul Ricoeur would call an event capable of 
“epoch making” and of founding the collective and narrative identity of a 
certain people ([1985] 1988). Ricoeur precisely writes that such “events 
generate feelings of considerable ethical intensity, whether this be fervent 
commemoration or some manifestation of loathing, or indignation, or of regret 
or compassion […]” (187).  
The international media in general and the famous live-aid initiative by 
pop stars in particular reminded the world of arguably one of the harshest 
humanitarian disasters near the end of the 20th century. The media galvanized 
various nations, donors and humanitarians into taking action to curb the 
tragedy. However, as much as it represented the urgency and deliverance at a 
time of such seemingly unprecedented hard times of the country in modern 
days, the image it has created of the country and its people remains inerasable 
from the memory of people around the world. Consequently, the event and the 
! #!
‘Eat-iopia1’, i.e. the ‘food-Ethiopia’ narrative embodied in archival footages 
and images have, since then, resulted in indignation, shame and regret among 
Ethiopians and a sense of pity and sympathy among non-Ethiopians, which is 
best articulated by Peter Gill in his Famine & Foreigners: Ethiopia Since Live 
Aid:   
… in 1973 it was a television programme about a famine that 
played a critical role in the downfall of Emperor Haile 
Selassie. In 1984 it was a famous television news report 
which revealed the dimensions of the greatest humanitarian 
disaster of the late twentieth century. The face of aid was 
transformed and the face of hunger was Ethiopian. 
      Over the past twenty-five years it is images of Ethiopian 
starvation that have held the imagination of the outside 
world. Instead of its glorious past and rich culture, we now 
associate Ethiopia with famine. It has become the iconic poor 
country… (Gill 2010, 2-3). 
Over the past three decades, foreign media while reporting even current state of 
affairs in Ethiopia could hardly make any discourse without almost necessarily 
alluding to that “epoch making” event, which has “held the imagination of the 
outside world.” This seems to be so because: 
Ethiopia was stamped in the minds of a generation as the 
defining symbol of starvation and all that was wrong in 
Africa. The scenes of emaciated children and parents dying 
on a brightly lit plain, and of Bob Geldof and Band Aid 
pricking the conscience of the west, are part of the collective 
narrative of the time (Smith 2014). 
To the present day, this catastrophic event has been an important milestone in 
the Ethiopian, if not the African, narrative of starvation, poverty, aid, 
underdevelopment, etc. In a word, the food crisis in Ethiopia has been not only 
the image of Ethiopia but also the face of the gloomy side of Africa as regards 
aid and its politics in media. “Even today, the nexus of politics, media and aid 
are influenced by the coverage of a famine 30 years ago,” writes Suzanne 
Franks (2014) in her article Ethiopian Famine: How Landmark BBC Report 
Influenced Modern Coverage. It would seem no surprising then if the 
hegemonic food-and-Ethiopia narrative has, over the last few decades, become 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!I came across with this coinage in the web where it is used mainly to promote eating out in 
Ethiopian restaurants. I have used it here to capture the narratives of food: famine, eating, not 
eating, etc attached to Ethiopia.!!!!
! $!
a governing discourse and an observing-lens for food-related and other studies 
and views of Western researchers on Ethiopia.  
Some scholars have gone as far as explaining the otherwise centuries-
long religious fasting tradition of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church 
(EOTC) as a mechanism of managing sporadic food scarcity. For example, 
Peter Farb and George Armelagos write, “[f]asting is sometimes adaptive for 
the society - as in Ethiopia, where fast days often correspond with the ‘hungry 
season’ when food is in short supply anyway, thereby stretching out the scant 
supplies” (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 131). In fact, similar functionalist remark 
has been made on “the Catholic Lent, which always occurs at the end of winter 
when food is scarce” (Civitello 2008, 61). However, the EOTC fasting periods 
are stretched rather almost all through the whole seasons accounting up to two 
thirds2 of the year irrespective of food supply or of harvest seasons. Even 
better, the Ethiopian Lent, the longest fast, known as Abiy Tsom (The Great 
Fast), often starts after the end of harvest in most regions, meaning, it coincides 
with relative abundance rather than scarcity. As Karl E. Knutsson and Ruth 
Selinus observe, “[i]n the whole of the highlands of Ethiopia and the major part 
of the rest of the country where Orthodox Christianity has any influence, the 
big fast occurs when harvest and threshing are completed and the stores 
temporarily filled” (Knutsson and Selinus 1970, 964). In view of this, it is the 
influence of the recent hegemonic discourse of food scarcity that seems to form 
the basis for explaining perennial practices such as the fasting etiquettes of the 
EOTC. There is no space here to treat how the religious fasting tradition in 
Ethiopia antedates the recorded history of famine in the country, but it suffices 
to refer to Peter Garnsey who rightly notes, “unravelling the logic of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#! !The number of fasting days (strict abstinence from all animal products except honey) in a 
year given by scholars varies: 165 days for ordinary Christians and 250 for the devout ones 
(Garnsey 1999, 142; Levine 1972, 232); for common people 110-150 and for the pious up to 
220 (Knutsson and Selinus 1970, 958) for the most pious 254 (Ficquet 2006, 45, footnote), 
whereas Zellelew (2014, 139), making no distinction between the ordinary and the pious 
Christians, calculates the seven major fasting seasons that make 191 days in a year.    !
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specific dietary rules is one thing, explaining the existence of the rules, dietary 
and non-dietary, as a package, quite another”3 (Garnsey 1999, 94).  
Jon Abbink, while discussing the tradition of peaceful co-existence 
among Ethiopians of different confessions, writes: “[p]aradoxically, their 
shared poverty and desperation may have contributed to local coexistence and 
mutual sociability” (Abbink 2007, 67). One may not totally downplay such 
hypothesis because the coexistence between different religious groups may 
indeed have resulted from, though not limited to, “shared poverty and 
desperation”. However, the tradition of sharing, co-existence and cooperation 
is not only among the poor or the desperate but also among the haves, and 
between the haves and have-nots. This means co-existence, interdependence 
and cooperation are not necessarily motivated by economic factors. The day-
to-day, micro-level interreligious relation in Ethiopia, particularly Christian-
Muslim, is part of the interdependence and cooperation at times of crisis and 
misfortune as well as at times of happiness and rejoicing regardless of the 
economic status of individuals to whom the essence of food exchange and 
hospitality is more than an economic matter.  
If, in recent decades, the food scarcity narrative in the exterior embodies 
the collective identity of all Ethiopians regardless of religious and ethnic 
identities, the interior narrative of food, however, plays an important role in the 
expression of distinct identities of Ethiopians with different religious and 
ethnic backgrounds. My objective here is not necessarily to refute scholars’ 
claim about food and Ethiopia but rather to reflect how the exterior food-
Ethiopia narrative has become an observing-lens to view the country and its 
(food) culture. The contrast between the hegemonic narrative of food scarcity 
in the exterior, on the one hand, and the abundance and importance at least of 
food discourse in the everyday life of Ethiopians in the interior, on the other, 
might make another narrative in its own right. This research, which deals with 
the role of food in interreligious encounters in Ethiopia, is also conceived out !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$!But this does not mean that some socio-cultural practices including religious fasting traditions 
have no “latent functions” (Merton 1968). For example, the long fasting seasons of the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church that involve strict meat abstinence have a positive environmental 
effect (Zellelew 2014) based on the nexus between meat production/consumption and its 
environmental hazard (Barclay 2010). !
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of and situated between these two seemingly opposing narratives of food and 
Ethiopia. In view of this, this study embodies a discussion of the interior food 
narratives against the backdrop of the hegemonic food-Ethiopia narrative that 
is often enacted in images of famine, draught, hunger, poverty, etc. Like many 
studies, it was motivated by both personal and collective questions and 
experiences underpinned by the same ‘Eat-iopia’ narrative.  
The inspiration for this study stems from my lived experience with two-
confessional society, family and friends in Ethiopia. Particularly, the experience 
with meat that I, as an Orthodox Christian, had with my Muslim aunt in my 
childhood and have had with my Muslim friends to the present day act as a 
backdrop to the basic problem, which has grown from a childhood fascination 
to an intellectual question in the shape of a PhD dissertation. This study, in a 
nutshell, argues that whether theologically justified or not, the food taboo under 
study has not deterred Christians and Muslims from converging in food 
contexts such as at wedding feasts. Among its other functions, it has been a 
cause for a creative way of dealing with religious dietary/culinary differences, 
which would otherwise make food fellowship among Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims in Ethiopia next to impossible, if not unimaginable. Or, to put it 
another way, in my attempt to deal with food and religious identity in Ethiopia, 
I found myself dealing with the fact that the strict dietary/culinary difference in 
the two religions and the resultant difficulty of commensality is ironically a 
cause of opportunities for the two religious groups to deal with differences in a 
mutually accommodating and reciprocal mode.   
Before delving into details, however, it is important to briefly look at the 
historical account of the two religions in Ethiopia in order to get some 
insightful background of the apparently peculiar interaction of Christians and 
Muslims in food contexts and of the distinct characteristics in general and the 
gastro-politics in particular of these two religions in the country.  
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Brief Historical Overview of Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is a multi-religious4 country: Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and 
Animism have all played an important role in its history, and its name has even 
become part and parcel of Ras Tafarianism5 since its inception in Jamaica in 
1930 (Semaj 1980). Apart from its diversity, religion has long been a socio-
cultural and -political force for many centuries in the country’s history. From 
the presumably mythical and legendary ancestral link that forges part of the 
nation’s ancient dynasty (the Solomonic Dynasty6) to the Axum Empire, which 
officially accepted7 Christianity in the 4th century and that would also later 
become “the first foreign relations case of Islam” (Kabha and Erlich 2006, 535) 
in the seventh century, religion has until the present day remained crucial in 
both the political and civil lives of its peoples. As Ulrich Braukaumper 
comments, “[a]lthough the revolution of 1974 turned Ethiopia into a 
pronouncedly secular state, religion has continued playing an important role in 
the political, socio-economic and cultural affairs of the country” (Braukamper 
2004, 9; see also Girma 2012, xvi-xvii). Orthodox Christianity was especially 
instrumental in the political realm of the country, from its official introduction 
in the 4th Century until the announcement of the separation of church and state 
by a revolutionary communist military government in 1974 (Ahmed 1992; 
Braukamper 2004, 3; Gnamo 2002, 103-5; Larebo 1986, 149). With the 
exception of the 9th Century challenge by Queen Yodit who destroyed the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%! !According to 2007 census, Ethiopian Orthodox Christians account 43.5% (32,138,126); 
Muslim, 33.9% (25,045,550); Protestant 18% (13,746,787); Indigenous 2.6% (1,957.944); 
Catholic 0.7% (536.827); and Others 0.6% (471,861) (Population Census Commission 2008)!&!!!Ras Tafari is a pre-coronation name of Emperor Haile Selassie I (reigned 1930 to 1974)!'!!For ‘legendary origin of the kingdom’ see Jones and Monroe 2003, 10-21; Robinson 2004a, 
110; for the main legend see E.A. Wallis Budge’s (1932) translation of the Kibre Negest.!(!!According to some historians this is unique of the Axumite Empire in contrast to that of the 
Greco-Roman empires, where Christianity was confessed first by the lower class then by ruling 
classes, whereas in the former it happened in reverse pattern (Larebo 1986, 148-9; Shenk 1988, 
270). However, traditional sources contradict such views in that Christianity was accepted long 
ago in the 1st Century, 34 AD (see Hable Selassie and Tamrat 1970; also Hable Selassie 1972) 
before it was accepted officially by the ruling classes in the 4th century may mean it also had 
followed the same pattern as that of the Greco-Roman empires. As John D. Carlson notes, 
“[c]onversion to Christianity occurred slowly and was initially limited to trade routes and 
towns. It eventually gained broad acceptance, as embodied in the conversion of the Axumite 
King, Ezana” (Carlson 2011, 171).  
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Axumite Kingdom, the 16th Century challenge by the Muslim Ahmed Gragn8, 
and the 17th Century interlude of Catholicism (Feyissa 2011), Orthodox 
Christianity had been influential in the country’s politics to the extent of the 
Church becoming “an embodiment of imperial legitimacy and official 
nationalism” (Gnamo 2002, 105).  
It is also worth noting that the military government overthrew Emperor 
Haile Selassie I, who claimed to be an elect of God9 through adherence to the 
bloodline of Solomonic Dynasty (House of David), a so-claimed royal sib of 
King Solomon of Israel through a legendary and partially mythical ancestral 
account of kings from this dynasty in Ethiopian history. Speaking of the 
country’s history, one cannot afford to ignore the role of the EOTC in state 
affairs so much so that church and state were next to two sides of a coin. The 
church, among other things, had an important role in legitimizing and 
sanctioning the Ethiopian kings (Erlich 2002; Larebo 1986) by, for example, 
solemnizing their coronation until its separation from the state in 1974. Apart 
from such role in politics, the socio-cultural influence of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Church in the Ethiopian societies is evident in the role it has played 
in art, literature, architecture, language, music, education, and legal system, to 
mention but few. In short, it would be no exaggeration to say that to read 
Ethiopian history is to read history of the EOTC and vice versa.  
On the other hand, it is remarkable that the history of Islam in Ethiopia 
goes back to the time of the very inception of Islam in the Middle East. It 
entered the country around 615 AD, three centuries after Christianity did. 
Despite its long history in the country, Islam in Ethiopia is believed by many to 
have a limited, if not non-existent, political representation (Ayele 1975; Demoz 
1969; Vagnsi 1985). Some scholars surmise that Muslims are today 
demographically dominant in the country (Ayele 1975, 90; Carmichael 2004, 
217; Desplat 2005, 486; Robinson 2004b, 14; Vangsi 1985) suggesting as if !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)! !Gragn, literally means ‘the left handed’, is the nickname of Ahmed ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi 
(1507-1543) who fought against Christian Abyssinia in a civil war that started in 1529. !!*! !Max Weber views this as a sociologically important phenomenon of “the hereditary of 
‘divine right of kings’” (Weber 1958, 49) in that kings claim that their authority and legitimacy 
is derived from God rather than from the people they ruled (Habermas 2011, 19; Safran 2005, 
1). !
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their numbers were underreported to maintain the appearance of a Christian 
majority. In the words of François-Xavier Fauvell-Aymar and Bertrand Hirsch 
“[…] the Muslims have always been, politically speaking, minorities in the 
history of Ethiopia, as is the case in the most recent period even though they 
may be demographically dominant” (Fauvell-Aymar and Hirsch 2011, 27). 
Abbas Haji Gnamo, for one, states that despite the long history of Islam in 
Ethiopia as far back as in the time of the prophet Mohammed, “many including 
in the Islamic world, do not know that almost half of the Ethiopian population 
are Muslims” (Gnamo 2002, 102-3). Nevertheless, the most recent, i.e. 2007, 
government census report shows that their number stands second with 33% 
next to that of Christians, who are reported to be 62.2% (Population Census 
Commission 2008, see Appendix 3).   
Be that as it may, scholars of Islam in Ethiopia whose writings are 
concerned with its historical and political representation tend to agree that this 
religion has lacked not only political representation (Braukaumper 2004, 3; 
Demoz 1969, 53; Vangsi 1985, 127) but also the scholarly attention it deserves 
owing partly to the assumption by some scholars that Ethiopia is a land of 
Christianity and Islam is then of “secondary importance” (Ullendorff 1962 in 
Ahmed 1992, 15). In the past the strength of Christianity deterred Islam from 
acquiring a real hold in Abyssinia (Huntingford 1953, 138); however, over 
centuries, despite the expansion and strength of Christianity, Islam has also 
established itself in many areas in today’s Ethiopia, including what was 
“historic Abyssinia” (Ahmed 2001, 31; 1992, 15), in terms both of distribution 
as well as of number. But still, though Islam historically was always on the 
periphery of the Ethiopian political space, its very expansion, like that of 
Christianity, can also be seen into two ways: as a political factor, a post tenth 
century development (Tamrat 1972 in Ahmed 2001, 32; see also Trimingham 
1952) and “as a religion and a culture” (Ahmed 2001, 32). Ahmed’s survey 
about the development of Islam in Ethiopia sheds a better light here, giving a 
relatively precise chronological account of the progress and expansion of Islam 
from its introduction in the 7th to its revival in the 19th century: 1) Early phase 
(7th to 11th century) marked by arrival of Muslim immigrants [Islam’s first 
encounter with Christianity] 2) expansion and consolidation (12th to 15th 
century) known for the establishment of “Muslim statelets” in the country’s 
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hinterland 3) confrontation (16th century) precisely famous for the “Gran 
episode” 4) steady expansion (17th and 18th centuries) marked by significant 
progress taking advantage of the Christian kingdom’s internal problems [ 
known as Zemene Mesafint, ‘era of princes’] and 5) revival and internal 
reversals (19th century), the coming and expansion of the mystical orders both 
in central and southern parts of Ethiopia (57-59). Therefore, that Islam did not 
assume (a significant) space in the power politics of the country does not mean 
it did not pose political questions and challenges in its entire history, nor does 
it demean its being a cultural force in its own way as well as in its interaction 
with its counterpart, i.e. (Orthodox) Christianity and other indigenous faiths. 
One notable example is the so-called Gragn invasion in the 16th century, which, 
as many commentators noted, has more of a political, economic and 
demographic implication than of purely religious causes and consequences to 
be reckoned with (Ahmed 2006, 4; 1992, 18; Gnamo 2002, 108; see also 
Carlson 2011, 181-2). Since the political and territorial challenge Islam posed 
during this period, it was arguably only after the separation of church and state 
in 1974 that Ethiopian Muslim’s questions of self-assertion, Ethiopian-ness and 
political representation have arisen to prominence. Such questions were 
pursued rigorously after having gained relative momentum following the 
deposition of the communist government in 1991 by the current government, 
which introduced religious liberty at an unprecedented scale (Haustein and 
Østebø 2011). In a nutshell, the political changes that Ethiopia has seen in the 
last four decades in general and since the current ruling party EPRDF 
(Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front) came to power in 
particular has shaped the contemporary interreligious landscape of the country, 
which is briefly highlighted below.  
 
Contemporary Christian-Muslim Relations in Ethiopia 
The overall relationship between Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia may be 
seen in light of an appraisal of their relationship as state and institutional issue 
(historical-political) at the macro level, on the one hand, and as practices and 
norms (socio-cultural) in the quotidian encounters between their respective 
followers at the micro level, on the other. For instance, at the macro level the 
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power balance had historically been skewed toward Orthodox Christianity, as 
stated before, until the separation of church and state. At the micro level, 
however, their encounters have more often than not been marked by a relative 
peace and mutual co-existence (Haustein and Østebo 2011). Perhaps failure to 
notice these two levels could lead to a wrong generalization about the historical 
as well as the contemporary status of the relationship between the two religions 
in the country as either too good or too bad. In other words, based simply on the 
micro-level relationship between the two groups, one might mistakenly label 
the entire history of their relationship as peaceful. Similarly, focusing only on 
the macro-level power imbalance and conflicts could encourage a false 
assumption that the historical relationship between the two religions can be 
simply termed as checkered, hostile, or antagonistic. In fact, one should not 
downplay the salience of the macro level historical power imbalance as a 
source of grievance and conflict with its own possible detrimental effect at 
micro level relationships. In similar vein, day-to-day skirmishes and 
misunderstandings between the two communities at micro-level could also 
grow into big scale conflicts and affect their macro-level engagements. As 
Haustein and Østebo precisely write: 
Whereas the peaceful relationship between Christians and 
Muslims in Ethiopia has often been celebrated by both 
Ethiopians and foreign observers, this remains a 
simplification of a far more complex picture. Christian-
Muslim relations on the micro-level have been of a seemingly 
harmonic character, yet relations on the macro-level have in 
contrast been more antagonistic, shaped by recurrent conflicts 
in the past (Haustein and Østebo 2011, 767). 
It is thus difficult as well as impertinent to extrapolate the rather complex 
relationship between the two religions based only on one level. Therefore, the 
history of their encounters as well as their contemporary relationship requires 
systematic study that takes the two levels into consideration perhaps by viewing 
each one at a time, which the current study attempted to pursue.   
Today, as in many parts of the world, religious identity consciousness is 
growing in Ethiopia, and political and historical representations of ethnic and 
religious groups are being questioned. Writing of the Christian-Muslim 
relations in Europe and Russia, in such a way that sounds, to a degree, parallel 
to the current atmosphere among religious elites in Ethiopia, Mario Apostolov 
! ""!
comments that people have a tendency of attributing to Christian–Muslim 
relations a meaning of inequality and discrimination: some Islamist extremists 
claim that Muslims are discriminated against all over the world and that their 
identity and culture are under threat of destruction while right-wing extremist 
Christians claim that their Christian culture is under siege and threat of being 
submerged by Muslim immigrants (Apostolov 2004, 107). Such tendencies 
rooted in notions of inequality and discrimination help relatively small groups 
of extremists to manipulate people who are vulnerable to being convinced by 
such ideologies (107).  
As regards the interaction between Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia, 
there is a widely held view of “peaceful coexistence”. One reason that seems to 
have contributed for such an interaction is a history that goes back to the time 
of Mohammad whose followers had to flee from persecution by the Qurayshite 
oligarchy in Mecca10 in need of refuge, which the Axum king in Christian 
Abyssinia provided at such a dire and critical moment (Carmichael 2004, 219; 
Erlich 2004; Robinson 2004, 112). Haggai Erlich (2004, 231) describes this as 
a “gesture [that] gave birth to a legacy of eternal gratitude,” which entitles 
Ethiopia a unique place in hadith (“Leave the Abyssinians alone …”) and thus 
to be exempt from jihad (Erlich 2002, 25).  
Recent scholarship on the historiography of the country in general and of 
Islam in Ethiopia in particular, as well as popular views among the Muslim 
community is, however, not only challenging the long-held picture in which 
the country has been depicted as “a Christian Island” (see Ahmed 1992; Ramos 
2013) but also questioning the notion of the often talked-about “co-existence”. 
Many Ethiopian Muslims in recent times are critical, for example, of the first 
phrase for it apparently glosses over their existence and representation in the 
image it evokes of the country. However, according to some, the phrase can 
also apply to the geo-religious situation of the country in that Ethiopia is 
surrounded by Islamic states or countries with a predominant Muslim 
population such as Sudan in the west, Somalia in the east and south-east, 
Djibouti again in the east while the Middle East and Egypt are also not far !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"+!For discussion on the hijra, see Ahmed (1992, 21-22). !
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given their historical influence on and contact with the country. In addition, the 
often-used “co-existence” also appears to conceal the discriminations and 
under/mis-representations that Muslims endured in the history of their own 
country. Hussein Ahmed, for example, comments that the so-called “tradition 
of tolerance must not obscure the enduring sources of tension and conflict” 
(Ahmed 2006; see also Feyissa 2011). Conversely, one can also argue that the 
occasional misunderstandings, tensions, and conflicts should not also 
overshadow the enduring tolerance and co-existence of the two religious 
groups. As Ahmed himself writes elsewhere “positive interactions between 
Muslim and Christian Ethiopians may well prove to have been of far greater 
importance than conflicts” (Ahmed 1992, 18). Therefore, yet again, the 
relationship between the two religions in the country should be put into 
perspective in light of their interactions in the two levels. 
On the other hand, the apparently politically legitimate questions of 
asserting one’s religious and ethnic identity in Ethiopia today are more often 
than not pursued at the expense of the identity and history of other religious 
and ethnic groups. Tony Karbo has aptly described this when he wrote: 
“Sometimes the difference between the legitimate search for identity and [the] 
hostility towards neighbors of other religions is blurred” (Karbo 2013, 52). As 
a result, asserting one’s identity in one religion is perceived as necessarily a 
threat by another: “It is not uncommon to find a rise in influence of movements 
and leaders among the followers of major religious traditions who mobilize 
their believers in the name of preserving a perceived threat to their religion” 
(52). Especially in urban Ethiopia, there seems to prevail an atmosphere of 
competition and a lurking fear of being outnumbered among Muslims and 
Christians, which seems to have hung in the balance the micro-level, peaceful 
co-existence and friendship between the two religious groups. According to a 
recent study by!Manuel Joao Ramos, for example, Amhara Christians, referring 
to Muslims, say: “They have more wives, they breed more than we do”; “We’ll 
soon become a minority in our own country and the government is doing 
nothing about it” (Ramos 2013, 17; see also Haustein and Østebo 2011, 767). It 
is also worth noting that as early as in the 1960’s, a Muslim author, pen-named 
Abu Ahmad, wrote a book claiming that 75 per cent of the Ethiopian 
population is Muslim, which, according to the late scholar Hussein Ahmed, is 
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“a startling claim” and whose authorship has “several factual errors” (Ahmed 
1992, 40). Over five decades since then, similar demographic polemics and 
allegations are still in the air.   
In addition, elitist groups and individuals from both sides release alarmist 
propagandas, encouraging the mass to panic and to feel engulfed by the other 
religion. Scholars have come up with alarming studies that since EPRDF came 
to power in 199111, the Christian-Muslim contact, tolerance and cooperation 
has been increasingly targeted by extremists and dogmatic preachers (Abbink 
1998; 2011). Moreover, one can witness not only interreligious but also intra-
religious polemics and tensions (Desplat 2005, 486; Haustein and Østebo 
2011). And the statistical preoccupation over census data that we have noted 
above is also a reflection of the apparent feelings of fear of being outnumbered 
in both Christian and Muslim camps.  
Therefore, as much as the acknowledgment of and the awareness about 
the injustices and oppressions that religious or minority groups have endured as 
a result of macro-level political engagements, and aside from maintaining the 
sheer rhetoric of peaceful co-existence at micro-level relationships, the study of 
the relationship between Islam and Christianity in Ethiopia should demonstrate 
practical examples and practices of this often-talked-about peaceful co-
existence and culture of accommodation. Except for some studies, there is a 
clear lacuna in the study of the socio-cultural Christian-Muslim encounters in 
the country, especially in geographical areas that have often been labeled as 
predominantly “Christian”. On a positive note, however, what is interesting 
and is also the motivation behind this very study is this: In the face of an 
apparently growing atmosphere filled with inter- and intra-religious polemics 
and of the propagation of hatred and mutual suspicion by some 
fundamentalist12 and extremist religious elites, the “innocent mass” (the non-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!""!!Over four decades ago, while remarking on the then representation of the Muslims in what 
he calls “in the corridors of power” in Ethiopia, Abraham Demoz in a prophetic tone says: “If 
at present the demands for greater participation on the part of Moslems are not very vocal it is 
only a matter of time before such demands appear” (Demoz 1969, 53).  
     "#!!!First, the weight and currency of this word when used to describe Muslims and Christians 
does not seem to be the same. Second, with its reference to Islam, there appears to be a sort of 
hesitation among scholars as to whether the Islamic revivalism in Ethiopia should be called 
“fundamentalism”. Hussein Ahmed argues that Islam in Ethiopia in the 1990’s was resurgent 
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elite Christian and Muslim society) has continued interacting on various 
seemingly banal socio-cultural occasions or events. These occasions are very 
important for inter-religious encounters, in which one observes mutual 
understanding of differences, accommodations and reciprocal hospitality. Such 
events include wedding feasts wherein Christians and Muslims converge, 
cooperate and share their happiness together while they duly affirm and 
negotiate their religious identities. One important agent through which they do 
so is food and/or eating. Therefore, how food has become a cause for these 
apparently paradoxical phenomena (i.e. for their convergence and divergence) 
is a question that this research primarily seeks to address.  
 
Defining the Research Problem: Narratives beyond the Knife 
“The prevalence in every society of food taboos - which to outsiders appear 
foolish, uneconomic, and often meaningless - has long posed an intellectual 
problem” (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 126). In other words, why certain people 
or cultures wage taboo on certain foods that could be a culinary delight of 
other peoples and cultures is always a baffling question. Studies show that 
religion is one of the several factors that affect the selection of foods by a 
certain culture or society (Rozin 1982 in Belasco 2008, 16), which brings the 
notion of religious food taboo to discussion. “The taboo problem” (Williams 
2004, 429), or what Freud (1950, 26) called the “riddle of taboo” has been 
studied by anthropology and other fields. Brett Williams precisely writes of the 
importance of studying taboos: “[t]o study taboos is to plumb the depths of 
people’s humanity and the breadths of human diversity and creativity because 
nothing is perhaps as interesting as those practices that so frighten and repel 
people that they try to forbid them, manage them, and redefine them” 
(Williams 2004, 427, my emphasis). Narratives of food in general and of food !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
thus should not be labeled fundamentalist (Ahmed 1998 cited in Carmichael 2004, 232) and 
Tim Carmichael, for one, corroborates Ahmed’s view, remarking, “Islamic resurgence or 
revivalism is not necessarily the same thing as Islamic fundamentalism” (2004, 232). This 
might be true of the situation in the period studied by Ahmed and Carmichael or even in the 
years following the fall of Emperor Hailesellasie in 1974 (see Erlich 2004, 231) but the last 
decade in Ethiopia has seen a rather checkered interreligious and intra-religious relationship 
marred by sporadic conflicts, burning of worshipping houses, alleged forced conversions, 
killings, etc (see Haustein and Østebo 2011, 767). In view of such incidents, to use and speak of 
religious fundamentalism today in Ethiopia should not be an overstatement.!!!!!!!!!!
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taboos in particular thus tell, among other things, who people are, whom they 
communicate with, who the powerful and who the powerless are, etc, which in 
turn reveal several things about individuals and the society or group they 
belong to. Food can be “an instrument of power” (Grassi 2013, 194) and “to 
know what, where, how, when, and with whom people eat is to know the 
character of their society” (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 211).  
In view of the taboo discussion above, the kind of taboo that the current 
study is concerned with is unique in that it is not about the avoidance of a 
particular diet by a group of individuals. The taboo is more of a culinary 
problem rather than a dietary one. It is a religious taboo of avoiding meat 
slaughtered by people of the other faith, which has been observed by Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christians and Ethiopian Muslims for several centuries. It thus 
makes commensality very difficult between those who observe it. Apart from 
describing the system built around this taboo, the study looks at how it 
functions and what purpose it serves. For example, one point worthy of 
consideration and that this study attempts to pursue is the notion of creativity 
attached to food and food taboos. That is, the study assumes that beyond food-
oriented religious polemics within and across religions and beyond the 
apparently conflicting values and norms between religious groups are 
believers’ mechanisms of juggling religious restrictions and the mundane-will 
for social relations. Out of such ambivalence seem to be born creative ways 
and systems about which one could hardly tell whether the systems are purely 
religious or purely cultural. In other words, there appears to be a fuzzy line or 
boundary between the religious and the mundane aspect of the system built on 
this taboo, which in turn nuances the distinction of religion as a belief system 
and as a cultural system (Geertz 1973). Furthermore, such dynamics seems to 
be determined and affected by political, ideological and historical factors. As 
Carolyn Rouse and Janet Hoskins write:  
Eating is one form of creative activity in which subjects are 
allowed to make choices about what will come to constitute 
their very being, both corporeally and symbolically. It should 
come as no surprise that these decisions are politically 
charged and that they cannot escape the weight of history in 
their articulations (Rouse and Hoskins 2004, 246).  
Needless to say, what we eat, which invokes what we do not, establishes our 
social, religious as well as ethnic membership in a society or group that we 
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belong to (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 6). Massimo Montanari writes, “[l]ike 
spoken language, the food system […] is an extraordinary vehicle of self-
representation and of cultural exchange—a means of establishing identity, to 
be sure, but also the first way of entering into contact with a different culture” 
(Montanari 2004, 133-4). Consequently, food, from its very preparation to its 
consumption, is a cause for inclusion and exclusion in the process of 
interpersonal and inter-group interactions. 
By the title of the study Narratives beyond the knife, I have intended to 
express and capture the power and “charisma” of the knife as an important 
culinary tool that transforms during slaughtering the neutral animal into an 
identity-laden meat in Ethiopia as ‘Christian’ and ‘Muslim’. It took the 
inspiration from some apparently trivial linguistic usages such as be hulet 
bilawa meblat “eating with two knives” and stories that encapsulate the notion 
of what Eloi Ficquet (2006) calls, “meat soaked in faith,” which induces the 
separation of space, utensils, foods, etc between the two religious communities 
in Ethiopia. The study basically is keyed to the centrality of food and culinary 
tools as identity marker. Thus, it aims to explore the role that food plays as a 
religious identity marker and as a negotiating factor for Muslims and Christians 
in Ethiopia in certain zones of encounters. It attempts to posit food contexts 
that involve meat as cultural spaces that serve both as diverging and 
converging zones. Dubbed by some as theologically baseless and 
sociologically a barrier for the interaction of Christians and Muslims in 
Ethiopia, this taboo has been found to be an interesting and potentially rich 
subject of study as to unravel the discourses and narratives surrounding the 
system built on food taboo and their implication for multi-confessional 
societies.  
The taboo observed by Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia as 
regards the so-called “Christian/Muslim knife” or “Christian/Muslim meat” 
effectively delineates the frontier between the two religions with regard to food 
and religious encounters by affecting the spaces as well as the materials they 
share. It is reminiscent of Herodotus’ account on Egyptians and the Greeks 
where “[…] no Egyptian man or woman will kiss a Greek man, or use the 
knife, or a spit, or a cauldron belonging to a Greek, or taste the flesh of an 
unblemished ox that has been cut up with a Greek knife” (Herodotus, Histories, 
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2.41). Beyond the prohibition of meat and its accompanying culinary materials 
are various reasons or foundations of meat taboo. Since antiquity meat appears 
to be the most forbidden food item and the reasons for avoiding meat are 
theological, ethical, philosophical and ‘medical’ or related to health (Garnsey 
1999). Attitudes toward eating meat thus illuminate human-relationship 
dynamics (Elias [1939] 2000, 100). Therefore, studying and understanding the 
narratives surrounding food taboos in general and meat-related ones in 
particular help to understand the various interpretations given by the observant 
as to their implications for interreligious encounters, power relationship as well 
as the ideological underpinnings of such apparently banal practices and 
customs built on food and foodways.  
 
Objectives of the Study  
Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia share striking dietary similarities such as 
avoiding pork, reptiles, and scavenged meat, to mention but few. This study is 
concerned with a unique taboo of avoiding meat slaughtered by people of the 
other faith that affects the commensality between the two religions. It is a 
catalyst that precipitates the dynamics of the encounters between these two 
religious groups in socio-cultural settings such as wedding feasts and in the 
wider public spaces. In other words, this research seeks to answer the following 
three interrelated basic questions: 
1. What are the underlying narratives beyond the so-called 
“Christian/Muslim knife” and “Christian/Muslim meat” in Ethiopia?  
2. How does the knife, as a synecdoche of slaughtering, serve as 
religious identity marker in Islam and Orthodox Christianity in Ethiopia?  
3. How do food-contexts delineated by knife (slaughtering) function as 
interreligious converging and diverging zones?  
While the study basically intends to respond these questions, it seeks to: 
• theorize the role of the knife with regard to food, space and religious 
identity in terms of the culinary practices and broadly of the gastro-politics of 
the two religions. 
• understand how these two religious groups “as inhabitants of 
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interzonal spaces” negotiate their identities through affects and discourses 
attached to food and culinary practices. 
• synthesizes the virtues of the system built around the paradoxical 
nature of the taboo on commensality and differences between Christians and 
Muslims in Ethiopia and the implications of the virtues for contemporary 
(multi-confessional) societies.    
 
Scope of the Study 
First of all it is essential to delimit the scope of this research in terms of which 
Christianity and which Islam it focuses on. As much as Christianity falls under 
such different denominations as Orthodox, Protestantism, Catholicism in 
Ethiopia, to mention but few, so too is Islam in general and Ethiopian Islam in 
particular characterized by a heterogeneous13 and dynamic form, as 
demonstrated by the various changes and reforms it has seen through history 
(Østebø 2009). The current much contested and politicized “inter-Islam, 
Ahbash-Wahhabiyya conceptual rivalry” (Kabha and Erlich 2006, 519) in 
Ethiopia and elsewhere then may not also be surprising. Ahmed’s 
categorization of Ethiopian Islam in two strands more than two decades ago 
still sounds valid: “the political, often expansionist, manifestations of external 
Islam on the one hand, and indigenous Islam which is part of the Ethiopian 
culture on the other” (Ahmed 1992, 45-6). However, it is difficult to maintain 
this apparently simple classification when dealing with African Islam in 
general (see Soares and Otayek 2007, 7) and with Ethiopian Islam in particular 
(see Desplat 2005, 483-4) because of various internal and external dynamic 
forces that make this categorization inapplicable. Thus, instead of such 
reductionist dichotomy: the so-called political and expansionist (Ahmed, 1992) 
or “established Islam” (Brenner 2000, 144) vis-à-vis “popular” (Gnamo 2002; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"$! ! Eller (2007, 212) writes, “As the world’s second largest religion, Islam also displays 
tremendous local variation and adaptation. Like Christianity, Islam is fundamentally divided, in 
this case into two main branches known as Sunni and Shi’a. […] each of these main branches is 
further divided into numerous schools of interpretation and jurisprudence […].” As regards 
Islam in Ethiopia, Abbink (2007, 66) comments: “there is considerable diversity within the 
Muslim communities of Ethiopia” and “notable regional divergences” (see also Patrick Desplat 
2005). Therefore, one can hardly generalize about Islam in a given country, much less across 
countries (Eller 2007, 215). !
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Brenner 2000) or “popularized” Islam (Østebø 2009), this study, as noted 
before, takes primarily those Muslims — regardless of their belongingness to 
either of the two groups — for whom food particularly meat slaughtered by 
people of other faiths is an issue. In relation to this, the fact that whether or not 
food is an issue for Muslims should come as no surprise because there are still 
controversies over Islamic food norms (Rouse and Hoskins 2004, 245).  
Similarly, food in essence is an issue for Orthodox Christians; however, 
because of socialization, acculturation and syncretism, it is also often an issue 
for some other Christians in Ethiopia. For instance, even many Protestants, 
who often maintain the irrelevance of food prohibitions for Christians, do not 
eat ‘Muslim meat’. This could be because of, what Ben Highmore would call, 
the “pedagogy of disgust” (Highmore 2010, 130) that such followers have 
grown up with, as the first generation of Ethiopian Protestants were converted 
mainly from Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity. For example, Braukamper, 
writing of food avoidance in Southern Ethiopia, suggests that neither food 
taboos affect the “(re)-Christianization” process in this region, nor did the 
process change the observance of food taboos by the converts: “food taboos did 
not offer any obstacle on the (re)Christianization of those areas. Many people 
maintained them when they turned Protestant or Roman Catholic [though] 
there was no need to observe them” (1982, 430). It is, therefore, difficult in the 
scope of this study to take a detailed account of each denomination’s/sect’s 
view of food norms.  
It must be noted that there are Muslims who do not mind eating meat 
whether the animal is slaughtered by Christians as long as it is in the name of 
One God based on the doctrine of God’s singularity. Likewise, there are also 
(Orthodox) Christians who do not observe this taboo, nor are haunted by the 
disgust it entails. Interestingly, the late Mary Armide, one of the most 
prominent folk singers in Ethiopia, has captured in the following lyrics one of 
the justifications often heard from such individuals:   
!"#$ %&'( )*"+,- %&'. 
/012 345( /012 345( 
,$ "6( ,$ "6 4#7 $28459 (:; %*$<) 
Islam arede, Kristian arede, 
Chegwarana gubet, chegwarana gubet, 
Yam siga, yam siga, belahu minalebet. 
Whether Muslim slaughtered or Christian slaughtered, 
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Stomach and liver, stomach and liver; 
That is meat; this meat: nothing happened - both I ate. (Mary 
Armide, my translation). 
I believe that those groups or individuals who do not observe the taboo or dare 
to break it may merit investigation in their own right, but this study deals 
primarily with those Christians and Muslims for whom food is an issue, and 
despite their differences in dietary/culinary rules with their Muslim and 
Christian neighbors respectively manage to keep interacting in food contexts. It 
should be clear, however, that this is not a purely comparative study of 
religions or intra-religious denominations. It simply has focused on Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christianity and Ethiopian Islam for whom meat serves as a 
separating agent in their socio-cultural encounters. The attempt to study the 
two religions and their food culture is not also directed at questions regarding 
the truth or falsity of doctrinal beliefs (Bell 1997) but rather at the socio-
cultural dynamics of the two religions. Finally, unless I mention otherwise, I 
sometimes use in this study the short form “Christians” which refers to 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christians.   
 
Significance of the Study 
The decision made in this study to taking narratives related to food in general 
and to the knife and meat in particular is based on the assumption that 
important stories are encapsulated in seemingly banal food-related utterances, 
routine food practices and everyday communicative discourses. Especially in a 
predominantly oral society like Ethiopia, oral narratives and discourses reflect 
the collective consciousness of the society and give vital socio-cultural 
information. Hence, firstly, this study, as an inquiry into the food culture and 
its implication for religious identity and interreligious encounters in the 
country, demonstrates the potentialities of food as not only an object of study 
but also an inquiry tool and lens for cultural and interdisciplinary studies in 
Ethiopia.  
Secondly, in today’s world where interreligious and intergroup tensions 
have become a daily routine, it seems high time to look for indigenous 
mechanisms of managing diversity and difference at a local level. In view of 
this, the current study attempts to show how Orthodox Christianity and Islam 
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in Ethiopia have transformed over centuries the barriers of a religious food 
taboo for commensality into creative food context that is marked by reciprocal 
hospitality and mutual understanding of (dietary/culinary) differences.            
Thirdly, this study has attempted to ferret out and outline some virtues 
and functions of the system built on this religious food taboo. It is hoped that 
such an attempt demonstrates the potential of some indigenous, socio-cultural 
and religious practices that are often rejected on the basis of certain religious as 
well as secular orthodoxies. This, however, should not be equated to accepting 
blindly some perceived functions of outdated and ‘inherently harmful’ 
practices, which also have no viable significance to current societies.  
Finally, as an endeavor in the realm of cultural studies, this study is 
hoped to be an input for cultural policy making and cultural political decisions 
as regards the relationship between cultural, religious and traditional norms vis-
à-vis secular and religious views in the face of an ever-increasing change and 
transformation of societies, cultures and religions.   
 
Theoretical Background and Methodology 
It may be already clear from the foregoing that this study is a “micro-level 
research” that principally addresses socio-cultural contexts such as wedding 
feast where meat serves as a converging and diverging agent in Christian-
Muslim encounters. It is an interdisciplinary research that attempts to unravel 
the narratives of food and culinary tools and their implication in interreligious 
encounters in the country by weaving together various disciplines.  
 
Theoretical Framework  
The study grapples with a widely observed food taboo that is intertwined with 
the rather complex notion of religion as belief system, and as cultural system 
(Geertz 1973). Tackling such complexity with a single theory is obviously 
impossible. Thus, “it is necessary also to consider the philosophies and 
cosmologies of the sign that shape religious practices and narratives in their 
indigenous contexts of performance” (Yelle 2013, 1). To this end, theories and 
approaches from various fields are used as analytical frameworks and models 
that include affect theory, communication accommodation theory, semiotic and 
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narrative analysis, and critical discourse analysis. As Warren Belasco (1999, 
31) notes, “studying food is interdisciplinary. To study food you must integrate 
data and analyses from a wide variety of disciplines, from agronomy, literature, 
and nutrition and to economics, biology, and history.” Hence, the study takes 
food and its socio-cultural contexts as well as its discursive realms as text by 
involving people who interact in such contexts and whose life is affected by the 
discourses. So, it goes further “from texts to utterances”14 as Cultural Studies 
should do to analyze the utterances of persons as social actors, for which 
critical discourse analysis serves as an exploratory tool (Barker 2002, 40). In 
other words, the research attempts to combine various interpretative 
frameworks in order not only to describe but also unravel what people say and 
do in relation to their identity (Billig 1997 cited in Barker 2002, 40) through 
semiotics and narrative analysis (Saukoo 2003) as principal analytical tools. 
The overall theoretical ground for this research revolves around food, identity 
and intergroup space. Below, I have attempted to summarize the theoretical 
backgrounds from various fields as regards food under three conceptual 
rubrics: (1) food as an identity marker; (2) food as a sign system; and (3) food 
contexts as uniting and separating cultural spaces. 
1. Culinary and dietary practices play role in individual and group 
identities (Barclay 2010; De Garine 2001; Lyons 2007; McGee 2011; Meigs 
1997; Mintz and Du Bois 2002; Nukaga 2008). Several studies assert the socio-
cultural implication of food to identity and identity construction. Barclay 
(2010, 586) underscores, for instance, that what we eat and with whom we eat 
play an important role in the process of inclusion and exclusion in our 
interpersonal and intergroup relations. Scholars also treat how culinary and 
dietary practices can determine and shape individuals’ and groups’ identities. 
According to Lyons (2007, 250) cuisine creates, reproduces and modifies 
identities, and we learn since childhood to not only distinguish which flavors, 
textures, colors, and smells of food are culturally and socially acceptable to eat !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"%!!!Barker (2002, 40) says, “Cultural studies has been lopsided in its concentration on texts and 
in its general failure to analyse the utterances of living speaking subjects using the tools of 
linguistic analysis. However, once we take on board the significance of practice in the 
operations of language, then it is clear that we need to analyse the utterances of persons as 
social actors.”!
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but also to determine “who can or cannot be involved in food preparation and 
consumption […].” Palmer (1998, as cited in Lyons, 2007) emphasized that 
such “complex practice inhibits or enables interaction between different social 
groups depending on their mutual regard for the other’s culinary practices.” 
This in turn nuances the distinction between one’s own food and food culture 
vis-à-vis the food and food culture of others, which makes food in general a 
social marker (De Garine 2001, 487). These all suggest that food is an 
important socio-cultural element on which individual and group identity can be 
constructed and through which inter-personal and inter-group distinctions can 
be maintained, according to which food-based identities can also emerge. 
Mintz and Du Bois (2002, 109) comment, “[l]ike all culturally defined material 
substances used in the creation and maintenance of social relationships, food 
serves both to solidify group membership and to set groups apart.” In line with 
this, the rules associated with food and eating “unite [and] apparently separate 
diverse objects and organisms” (Meigs 1997, 95), resulting in inclusion and 
exclusion based on dietary/culinary identities. 
2. Food and its socio-cultural contexts are signs and systems of 
communication (Barthes [1961] 1997; Bentley 2001; Danesi 2004; Grassi 
2013; McGee 2001; Monatanari 2004; Watson and Caldwell 2005). Food can 
also be a tool for unraveling the interwoven threads of social, religious and 
cultural aspects of a society. Roland Barthes ([1961] 1997) notes that food “is 
not only a collection of products that can be used for statistical or nutritional 
studies. It is also, and at the same time, a system of communication, a body of 
images, protocol of usages, situations, and behavior”. Among other things, 
food is used stereotypically as a template for evaluating other people and other 
cultures (Danesi 2004, 199). Louis Marin (cited in McGee 2001) states, “all 
cookery involves a theological, ideological, political, and economic operation 
by the means of which a nonsignified edible foodstuff is transformed into a 
sign/body that is eaten.” This sign thus can also bring up another sign in a 
Peircean model of signs as processual: “signs give rise to new signs, in an 
unending process of signification” (Keane 2003, 413), making food in general 
a sign system. More precisely, Barthes ([1961] 1997, 25) notes, “[f]ood serves 
as a sign [… and] is also charged with signifying the situation in which it is 
used.” In addition, around food and its socio-cultural context are discourses 
! #%!
and narratives - texts – that can be analyzed in literary and cultural studies. As 
McGee (2001, 11) asserts, “[f]or all cultures, food and diet have functioned as 
conveyers of meaning both to those within the group and to outsiders. In this 
sense, the meal itself can be treated as a text: communicating its context, as 
well as its specific meaning, it gives us a reading of more than itself.” Elspeth 
Probyn, for her part says, “food and eating can be analytically productive foci 
in the examination of multicultural dynamics” (Probyn 1998, cited in 
Gunaratnam 2001). In short, beneath food and the food culture of a society, 
there are various meaningful elements that tell more about the dynamics of that 
society. What Bentley (2001, 180) states sounds tailor-made here: “Food, at the 
base of civilization, contains deep, multi-layered meanings.” This makes food 
“[...] an important and endlessly fascinating lens for social and cultural analysis 
– not only for anthropologists, but also for scholars of history, literature, 
cultural studies, political economy, and public policy” (Watson and Caldwell 
2005).   
In addition, food is an important factor in human communication and 
relationships. This study views food as a “system of communication” (Barthes 
[1961] 1997) and it takes the notion of “principle of reciprocity” (Levi-Strauss 
1949) or “mechanisms of reciprocity” (Komter 2007) as theoretical background 
to elucidate the function of food in the reciprocal hospitality witnessed on 
socio-cultural events such as weddings in Ethiopia. Such function, as a 
corollary of religious food taboo, is underpinned by Robert Merton’s work on 
the manifest and latent functions of socio-cultural practices. That is, while 
“manifest functions” refer to “objective consequences for a specified unit and 
[are] intended”, “latent functions” refer to “unintended and unrecognized 
consequences of the same order” (Merton 1968, 117). This study maintains that 
the taboo of avoiding meat slaughtered by people of the other faith has, among 
other things, a “latent function” of reciprocal hospitality.  
3. Space unites and separates us (Lawson 2001; Lamont and Molnar 
2002). Broadly, “[s]pace is both that which brings us together and 
simultaneously that which separates us from each other” (Lawson 2001, 6). 
The spaces that Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia share and through which 
they bargain their religious identity can be explained by the seemingly 
paradoxical notion of boundaries, which “are conditions not only for separation 
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and exclusion, but also for communication, exchange, bridging, and inclusion 
[…]” (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 181). In addition, central to the interreligious 
interactions in food contexts is whether the item is “sacred” or not for each 
religion. In other words, we see “the hidden presence of the sacred” (Foucault 
1967) in the inclusion (unity) and exclusion (separation) process that results in 
symbolic boundaries, which “are conceptual distinctions made by social actors 
to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space” (Lamont and 
Molnar 2002, 168). Noëlle McAfee, in her study of Julia Kristeva’s claim 
about religious food taboos, says, “religions have served such purposes, setting 
up ways to cleanse or purify” (McAfee 2004, 49). Evidently, religion is one of 
the factors that lead to distinction of clean and unclean food, what (not) to eat, 
with whom (not) to eat, etc the examination of which “allows us to capture the 
dynamic dimensions of social relation” (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 168). A 
case in point can be attempting to “capture” the emotional experiences and 
space negotiations of individuals from different religious groups during their 
encounters that involve food or eating. For example, the notion of 
hierarchization related to [food] disgust (Miller 1997; Ahmed 2004) explains 
the power relation that is manifest in interreligious relations because of the 
affective experiences of individuals, such as disgust, caused by tabooed food. 
Therefore, the paradoxical notion food contexts as uniting and separating 
spaces underpin the various analyses and interpretations of the cultural and/or 
religious system built on the taboo under question.       
 
Methodology 
I have conducted this study by weaving data from (personal and collective) 
lived experiences, (religious) texts, (popular) discourses and socio-cultural 
contexts, the interplay of which is a “trademark of the cultural studies approach 
to empirical research” (Saukko 2003, 11; see also Pickering 2008). In order to 
critically examine the relationship between religious groups in a specific socio-
cultural setting, this research employs qualitative methodology, which aims to 
deeply study a phenomenon in a specific and definable setting, involving group 
of people or communities (Holliday 2002, 37). In other words, the basic 
questions that this research has posed require qualitative rather than 
quantitative methodology. The phenomena that are envisaged to be studied in 
! #'!
this research are qualitatively researchable such that they involve individuals’ 
and groups’ beliefs, attitudes and perceptions, which define their interactions. 
Thus, qualitative methodology allows studying such elements in the encounters 
between the Christian and Muslim communities in order to understand what 
individuals make of their encounters in connection with their respective food 
norms.  
The study focuses on wedding feasts because, as far as my lived 
experience is concerned, wedding feasts are the most effective food contexts 
where Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia negotiate their religious identity. 
More importantly, due to the religious food taboo in question, they are socio-
cultural events at which one observes the converging and diverging roles of 
food in the encounters (food-induced unity (Meigs 1997) and food-induced 
separation) between the two groups. As Hilda Kuper comments, such “[a]n 
event can be interpreted as a series of interactions between people interested 
and involved in a particular issue. Their intensity may be similar or divergent, 
with divergencies of different degrees ranging from almost compatibility to 
total and irreconcilable opposition” (Kuper 2003, 252). Therefore, wedding 
feasts, as socio-cultural events, have been interpreted as settings as to see this 
apparently paradoxical “intensity” of interaction between the two religious 
groups.     
Furthermore, obtaining in-depth data from an area and a group of people 
who were easy to get to and hospitable to the inquiry (Stake 1995, 24) was 
opted. As Stake further notes, when we have a research question, puzzlement, a 
need for general understanding and want to get insight into a question, we 
study a particular case, of which there are three types: intrinsic, collective, and 
instrumental (26). Bahir Dar city was selected to serve as an instrumental case 
whose attributes, traits or patterns with regard to the research problem can be 
extended to other cases. This, however, does not mean that the primary 
objective was to extend the study to other cases: “Case study research is not 
sampling research. We do not study a case primarily to understand other cases. 
Our first obligation is to understand this one case” (27). Therefore, if the 
research findings become instrumental and applicable elsewhere, which I 
believe so, it will be much more relevant; however, if they fail to be 
instrumental, then they can still be socio-anthropologically important in their 
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own right in the shape of “a tale of two religious communities” and their 
interreligious encounters in food contexts in the research area.   
 
The research site 
The Amhara Regional State (fig. 1) is found generally in the northwestern part 
of Ethiopia bordered by Sudan to the west, Benishangul Regional State to the 
west and southwest, Tigray Regional State to the north and Afar Regional State 
to the East. Its capital, Bahir Dar City, is found some 570 km away from Addis 
Ababa. It is located in the southern shore of Lake Tana (source of the Blue 
Nile) after which it is named Bahir Dar (“sea shore”). According to the latest 
2007 census, the Amhara Regional State is populated predominantly with 
about 14.25 million Orthodox Christians (82.5) and with nearly 3 million 
(17.2%) Muslim inhabitants while Bahir Dar City, officially known as Bahir 
Dar Special-Zone, is a home for 220,344 people out of which 89.72% are 
Orthodox Christians and 8.47% are Muslims (FDRE Population Census 
Commission 2008).  
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Common misconceptions about the research area  
!"#$ ,&'=- %>4#$ %?1. 
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Islam yaredewun aybelam Amara; 
Endatkelakeyign kene Omar gara. 
Amhara does not eat what Muslims slaughter, 
Please don’t mix me up with the group of Omar.  
(My translation) 
Told from a viewpoint of a Christian, referred to in the lyric as ‘Amhara’, this 
oral poem documents a cultural and religious food norm in the society’s 
consciousness. In addition, the poem reveals15 a general misconception about a 
people in Ethiopia and especially in the geographical area where the current 
study was conducted. It is a confusing misnomer, which tends to equate the 
Amhara ethnic group to one particular religion, i.e. Christianity although 
“Muslims and Christians have shared for centuries many aspects of the overall 
Ethiopian culture, such as belonging to a common ethnic-linguistic group […]” 
(Ahmed 1992, 20). As Donald N. Levine in his seminal Wax and Gold: 
Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture writes, “[t]o all Amhara except 
a small minority who are Muslim, the name of their ethnic group is 
synonymous with Christian. The term [Amhara] signifies Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christian […]” (Levine 1972, 78). This is also evident from another saying 
obtained from an informant who remembered what her grandmother used to 
say when the latter faced something confusing and mixed-up, which itself is 
expressed in another mix-up of taking Amhara as a synonym of Christian and 
an antithesis of Islam:  
$H I=J.  
!"#$ K?1= L'MNJ9 
Minu tawko, 
Islam k’Amaraw tedebalko. 
Nothing is distinguishable;  
Muslim is mixed up with Amhara.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"&!!It might also be interesting to note that the point of view of this poem is suggestive of the 
notion of power relations manifested on food avoidance that this study addresses in the coming 
chapters. For example, ‘Amhara [Christian] does not eat what Muslims slaughtered’ shows the 
avoidance by the Christians of the food of Muslims, while it simultaneously makes one wonder 
whether there is a comparable popular saying/poem from a Muslim perspective. !
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As ironically mixed up as the saying itself sounds, it should also be noted that 
the use of such misnomer is prevalent not only among the Christians but also 
among Muslims themselves who yet again ironically “regard all the Amhara as 
Christians, even though some Muslims belonged to that ethnic group”16 
(Ahmed 1992, 20; see also Ramos 2013, 21-22). In fact, as wrong and 
awkward as it may sound, in addition to the popular poem presented as 
epigraph above, there are also some popular expressions that appear to take it 
for granted. For example, one could often hear a linguistic usage as “Is he 
Amhara or Muslim?” “Is she Oromo or Christian?” Such linguistic and literary 
usages document and reveal the historical misconceptions related to the 
Amhara-Tigre ethnic groups and the religions attached to them. It is all the 
more surprising to see the use of this same misnomer even among scholars17.  
It is, however, an undeniable fact that the current Amhara Regional State 
along with today’s Tigray Regional State and today’s Eritrea is historically 
referred to as “Christian highland” an appellation that arguably subsumes the 
Muslim inhabitants of this historically important region for both Christianity 
and Islam since the first Christian-Muslim encounter in the 7th Century, i.e. 
around 615 to be more precise. Indeed, this region is the core of Christianity in 
the history of the country as well of the EOTC. However, it has been arguably 
over-emphasized to the extent of blurring the existence of a considerable 
number of Muslim Ethiopians who belong to the same ethnic groups as their 
Christian counter parts in this region. Not only today, but even in the past, as 
David Robinson notes, “[i]n the highlands there were close significant Muslim 
minorities who spoke the same languages and shared much of the culture of the 
Christian ruling classes” (Robinson 2004a, 113). Though predominantly 
populated by Semitic-speaking Christians, the area has thus always been a 
home for people from different religious backgrounds. As Ahmed precisely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"'! ! !There is also a tendency among some to equate Oromos with Islam despite the fact that 
many Christians belong to the Oromo ethnic group. Even in the current Oromiya Regional 
Government alone, the number of Christians and Muslims is fairly equal. According to the 
2007 census report, there are 13.2 million (48.7%) Christians and 12.8 million (47.5%) 
Muslims (Population Census Commission 2008), though such population size by region does 
not necessarily reveal the ethno-religious composition.   !"(!!!Getnet Tamene, presenting the unique dietary laws of the Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, 
for example, writes: “[l]ike the Jews of old an Amhara [sic] prefers never to eat with any man 
[sic] who is not a Christian and like them he will also fast twice a week” (Tamene 1998, 103). !!
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writes, “[…] in spite of the preponderance of Christianity as a state religion and 
the dominance of the Semitic-speaking […] Abyssinia had historically been a 
heterogeneous society consisting of non-Semitic pagan and Muslim elements 
of equal historical standing” (Ahmed 1992, 16; see also Ahmed 2004, 38-39; 
Abbink 1998, 119; Abdussamad H. Ahmad 2000). Therefore, labeling this 
region today in what sounds to be a blurring adjective “Christian highland” 
seems neither appropriate to the contemporary politico-religious reality of the 
country nor inviting for socio-cultural studies of the interaction among diverse 
groups in general and between the Christian and Muslim religious communities 
in particular.  
Generally, research and publication on Islam in Ethiopia has shown 
progress in geographical as well as thematic coverage on such areas as central, 
southern and eastern Ethiopia, specifically on places like Wallo, Jimma, Arsi, 
Bale and Harar (Ahmed 2009, 454). However, in Ahmed’s review as well as in 
my attempt to survey relatively recent literature on Islam in North Ethiopia, the 
Amhara region (save Wollo) is conspicuous by its absence except in a couple 
of studies (Ahmad 2000; Ramos 2013). Therefore, I do not want to follow the 
same trend that tends to ignore the Muslim population of this region only on 
account of statistical figures or some established beliefs that this region is 
predominantly Christian while it is a home for many Muslim Ethiopians in 
areas such as Wollo, Shewa, Gojjam, Gondar and Tigray (Abbink 2007, 67; 
Abbink 1998, 119; Ahmad 2000; Ahmed 2004, 38-39; 1992, 20; Ramos 2013, 
21-22)18.  
On the other hand, it has also become common among scholars as well as 
activists to depict Islam in Ethiopia almost as an antithesis of the Semitic-
speaking Christian Abyssinia, an assumption that presumably ignores again not 
only the presence of many Muslim Semitic-speaking but also Christian non-
Semitic-speaking peoples all over the country. Trimingham (1952, 101) wrote, 
“[…] Islam’s force of expansion amongst pagans in Ethiopia was helped by the 
fact that it was the religion hostile to the Amharic race [sic] who lorded it over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!")! ! !For a review of European travelers’ and scholars’ accounts on the presence of Islam in 
Ethiopia in general and in the so-called Christian highland such as Tigray, Gondar and Wollo 
since the 16th to the 19th centuries, see Ahmed (1992, 25-28).!
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them.” Such a tendency prevails among scholars primarily because of the fact 
that the Christian Abyssinian Empire belonged to the Semitic-speaking 
Amhara and Tigre peoples. However, one cannot downplay the use of religion 
as a political instrument in Ethiopia. For example, while the Orthodox 
Christian Church was used as “an embodiment of imperial legitimacy and 
official nationalism” (Gnamo 2002, 105; see also Ayele 1975, 80), Islam, for 
some Ethiopians, was used “as an ideology of resistance”19 (Braukamper 2004, 
3). But, the implication of such discourse overtime creates overgeneralizations 
and misconceptions to the extent of equating certain ethnic groups, namely 
Amhara and Tigre, with a single religion, i.e. Christianity, by subsuming, if not 
ignoring or neglecting, a considerable number of Muslims among these ethnic 
groups. Therefore, especially in today’s Ethiopia, whose political 
administration is based on ethnic identity, the issue of ethnicity and religion 
should be carefully examined20 not to confuse to the extent of taking one as a 
synonym for the other when speaking of either. Moreover, whether the Muslim 
population is a significant minority in today’s Amhara Regional State in 
general and in Bahir Dar City in particular, how the two groups (the Christian 
majority and the Muslim minority) interact with each other at socio-cultural 
events, I believe, simply merits investigation.  
      
Research participants and data generating instruments 
This study took Orthodox Christian and Muslim participants who were 
purposely selected to represent the following groups: Religious fathers/learned 
men, local elites, people who previously organized a wedding, and various 
individuals from different age, gender, and educational backgrounds.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"*! !See also Ayele (1975, 87); Carmichael (1996, 170-1); Desplat and Østebø (2013, 5-6); 
Gnamo (2002, 106-7); For the attitudes of the Christian emperors and the lowland Muslims’ 
resistance in the 13th and 14th centuries, see Robinson (2004a, 114); also Ayele (1975). 
 #+!!As Ahmed (1992, 19) comments, for example, on the 19th Century power struggle between 
“Amhara-Tigrean paladins of Christianity and the Yajju Oromo Champions of Islam”, two 
issues must be re-examined: the exact role of ethnic solidarity and of religious loyalty in the 
power struggle. In addition, Sven Rubenson suggest, “[f]actors other than loyalty to a particular 
faith may have been decisive in the conflicts and rivalries of the time” (Rubenson 1976 in 
Ahmed 1992, 19)          !
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The main empirical data generating instruments were one-to-one and 
group interviews. Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were used on various 
topics related to the research questions from informants “who for various 
reasons are either very effective at relating cultural practices or simply more 
willing than most to take time to do so” (Davies 2002, 71). Purposive and 
snowball sampling techniques were employed in order to find more resourceful 
persons on the subject under discussion until fairly detailed and sufficient 
information for analysis was generated. It should also be mentioned that 
relevant information was obtained from casual conversations and random group 
interviews depending on the informant type and situation. Interviews took place 
in the local official language Amharic using interview guide questions (see 
Appendix 1). Most interviews were tape-recorded after having duly requested 
the informed conscent of each informant. Data in general were obtained at 
different phases of the study in accordance with the schedule of my mobility 
among the three Universities in three countries (Italy, Germany and Brazil). 
Thus they were conducted in January and February 2013, August and 
September 2013, and finally in July and August 2014. The data were analyzed 
and interpreted by listening to each audio material both for a holistic grasp of 
the whole interview and for specific narratives that stand out to be quoted 
verbatim for illuminating a theme under discussion/analysis. In addition, 
relevant literary and religious texts were critically reviewed. Legends, oral 
poetry and sayings obtained from informants constitute a substantial proportion 
of the analysis and discussion of various themes of the study while published 
materials from dictionaries to the Bible and the Qur’an were also consulted as 
reference and supplementary materials. Particularly, religious texts (in Ethiopic 
and Amharic) that treat food and religion were very useful throughout. As 
regards oral literature and popular sayings, they were all collected from 
informants unless published sources are mentioned.  
 
Methodological disclaimer  
In the current ethno-political climate of the country, historical designations 
attributed to certain ethnic groups are being questioned. For example, some 
non-Amhara ethnic groups often pose the very basic question of what it means 
to be an Ethiopian. And they argue that the Amhara (and Tigre) cultures as well 
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as Orthodox Christianity had for long time been taken as an epitome of the 
Ethiopian cultural identity (see Adamu 2013, 20; Habecker 2012, 1214-15; 
Mains 2004, 342). I, however, do not believe that the culture of one particular 
ethnic group necessarily epitomizes the very diverse Ethiopian culture. This, 
however, is not to deny, especially in food studies, the role of regional and 
ethnic food culture in the construction of national identity (see Kifleyesus 
2006). But, the reason for conducting the current study in this region is purely 
methodological. For example, this site is more appropriate for my inquiry in 
terms of my linguistic and cultural competence, not to mention the fact that I 
have lived in this area for more than a decade which effectively helped me to 
have access to information mandatory in qualitative research, if not in any kind 
of inquiry. Thus, if it were not for methodological ease, the same study could 
have been done in other regions, where the custom of avoiding meat 
slaughtered by people of the other faith anyway serves as separating factor for 
Christians and Muslims. In my lived experience and as the available scant 
literatures suggests (Abbink 2007; Braukamper 1982; Carmichael 1996, 2004; 
Ficquet 2006), the topic I am dealing with (the Christian-Muslim interaction in 
food contexts) is common almost through out the country.  
Therefore, any generalization or conclusion I have drawn about the 
Christian-Muslim encounter in Ethiopia based on the narratives from this 
research site should not be seen as equating the Amhara culture as necessarily 
“Ethiopian” in the old sense, which other ethnic groups are critical of today. On 
the other hand, when I study the food narratives related to religion in this area, 
ethnicity was not my concern. In this connection, it is important to note that the 
ethno-religious characteristic of most peoples in Ethiopia is asymmetrical 
except among Afar, Somali, Argoba, and Harari ethnic groups, whose ethnic 
identity is symmetrical with their religion (Islam). In the case of such ethnic 
groups, one may draw a maxim: “Tell me your ethnic identity, and I will tell 
you your religious one.” However, the religious identity of many of the ethnic 
majorities such as Orormo, Amhara, Tigre, etc, as researches suggest (Abbink 
1998; Adamu 2014; Ahmed 1992), is not symmetrical to ethnic identity. Thus, 
one can find a Muslim or a Christian Amhara.  
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2 
 
Conceptualizing Commensality and 
Interreligious Encounters in Ethiopia 
 
This chapter first summarily highlights the scarce literature on food and 
interreligious relations in general and on Christian-Muslim encounters in 
particular in Ethiopia and elsewhere. It then attempts to conceptualize how 
food contexts at wedding feasts function as a cause of reciprocal hospitality 
between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia to negotiate their religious 
identities.  
There is a lacuna in the gastro-criticism of Sub-Saharan African 
foodways in general. Western researchers lack of interest in studying them and 
fail to recognize African cookery as cuisine (Lyons 2007). Lyons points out 
that even those who researched the African cuisine, such as the British social 
anthropologist Jack Goody, hypothesize that “unlike Eurasian cultures, sub-
Saharan African societies (except highland Ethiopia) lacked well-developed 
social hierarchies and thus failed to produce ‘haute’ cuisines.” (Goody21 1982; 
2006 in Lyons 2007, 348 parenthesis in original). Here, though “highland 
Ethiopia” appears to be presented as “exception” by Goody, some early 
European travelers to Ethiopia, as observed by Abbebe Kifleyesus, viewed the 
country’s food culture with their Eurocentric and thus condescending eyes: 
“The food of the Abyssinians...in no way resembles normal, proper food and 
the natives are not familiar with intelligent methods of preparing meals. In fact, 
many Abyssinians do not really know how to cook and eat or even how to sit 
correctly at a table,” wrote Henry Salt (1814 cited in Kifleyesus 2006, 30). 
Such European travelers, Kifleyesus comments, “failed to appreciate Ethiopian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#"! ! ! Goody also goes further in depicting “sub-Saharan cookery as bland and 
undifferentiated products that serve only to fill the belly”, an assumption criticized by many 
scholars (see Lyons 2007, 348). !
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life because they measured it largely in terms of European civilisation” (2006, 
30). In modern times, the disinterest in Ethiopian food culture seems to have 
continued so much so that it has barely won attention as a research topic. As a 
result, an inquiry on its culinary and dietary culture in general and its 
implication for interreligious encounters in particular is lacking except some 
endeavors in recent times by a few scholars, whose works are briefly reviewed 
in the coming sections. 
Particularly, the role of food for Christian-Muslim encounters, seldom 
has been a subject of interest by researchers probably in part because for some 
“food is not an issue for Christians” (Barclay 2010)22 a remark that seems on 
the surface to resonate with the New Testament23 but which subsumes all 
domains of Christianity into one box. However, some research has been done 
on the food etiquettes of Islam elsewhere (Bankhiera 1999; 1995; Kanafani-
Zahar, 1997; Rodinson 1965); on the Jewish dietary laws, i.e. the Kashruth 
(Douglas 1972, 72-79; Meyer-Rochow and Benno 2009), and on Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christianity (Beyene 1994; Ficquet 2006; Lyons 2007; Pawlikowski 
1972; Ullendorf 1968; Zellelew, 2014). However, very few have researched in 
detail the implications of these dietary cultures for interreligious relations with 
some exceptions (Bankhiera 1995; Beyene 1994; Finger 2007; Ficquet 2006; 
Kanafani-Zahar 1997; Rosenblum 2010). Katherine E. Ulrich has also studied 
discourses among Buddhist, Hindu and Jain dietary polemics in South India 
and its implication for religious identity construction and interreligious rivalry 
(Ulrich 2007). Here, Louis Dumont’s Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System 
and Its Implications is a seminal work that treats the role of food in the 
different castes of India (Dumont 1970). Apart from the caste24 system, there 
appear to be some parallels in the dynamics of social groups in India discussed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!##!!John Barclay basically argues that Christianity should forge food taboos, like avoiding 
meat consumption, to reduce global warming that is caused by meat production (Barclay 
2010). #$!!For example,!Mathew 15:11: “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but 
that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man.” See also Romans: 14, 1-22.!#%! ! For the role of food avoidance in socio-economic status in Southern Ethiopia, see!
Braukamper (1982); also Pankhurst (1999); Kifleyesus (2006).!
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by Dumont and of religious groups in Ethiopia particularly at wedding feasts 
by virtue of the paradoxical role of food as separating and uniting factor.  
In addition, Hyung-Jun Kim (1998), in describing the Muslim-Christian 
relations in one village in Java, discusses the exchange of food during holidays 
between Christians (Protestants and Catholics) and Muslims as a symbol of 
harmony between the two religious groups. Particularly, Kim observes that the 
revivalism of Islam in Indonesia in the late 1970s and 80s, however, negatively 
impacted the food exchange or reciprocity between the two religious groups in 
the Javanese village (Kim 1998). We cannot apply or draw a comparison 
between trends in a small village in Java (for example where Christianity 
barely had a century old history during the study and for whom food is not an 
issue, see Kim 1998, 72) with that of Ethiopia (where the two religions’ 
perennial co-existence has been tested by many conflicts and for both of whom 
food, particularly meat, is an issue and a separating factor in their encounter in 
food context). Kim’s study, as admitted by him/herself, cannot be generalized 
to show the Muslim-Christian relations even in rural Java. But in certain 
measures it not only illuminates the study of the Christian-Muslim encounters 
in Ethiopia in general but also summons up the decreasing trends of their 
meetings in food contexts in the face of the phenomenon of the so-called the 
‘religious return’ in general and of growing global puritan Islamic revivalism 
in particular.          
 
The Study of Food and (Religious) Identity in Ethiopia   
Except for some scholars making a passing reference to it, food as a religious 
identity marker in Ethiopia has rarely been a subject of research. Hussein 
Ahmed has slightly touched upon the issue of food and religion (Ahmed 1992, 
20-21). Having listed what he regarded as prejudices among Christians and 
Muslims against each other, he stated, “[e]ach of the two communities has a 
taboo against eating the flesh of animals slaughtered by the other” (Ahmed 
1992, 21). He argues that “such official and popular prejudices” have been 
strengthening the barrier between the Christian and Muslim communities such 
that they have led today to concentration on the themes of confrontation 
(Ahmed 1992, 20-21). However, Ahmed seems to generalize by saying that 
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their contact has little “developed into a mutual, enduring awareness of each 
other’s importance or the need for coexistence and reciprocal tolerance” and 
“Muslims and Christians have traditionally lacked mutual understanding of 
each other’s way of life” (Ahmed 1992, 20).  
Similarly, in Tim Carmichael’s studies (1996; 2004), an Arabic 
document luqtat tarikhiah (‘Historical Notes’), which was said to have been 
circulating in Harar in 1994 and that treats the spread of Christianity in 
Ethiopia and the role of Harar in the history of Islam in the country, 
corroborate Ahmed’s view. The said document recounts that Christians and 
Muslims “avoid each other because of unfounded mutual aversion. For 
example, even though the Quran does not forbid it, Muslims do not eat meat 
slaughtered by Christians, nor marry Christian women; and the Christians also 
exhibit fanatical behavior such as washing or destroying dishes that a Muslim 
has touched” (see Carmichael 1996, 173; 2004, 245-250). Moreover, F. Peter 
Ford, in discussing the Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia, characterizes 
this taboo as barrier and an example of the lack of knowledge of one group 
about the other’s faith (see Ford 2008, 61).  However, I argue that contrary to 
such accounts on this custom with regard to the Christian-Muslim relation, the 
avoidance of meat of animals slaughtered according to the other religion’s 
ritual might make commensality difficult but not deter the two groups from 
converging in food contexts and “eating together” in many parts of Ethiopia. 
To wit, it looks on the surface, as is observed by the writer of the said 
document and the other two scholars, that the two groups seem to “avoid each 
other” because of meat. If we re-examine some of their contacts in food 
contexts such as at wedding feasts, which this study is trying to do, what 
appears to be “prejudice” or “mutual aversion” or barrier would rather sound a 
blessing in disguise for their relations. It rather is a practical example of 
reciprocal hospitality punctuated by a mutual respect for dietary differences of 
one’s religious Other. Not to deny the presence of prejudices, if not mutual 
aversions, in intercultural relations in general and in Christian-Muslim relations 
in Ethiopia in particular; my point is that the “official and popular prejudices” 
themselves merit investigation as they allow us to see the dynamics of the 
groups’ encounters, for example, in food contexts. In this connection, it is 
interesting to quote Donald N. Levine, who wrote in his Greater Ethiopia:  
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Through […] various forms of interaction Ethiopians of 
diverse traditions became acquainted and developed customs 
for relating to one another. If their images of each other often 
contained pejorative stereotypes, such stereotypes were 
nonetheless invaluable for providing modes of reciprocal 
orientation that enabled them to trade, fight, worship, and 
negotiate with one another (Levine 2000, 46).     
The degree of contact in general among Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia is 
a scarcely surprising phenomenon. Alain Gascon and Bertrand Hirsch, for 
example, studied sacred spaces as places of religious confluence in Ethiopia, 
which sheds some light on the extent of the culture of contact and confluence 
between different religious groups sharing not only a socio-cultural setting like 
wedding feast but also a common space even in shrines (Gascon and Hirsch 
1992; see also Desplat 2005). Similarly, Jon Abbink’s Transformations of 
Islam and Communal Relations in Wollo, Ethiopia (2007) is also an important 
study in terms of showing the degree of socialization25 between Christians and 
Muslims. While Abbink describes “the taboo on eating meat of an animal 
slaughtered by someone of the other faith”! as “unambiguous dividing line” 
(2007, 72), he also remarks that, “[a]t mixed holiday celebrations and 
weddings, Christians and Muslims eat only meat slaughtered according to their 
own religious tradition. The host provides for both groups, and the system still 
works perfectly well”!(Abbink 2007, 80, footnote). This tradition, however, is 
not unique to Wollo, Abbink’s research area. Similar features of these 
“communal accommodations” are also existent in other regions/zones in the 
country at large where the two religious groups interact by duly maintaining 
and affirming their religious identity at wedding feasts through this religious 
food taboo.  
Another account on food taboos in Ethiopia is Ulrich Braukamper’s On 
Food Avoidances in Southern Ethiopia: Religious Manifestation and Socio-
Economic Relevance (1982). Braukamper studied the various food taboos 
including that which is related to the distinction between the so-called !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#&! ! Jon Abbink writes: “Muslims and Christians frequently intermarry, socialize, attend 
each other’s festivities, and undertake joint activities. Sometimes Muslims accept the 
mediation efforts of Christian priests and the healing power of Christian priests and saints, 
to whom there are also some shrines in the area. On the other hand, many Christians visit 
the tombs of Muslim shaykhs (for instance, at mawlid) and consult the shaykhs’ living 
descendants in cases of personal problems, illness, and other affliction” (Abbink 2007, 72).  !
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‘Christian/Muslim meat’. Although the title reads “Southern Ethiopia”, this 
survey is also important, for it implies that some taboos such as the avoidance 
of pork and of meat of animal slaughtered by people of other faith between 
Christians and Muslims are not limited only to the oft-thought-“pious” Amhara 
and Tigre Orthodox Christians in northern Ethiopia. Braukamper’s study is 
particularly relevant for my study by suggesting an apparently aesthetic 
reaction of Christians toward “Muslim’s meat” that shows the taboo’s 
implication as a manifestation of power relations between the two religious 
groups in the country (see Chapter 4). 
Though very short, Maxime Rodinson’s article “Les Interdiction 
Alimentaires Ethiopiennes” (Ethiopian Food Prohibitions) is another important 
survey that characterizes the diverse food taboos in Ethiopia as vague, non-
explicit and arbitrary (Rodinson 1966) while his other articles “Ghidha” 
(1965), which deals with Islamic food norms, and “Sur la question des 
‘Influences Juives’ en Éthiopie ” (1964, On the question of judaic influences 
on Ethiopia) are very useful resources in the study of food and religion in 
Ethiopia. Still among the very few studies on food, Yaqob Beyene’s “I Tabu 
Alimentari e il Cristianesimo Etiopico” (Food Taboos and Ethiopian 
Christianity) is a work that treats in fair depth the taboo particularly of 
‘Christian/Muslim meat’ in Ethiopia and in what is today Eritrea (Beyene 
1994). A relatively recent study is Abbebe Kifleyesus’ Muslims and Meals: 
The Social and Symbolic Function of Foods in Changing Socio-Economic 
Environments (2002) that looks at the symbolic and social functions of food 
among the Muslim Argoba people in Ethiopia. Kifleyesus has seen not only 
how food expresses the Argoba people’s in-group dynamics across lines of 
class and gender but also their out-group relations across ethnic and religious 
identity lines. In his other article The Construction of Ethiopian National 
Cuisine (2006), Kifleyesus also addresses the transformation and development 
of the various regional cuisines into trans-national cuisines thereby 
constructing an Ethiopian national cuisine. In the same article, he also 
discusses, among other things, the role of the preparation and consumption of 
some food items in socio-economic status and hierarchy in Ethiopia. In 
addition, two unique studies on the drinking culture in Ethiopia have also been 
done: one in southern Ethiopia (Abbink 1997) and the other in Jimma (Mains 
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2004). Using interestingly everyday discourse in rumor as a source of 
ethnographic data, the latter addresses questions of nationalism as well as of 
religious and ethnic identity in Jimma. This study also touches upon the taboo 
under question and the attitude of people as regards Muslim vis-à-vis Christian 
cooking (Mains 2004, 346), which the current study also treats (see Chapter 5). 
Apart from these studies, to my knowledge, only Eloi Ficquet, in a book 
chapter titled Flesh Soaked in Faith: Meat as a Marker of the Boundary 
between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia (2006), has studied exclusively 
the role of meat in the encounters between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia. 
An illuminating survey of the custom of avoiding eating meat slaughtered 
according to the other religion’s ritual, Ficquet’s study has discussed how meat 
marks the boundary between the two religious groups in Ethiopia by taking 
mainly historical notes and anecdotes. In this study, Ficquet also discusses how 
meat served as “a method of forced conversion” (Ficquet 2006, 47-52), which 
the current study also discusses at fair length (see Chapter 3).   
 
Unpacking the Ethiopian Commensality 
Commensality is one of the characteristics of Ethiopians’ depiction in classical 
texts. Homer, in Iliad, describes Ethiopians as “blameless” and their feasts were 
attended by Zeus, Iris and Poseidon (Hall 2002, 32). Herodotus says, “In the 
land of the Ethiopians26, it is the gods who come to men to feast with them; the 
emphasis is on commensality, a community of food that has not yet been 
disrupted” (cited in Vernant 1989, 167, my emphasis). Based on the classical 
account, for ancient Ethiopians the emphasis of commensality seems to be on 
food’s role in uniting humans with their gods while for modern Ethiopians with 
their religious and/or cultural Others. The bottom line is that commensality and 
hospitality are literally proverbial in today’s Ethiopia too where the common 
maxim abro meblat abro metetat ‘eating and drinking together’ is often a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#'!!I am aware of the fact that there is no consensus on what the classical usage of the name 
‘Ethiopia’ may refer to: for example, whether it includes areas different from or inclusive of 
the present day Ethiopia. However, given the geographic references (the Nile River, for 
example) used such as by Herodotus are clue enough to consider all or at least part of 
today’s Ethiopia in the classical sense of the term (see Bekerie 2004; Milkias 2011)   !
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defining discourse of collective mentality and a culture of sharing, which is 
further encapsulated in another food-related saying bichawun yebela bichawun 
yimotal ‘One who eats alone dies alone’. In this regard, the manner in which 
they eat: how they eat, with whom they eat, the utensils they use all can be 
objects of reflection and analysis in the study of food and the Ethiopian society. 
In the following sections, I shall briefly discuss some key concepts by 
juxtaposing their etymological roots that throw light on our understanding of 
the notion of commensality in the Ethiopian sense.  
 
From lehem to lemat   
In the strict sense of the very coinage of the word commensality, the term 
sounds short of defining the manner in which Ethiopians share food. The word 
commensality comes from the Medieval Latin commensalis wherein com means 
‘sharing’ and mensa ‘a table’ (NOAD 2008). It gives us the commonly used 
phrase ‘table sharing’. However, in the traditional Ethiopian as well as most 
African food culture, mensa (‘table’) is not commonly used for dining. 
Particularly, in the case of Ethiopia, it is lemat or messob, a circular basket 
made from woven grass that is used as table (Fig. 2). Although both are in fact 
round baskets made of woven grass and the words are thus often used 
interchangeably,27 they have different purposes: Messob mostly refers to the 
basket used to store injera whereas lemat is used as a table to serve injera. My 
interest is more on the one that acts as a substitute for table and that unites 
people together to share food. For clarity’s sake as well as for its Hebrew root 
word lehem (pl. lehemat meaning bread/injera), I use here lemat, although 
various commentators and cookbook writers on Ethiopian food culture often 
use messob, perhaps because some Ethiopian restaurants owned by the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#(!O?5 (PQ1>"R OS?5) TQ"UV !-WXV9/ O?5 (8$ ?5) GYL 8$. 8$ Z-W1 
Q[59/ 
O?5 (UV) NS$5) Z-W1 ZTQ"5 ?"AG\ G]Q ^D'- _R$ Z`N a-4 DN)N9 (Desta 
Teklewold 1962 E.C., 731). G]Q (bc4) 4de O?5 Z-W1 ?"AG\ ?B&f,2 GQg, 
b'h9 G]Q Z_!a. O?5 ,?*i. >j=$ D"k5 D-/5 B*l ZL4W E=9 (Desta 
Teklewold 1962 E.C., 816). For the preparation of lemat/messob, see Getahun and Kassu (2014, 
109).  !
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Ethiopian Diaspora have popularized messob by naming their restaurants after 
it.  
!
Figure 2: Messob/lemat market in Axum, Ethiopia  
(Picture courtesy of Afewerki Gebrehiwot: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1089459027748094&set=a.4711921395747
89.116897.100000520213865&type=1&theater ) 
Donald Levine (1972, 246) writes, “[t]raditional Amhara scoffs at what they 
regard as the excessively individualistic Western custom of sitting each person 
down to a separate place at the table and thus depriving the meal hour of what 
they feel should be its basically communal tone” (Levine 1972, 246). As much 
as the Ethiopians’ remark on the European food culture is ‘ethiocentric’, so to 
speak, it is worth noting that European travelers like Henry Salt, based on their 
Eurocentric lenses, also condescended the lack of table manner in the Ethiopian 
food culture (Kifleyesus 2006). Making comparison between culture and 
customs may not be bad in its own way, but using one’s food culture as an 
ultimate gauge to judge the food of others as inferior is a problem. In view of 
this, what I am discussing here may not be a totally different kind of 
commensality but a different degree of commensality. Both ‘table sharing’ and 
‘lemat sharing’ are commensality in the sense of sharing food and the moment 
of eating. On the surface both seem metonymies for the food that is shared. 
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Nevertheless, the degree of ‘sharing’ and what is shared in view particularly of 
the notion of space are different in the two.  
In the usual Western, notably European, sense of commensality, 
especially since the sixteenth century (Farb and Armelagos 1980), people share 
space, not the food itself. In other words, the sharing lies literally in the 
metonymy itself, i.e the table. In contrast, ‘sharing lemat’ is marked by a high 
degree of communality and intimacy in that diners share the same space and the 
same food in lemat. That is, the lemat is a space that binds people together. 
Bodies are very close to one another in a circular fashion. The common meal on 
the circular lemat at the center is a centripetal force drawing the hands of 
everyone taking part in the meal—one meal uniting many hands—resulting in 
what Humphrey Osmond coined as “sociopetal” in contrast to “sociofugal” 
space (Osmond 1959 in Lawson 2001, 140-2). Bryan Lawson (2001), for one, 
in his The Language of Space notes that round table creates a better social 
communing and togetherness among diners than a meeting table does. Even 
more precisely of the shape of the table, he writes, “the round table is the most 
sociopetal of all!” (Lawson 2001, 142). Following this, if round table brings 
people together, lemat then affords diners even a much better sociopetal setting 
to share the same food in a more communal fashion.  
Here, mention should be made about the distinct characteristics that mark 
the difference between Western and Ethiopian ‘tables’. The first one is the use 
of fingers instead of fork; and the second is the special bread called injera that 
is unique to Ethiopia. There is a physical proximity and/or contact not only 
among diners but also between diners and the food itself. That is, scooping 
with fingers allows Ethiopians to get closer to one another in small space 
around lemat and to make a “manual contact” with the food itself. But the use 
of fork “enabled Europeans to separate themselves from the eating process, 
even avoiding manual contact with their food” (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 
207). This marked difference in ‘table’ manners essentially begs the question 
of civilization following Norbert Elias’ notion of “the civilizing process” (Elias 
[1939] 2000).     
In light of “the civilizing process,” one may wrongly assume that the 
Ethiopian table manner has not evolved as much as the European has. In other 
words, the Ethiopian food culture in general and the table manner in particular 
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today appears to be still where the European was five hundreds years ago. This 
sounds to be a problematic point to extensively deal with here but an important 
one to address very briefly. First of all, one needs to look at the central thesis of 
“the civilizing process” itself particularly in connection with food and table 
manners. “The civilizing process” suggests that the change in the socio-cultural 
norms and “modes of behaviour” of Western societies has gone through a sort 
of evolutionary process so much so that it has reached its ‘adult’ and refined 
stage having evolved from and rejected several despicable manners and 
“’barbaric’ customs,” which “they esteem ‘uncivilized’ in other societies today” 
(Elias [1939] 2000, ix), or which other cultures and societies may still embrace 
to the present day. In view of this “civilizing process”, other cultures and 
societies seem to be in their ‘child’ stage as if a long “civilizing process” is yet 
awaiting them. To be more precise, as regards the use of fork, Europeans 
abandoned scooping food with their fingers and eating by sharing from the 
same plate as a result of this “process”. The primary reason for the 
transformation from finger to fork seems hygienic as many people used to 
scoop food from the same dish, but scholars downplay this factor as individuals 
already started eating from separate dishes. Elias ([1939] 2000, 107) himself 
does not accept hygiene to be a motivating factor for the change:  
Why does one really need a fork? Why is it “barbaric” and 
“uncivilized” to put food into one’s mouth by hand from 
one’s own plate? Because it is distasteful to dirty one’s 
fingers, or at least to be seen in society with dirty fingers. The 
suppression of eating by hand from one’s own plate has very 
little to do with the danger of illness, the so-called “rational” 
explanation.  
According to Farb and Armelagos (1980, 207), “[b]y the sixteenth century 
people were no longer eating from a common bowl but from their own plates, 
and since they also washed their hands before meals, their fingers were now 
every bit as hygienic as a fork would have been.” The reason, thus, is more 
about distaste than hygiene: “The fork is nothing other than the embodiment of 
a specific standard of emotions and a specific level of revulsion,” inferred Elias 
([1939] 2000, 107). Therefore, as the maxim “no accounting for taste” implies, 
a matter of taste cannot and should not be used to gauge other cultures’ manner 
of eating. In addition, neither fork nor knife superseded scooping food with 
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fingers in Ethiopia28. The two, with other utensils such as spoon, are in use side 
by side depending on the food type. For example, the Oromo specialty called 
genfo (a thick porridge made of flour such as of barley, wheat or oat) and the 
Gurage specialty kitfo (raw meat mixed with clarified butter and hot spices) are 
eaten with horn spoon while tihelo (often with similar ingredients to genfo but 
prepared in small ball shape), a specialty of Tigre people, is eaten with a 
chopstick-like stick. Therefore, without neglecting common and universal 
developmental processes in human behavior and culture, it is possible to reject 
the impertinent analysis through the lens of the so-called “civilizing process” 
that the very diverse and complex non-European food culture and norm around 
the world is in its ‘child’ stage.        
At this point, it is also interesting as well as necessary to return to and 
look once again at the role of injera vis-à-vis that of fork. A ubiquitous bread in 
almost every Ethiopian meal, injera, as some people would jokingly remark, is 
an “edible fork” that is used for scooping sauces from the lemat or the plate. It 
is a thin, flat, spongy bread (fig. 2) on which the various sauces (fig. 3) are 
poured and with a piece of which eaters scoop or sop up the sauce/s of their 
choice for each mouthful (see McCann 2009, 78-79; Osseo-Asare 2005, 110-
114; Sheen 2008). There appears to be no record when injera was invented, but 
its main ingredient teff, which is indeginous to Ethiopia, has been one of the 
ingredients in Ethiopian cooking since 3000 BC (Sheen 2008). But injera 
signifies a lot of socio-cultural meanings as I have briefly highlighted in the 
presentation of Chapter 4 in the Preview section above.  
 
From panis to companion and from injera to balinjera  
It is interesting to note the importance of staple foods and their socio-cultural 
role. The word balinjera, as Donald Levine (1972) rightly notices, coincides 
well with the English companion (Latin: com means ‘together with’ and panis 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#)!!Judged by the modern European table manners, there appears to be even a more ‘distasteful’ 
custom of using one’s finger to feed others with gursha, a mouthful of sauces wrapped with 
injera that the host tucks in their guest’s mouth, perhaps reminiscent of one’s childhood of 
being fed by parents, especially one’s mother.   !
! %)!
‘bread’. In Old French, compaignon literally means ‘one who breaks bread with 
another’, NOAD 2008).  
!<76B>4!$, Injera on lemat set out for various sauces to be poured on!
    Source: www.ethiopianspices.com (Accessed: 15 January 2015) 
!<76B>4!%,!!"#$%&!G723!H.>70B;!;.BA4;!E.!H4642.>7.8!=7;3!A.994=!'$(&("$)*F!EI3020!CJ!234!>4;4.>A34>F!
Like ‘companion’, balinjera is made out of two words bal and injera. Desta 
Tekelewold (1962 E.C.) defines the word Balinjera as:!!m,(!MN'&M(!%n(!
oQX!%'_!0'i(!-W1!%p1q!a match; colleague; one’s equal; once childhood 
friend; someone with whom one breaks injera. In addition, the Bible translation 
that has undergone considerable degree of contextualization and customization 
into the Ethiopian socio-cultural and socio-linguistic context is also another 
interesting point worthy of consideration. For example, the Last Supper is 
painted with Jesus and His disciples sitting around lemat (fig. 4) instead of 
around table while the biblical equivalent of ‘bread’ is injera in the Amharic 
Bible. If bread is the synecdoche of food in the Western culture, so is injera for 
Ethiopians, and if panis calls companion, injera calls balinjera. The Amharic 
! %*!
Bible equivalent of “Give us this day our daily bread” goes as: “Ye’ilet 
injerachinin siten zare” meaning ‘Give us this day our daily injera.’ For most 
Ethiopians, food means injera and vice versa29.  
!
Figure 5: An unknown Ethiopian artist's impression of the Last Supper [The Amharic caption 
translates: “Jesus had supper with His disciples on Thursday evening”] 
(Source: Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church – London: http://stmaryofzion.co.uk/home-
temp/4541637337 Accessed: 13 October 2014) 
Today, due to the advent of European culture in the country, lemat is used only 
in rural households, or in restaurants that serve traditionally. But still, even 
when people ‘share table’ in urban Ethiopia, they often eat from the same big 
plate or tray although in recent times breaking the injera into rolled pieces to 
serve individuals with separate plates like European dishes is becoming 
increasingly common. Even so, the very idea of commensality, however, is 
expressed not in the fact that people sit around the same table but in the fact 
that they share literally the same food by scooping from the same plate or 
lemat.  
Against the above contrastive description of table manners, the basic 
question here in this study, however, should be: Do Christians and Muslims in 
Ethiopia eat and drink together? The answer, as paradoxical as it may sound, is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!#*! !To add a personal note, when I was a child, my mother, when she had no injera in her 
messob, used to say: “Sorry kids, today we don’t have food; we only have rice/pasta for dinner” 
as if the latter is not “real food”. As McCann (2009, 5) precisely writes, “[p]eople tend to know 
intrinsically what they consider food, its taste, and how to eat it—or what is not edible. For 
some, food means rice, and for others it means maize porridge.”   !
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both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. People from both religions interact based on some 
commonly received, negotiating beliefs, and of course “compelling reasons” 
(Habermas 2005), for their ostensibly banal but very significant inter-religious 
interactions. One of the seemingly trivial negotiating factors for their 
encounters is food: their contact in various socio-cultural settings involves food 
or eating, which reflects group identity and becomes a bargaining tool both for 
their commensalities as well as separations in food contexts. Therefore, the 
yes-no paradoxical answer is manifested in “eating-induced unity” (Meigs 
1997, 95) and eating-induced separation respectively, thanks to “food’s 
relevance for marking, maintaining, and muting [religious] boundaries” 
(Nukaga 2008, 342).  
Negotiations across religious boundaries take place in food-contexts, 
which serve as interreligious meeting spaces where food, as many scholars 
note, establishes cultural identities and defines social relations (McGee 2001; 
Farb and Armelagos 1980; Montanari 2004). That is why the meat that is laden 
with religious identity is a cause for the ‘divergence’ of Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims because it inhibits sharing the same lemat. It may not necessarily 
inhibit commensality in the western sense of table sharing. When it comes to 
vegetarian food, for example, people from both religions who observe the 
taboo also share the same lemat. In short, if commensality in Ethiopia were 
defined in the original Western sense of ‘table sharing’ only, Christians and 
Muslims would not diverge in food contexts because of meat as both could30 sit 
around the same table while eating different food. But ‘commensality’ with 
lemat goes beyond sharing the metonymic table because sharing food in the 
Ethiopian sense means sharing literally the same food. The following poetic 
Amharic saying has best captured this: 
Z"#$ MN-r1(   
%,4# !-W19     
Ye’slam balinjera, 
Ayabela Injera.    
A Muslim companion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$+!While it is possible for one to see Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia literally “share table” 
without actually eating the same food, the disgust-laden meat taboo under study, however, in 
most cases forces Christians and Muslims to diverge and occupy separate spaces in food 
contexts such as wedding feasts (see Chapter 4).   !!!
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Does not feed injera. 
Told from a Christian point of view, this saying expresses, among its other 
possible interpretations and implications, the difficulty of commensality 
between Muslims and Christians. It is unfortunate that the wordplay is lost in 
my English translation. But, as I earlier made a brief etymological comparison 
of balinjera and injera vis-à-vis companion and panis, the ‘poet’ has played 
with balinjera and injera to an ironical effect thereby expressing the paradox of 
being ‘companion’ and at the same time not breaking ‘bread’! With this, I shall 
further develop in the following sections the discussion of commensality and 
companionship between the two religious groups against the backdrop of the 
underlying unique differences and similarities between Ethiopian Christianity 
and Ethiopian Islam in connection mainly with food. 
       
Commensality between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia 
 
Through commensality practices, individuals act out their self-
conceptions as members of a group and their public 
identifications with a group to form distinct identities: namely, 
those with whom “We” can eat (“Us”) and those with whom 
“We” cannot eat (“Them”).  
Jordan D. Rosenblum (2010, 7) 
In order to understand the commensality and dietary/culinary differences 
between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia, one needs to look at how the 
notion of food is treated in each religion and the dynamics of their peculiar 
encounters in wider socio-cultural contexts that involve food or eating. First of 
all, as much as they have influenced local and indigenous faiths and cultures, 
both Christianity and Islam as world religions have undergone processes of 
indigenization over centuries with local cultures in Ethiopia. As Lewis and 
Jewell (1976, 15) write, “[i]f the ‘great traditions’ of Christianity and Islam 
generously open their arms to assimilate the many local cultures of [… 
Ethiopia], many elements from the latter find their way by the back-door into 
the world-view of the two major religions.” Thus, these two religions have 
equally apparently unique features that distinguish them from their counterparts 
elsewhere. These features are manifest both in their relations and encounters as 
well as in their respective cultures. For instance, the role of meat in the 
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relationship between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia is unique compared to 
that of Christians and Muslims elsewhere such as in Lebanon, France, Uganda, 
Malawi (Ficquet 2006) and Tanzania (Terdiman 2013), where the slaughtering 
of animals is a business left to the Muslims because food in general and meat in 
particular is presumably not a dogmatic or doctrinal issue for such Christians. 
In the case of Ethiopia, however, even public slaughterhouses have distinct 
sections for slaughtering animals in Muslim and Christian ways. At household 
level as well, each group slaughters the animal according to their own 
respective ritual. Hence, the following sections treat how food has become an 
issue for both religions and thereby for their encounters by juxtaposing it with 
their historical background. However, there is no need, in the scope of this 
study, to dwell on the details of all the unique characteristics of these religions 
in Ethiopia except those that throw light on their unique etiquette with regard 
particularly to culinary tools and food for their difference and commensality.  
 
Food and Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity 
Broadly speaking, food is believed by many to be no issue for Christians 
(Barclay 2010), usually referring to the biblical accounts on food for Christians 
such as in Matthew 15:11 and Romans 14: 1-22. From a historical-
anthropological point of view, various religious or philosophical groups since 
antiquity established or abolished food prohibitions perhaps as a conscious 
mechanism of identity formation. The rejection of certain food taboos or the 
beginning of observing some others was then part of this attempt to create 
distinction: Judaism against Gentiles, Christianity against Judaism, Islam 
against Judeo-Christianity (see Garnsey 1998; Farb and Armelagos 1980). 
While early Christians abandoned Mosaic laws to “mark themselves off the 
Jews” (Garnsey 1999, 98), Christianity in Ethiopia, however, adheres to them 
to the present day. My own article (Zellelew 2014) on the unique fasting 
etiquettes of the EOTC has reviewed the literature on the possible explanations 
offered by scholars as regards the Mosaic laws observed by the Ethiopian 
Church. I will make a brief review below to illuminate the discussion in hand. 
In relation to the unique case of dietary demands in the EOTC, the 
Church’s history of isolation from other Churches throws light: The EOTC was 
isolated for many centuries such that its socio-cultural requirements were very 
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different, the most unique feature being its Hebraic substructure (Hastings 
2008). As a result “the pattern of Orthodox worship and religious life was as 
much one of the Old Testament as of the New” (35). Similarly, David 
Robinson (2004a, 110), in expounding the unique features of the EOTC that 
resulted from its isolation from the rest of the Christian world writes, 
“Ethiopian Christianity developed mainly from internal sources, encouraged by 
the Aksum court, local monks, and missionaries.” More to the point of dietary 
demands, there are several Judaic elements in the Church. For example, like 
Judaism “Ethiopia’s Orthodox Church forbids eating animals with uncloven 
hoofs and those that do not chew their own cud” (Lyons 2007, 354; see also 
Beyene 1994). In addition, the taboo of eating pork is a “‘pan-Ethiopian’ 
avoidance rule” (Braukamper 1982, 433), or according to Ullendorff, it is the 
most rigorous food prohibition observed throughout Ethiopia (1968, 103).  
More importantly, one particular dietary law observed by Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christians that plays a great role in their commensality with 
Ethiopian Muslims is almost directly linked to the purity concerns observed in 
early rabbinic food laws31 concerning questions like who eats with whom, who 
slaughters the animal, and what and where is eaten, etc. (see Finger 2007; 
Rosenblum 2010). More specifically, as Finger writes, “[i]n this system like 
eats with like […] Some food is clean if it comes from the right kind of animal 
and has been prepared with the right utensils and dishes” (2007, 177 my 
emphasis). Orthodox Christianity in Ethiopia is unique (Ullendorff 1968) 
among not only the broader Christianity but also other sister Oriental Orthodox 
Churches for various reasons among which are the veneration of the tabot 
(replica of arc of the covenant), the observance of the Sabbath and the 
observance of Mosaic food laws dividing clean from unclean, to mention just 
few (Ullendorff 1968; Pawlikowsky 1972; Shenk 1988; Hastings 2008, 35). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31  The Judaic dietary law influence among EOTC followers is all the more visible among 
some ascetic people who avoid eating food prepared or drinking water fetched on Sabbath, 
a custom similar to the Jew’s concern with regard to the question of not only who prepares 
the meal but also when it is prepared ensuring whether it confirms to Sabbath (Finger 2007, 
117; Meyer-Rochow and Benno 2009, 6; for discussions about the observance and 
controversies of the Sabbath in the EOTC, see Haile 1988; Pedersen 1999, 207-8; 
Ullendorff 1968, 109-13.) For a short discussion on the notion of time in food preparation 
as reflected in oral poetry, see Chapter 5. 
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Especially, some dietary/culinary rules dealt with in this study makes the 
Church even unique compared to the (Egyptian) Coptic Orthodox Church 
under whose synod the EOTC stayed for more than a millennium (Erlich 2002; 
Shenk 1988, 261; Tamene 1998, 96; Trimingham 1952, 25). The data obtained 
from EOTC scholar informants also basically falls under these two strands: 
Judaic foundation of the Ethiopian culture before the introduction of 
Christianity and the continued veneration of the Old Testament while a third 
possible account by informants also points to the different interpretation of the 
New Testament food norms for Christians. What one Christian religious father 
comments on the taboo under study is worthy of a lengthy quote here: 
The Bible does not forbid eating what a Muslim slaughters. As 
you know, the Bible is way older than Islam. So it can’t say 
about this. However, this does not mean that this custom has 
no scriptural foundation either. Apart from the Old Testament, 
we have accounts in the New Testament on what is proper for 
Christians to eat. One is about not eating what is offered to 
idols… Should a Christian eat what is slaughtered in the name 
of Allah or Mohammed? Is [the Muslim notion of] Allah equal 
to [the Christian notion of] God? This in itself can be 
problematic. […] But let’s not go that far. But, you see, there 
are seemingly small things that we overlook but which have 
big meaning. … That is why it is better to eat one’s own food 
rather than stumbling because of food, as the Apostle Paul 
taught us [Romans 14: 20-21]. So, if we have some uncertainty 
over the slaughtering, it is better to avoid it. I think this 
explains the custom. Our forefathers did not establish 
something out of whim or without reason.32 
Overall, the Church, because of its unique history that traces back to Judaism, 
its indigenous elements, its veneration or imitation of the Old Testament as 
well as its interpretation of Christian food norms in the New Testament, has 
unique food proscriptions that include the taboo of avoiding meat slaughtered 
by people of the other faith. And what this food culture means for EOTC 
followers in their encounters with followers of neighboring religions is 
discussed in the coming chapters.   
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$#!!Amharic version in Appendix 4!
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Food and Ethiopian Islam 
 
There is nothing pejorative about the africanaization of Islam 
or, more appropriately, the “Berberization” or “Swahili-
zation” or “whateverization” of Islam.   
(Robinson 2004a, 42, emphasis in original)  
 
First of all, some writers are critical of the nomenclature of Muslims and Islam 
vis-à-vis that of Christians and Christianity which appears to nuance the status 
of religions in Ethiopia. For example, “Islam in Ethiopia,” according to some, 
demeans the status of Islam in the country compared to the common 
nomenclature “the Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity” or “the Ethiopian 
Church.” Teshome Birhanu Kemal, for example, criticizes the Ethiopian media 
for using “Muslims in Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopian Muslims” (Kemal 2004 
E.C, 9, my emphasis and my translation), for the former, according to him, 
implies Muslims as “foreign” to the country. This reminds one of Jaques 
Derrida’s remarks about “subtle but decisive distinction” in the appellation of 
Algerian Muslims until World War II as “French nationals” instead of “French 
citizens” evoking foreignness (Derrida 2000, 143). However, it should not be 
illegitimate to give the adjective “Ethiopian” to Islam because of its unique 
historical and socio-cultural features in Ethiopia as much as one uses the same 
adjective to Orthodox Christianity in the country because Ethiopian Islam, like 
Ethiopian Christianity, is also adapted to local cultures and elements of 
indigenous faiths (see Abbink 1998; Lewis and Jewell 1976, 13-15; 
Trimingham 1952).    
To begin with its very introduction, as many commentators note (Abbink 
1998; Ahmed 2001; Robinson 2004a), though there were occasional conflicts 
and frictions between the two religious groups later on the course of history, 
the Christian-Muslim first encounter was a peaceful one contrary to the 
introduction of Islam elsewhere, which was through conquest: in Syria (636), 
in Persia (637), Jerusalem (638), etc. (Apostolov 2004, 25). That is, while the 
other two powers, namely the Byzantine (in losing Syria) and the Persian 
empires were defeated by the Muslims, the Ethiopian empire accommodated 
the persecuted Muslims from Arabia; in other words, the Christian kingdom of 
Ethiopia was at least “initially accommodating” (Ahmed 2001) to Muslims. 
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Moreover, compared to other parts of Africa such as in West African Sahel and 
the East African coast, the process of islamization was a peaceful one in 
Ethiopia33 (Robinson 2004a, 113), nor was it accompanied by arabization like 
in North Africa and part of Sudan (Trimingham 1952). On the other hand, 
though similar to elsewhere in Africa when it comes to assimilating indigenous 
pagan rites and beliefs by giving them “orthodox interpretations and 
explanatory Muslim legends”, it is only in Ethiopia that Islam faced a 
remarkable challenge from the Orthodox Christian Church (Baum 1953, 1; see 
also Trimingham 1952, 139). It is also a facet of Ethiopian Islam that it has 
been shaped by cultural and ethnic traditions (Abbink 1998).  
The unique food norms that the two religions adhere to seem to originate 
from their own encounters and frictions (see Chapter 3) as much as from other 
local and indigenous cultures and norms. In general in Islam the law 
concerning halal (“lawful food”) originates from four sources: the Qur’an, the 
hadith (“instructions by Mohammed”), the sunnah (“religious tradition”) and 
fiqh (“a summary of Islamic learning”) (Lerner and Rabello 2007, 11). 
Although the halal and haram dichotomy of food in Islam as stated, for 
example, in the Qur’an is universal, there are still differences and controversies 
in Islam over food (Rouse and Hoskins 2004, 245), like that of the differences 
among various denominations of Christianity over scriptural interpretations on 
food proper for Christians. Broadly speaking, the debate over food in Ethiopian 
Islam falls in line with the long-standing debate over food in Islam. Maxime 
Rodinson (1965, 1065) expounded this debate as follows:  
The Kur’an allowed Muslims to eat the food of the Ahl al-
kitab and vice versa (V, 7/5). But there is attributed to be the 
Prophet a letter to the mazdeans of hadjar according to which 
Muslims were not to eat meat which they had killed as a 
sacrifice (Ibn Sa‘d, 1917 […]) Even in relation to the Ahl al-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33  The Christian-Muslim relations during Islam’s early period of expansion are also markedly 
different in Ethiopia compared to its expansion elsewhere. Writing of Muslim-Christian 
relations in a period he termed “an epoch of expansion (7-10th centuries)” for Islam, Douglas 
Pratt uses a term “direct engagement” which “refers to the situation of interaction and 
relationship that occurred in regard to Christian communities living under Muslim rule.” This 
relationship “was dominated by the concept of dhimma, or dhimmi community: the protected 
minority” who had the right to live and practice their religion as long as they paid jizya (tax) 
and “remained submissive in front of the Muslim community” (Pratt 2005, 103).  !
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kitab, the law was more restrictive than the kur’an, at least 
concerning animals killed while hunting or by ritual 
slaughter. It was not forbidden but reprehensible (makruh), 
according to certain Malikis, to eat what a Kitabi had 
slaughtered for himself; according to others, on the contrary, 
this applied to meat slaughtered by a Kitabi for a Muslim. In 
all cases it was reprehensible to obtain meat from a non-
Muslim butcher (Malikis). It was advisable to make sure that 
the name of Allah had been invoked and not the Cross, or 
Jesus, etc., though it was permissible to eat, according to all 
schools except the Hanbalis, if no name at all had been 
invoked. 
In view of this, in Ethiopia, too, there are two opposing views in Islam with 
regard to food proper for Muslims, especially what is concerned with meat of 
animals slaughtered by people of the other faith. The first one is a perennial 
tradition maintained by many Muslims who avoid eating meat of animals 
slaughtered by Christians. According to this group, it is not Islamic to eat meat 
of an animal slaughtered by Christians or non-Muslims. The second one is that 
which is maintained in recent times by Muslims who reject the first view. 
According to this one group, what is most important for a Muslim, as regards 
food, is to be cautious whether the animal is halal (lawful) first of all and 
second of all how pertinently the slaughtering is performed (according to the 
Islamic etiquette, such as blood being completely drained). This group further 
maintains that there is a Qur’anic warrant to eating food/meat if it is lawful 
(Surat Al-Baqarah 2: 168; Surat Al-Mai’dah 5: 88; Surat An’nahi 16:114) and 
if the meat went through proper ritual slaughter (dhaka’a) (Surat Al-Mai’dah 5: 
4; Surat Al-An’am 6: 147) by people of the book (Surat Al-Mai’dah 5: 5), that 
is, Jews and Christians. However, the latter verse of the Qur’an that refers to 
Jews and Christians has a different interpretation by the first group. They argue 
that it does not apply to the Jews and Christians of today but to those of the 
contemporaries of Mohammad. Moreover, they maintain that the name of 
Allah should be invoked on the lawful foods, not the name of Trinity, for 
example, referring to various verses of the Qur’an (Surat Al-Mai’dah 5: 4; 
Surat Al-An’am 6: 118-121; Surat An’nahi 16: 115; see Rodinson 1965, 1061).  
I need not dwell too much on verifying which view is theologically 
justified, as it is beyond the scope and concern of this study. However, in 
general, the avoidance by Jews, Christians or Muslims (or even different sects 
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within the same religion) of eating meat of an animal killed by a person in the 
other faith has changed through time and from place to place in the course of 
history (Rodinson 1965, 1066). In addition, each Muslim sect, while basically 
adhering to the Qur’anic food proscription, formulates its own “complete 
doctrine on all points of dogma and practice” (1070) by making its decisions 
on problems related to food prohibitions in the Quran, although “some have 
considered them to have only an allegorical significance or that an era was 
beginning in which there was no further justification for them” (1070). On top 
of this, there are “post-Kur’anic religious regulations” which affected questions 
concerning the food prohibitions in Islam (1068). Therefore, there is no 
consistency in terms of time as well as place34 by a given religion or sect 
concerning its dietary rules. 
As Montanari (2004, 137) writes, “[c]ulinary identities were not 
inscribed in the heavens” which corroborates Jack David Eller’s comment: 
“Individuals, families, and communities […] make their unique interpretations 
of and responses to the world religion, generating a distinctly local version of it 
[…] none can be said sensibly to be the “correct” or “real” one” (Eller 2007, 
204). Nevertheless, speaking of taboos in general and of the so-called 
“Christian/Muslim meat” in particular, such a food taboo duly works as a 
separating factor for Christians and Muslims, on the one hand, because of the 
nature of food taboos in general as unwritten social rules (Colding and Folke 
1997) or “unwritten code of laws” (Wundt 1906 in Freud 1950, 22), and of 
varied interpretations of scriptures by each religion and denomination/sect, on 
the other. In short, both Islam and Orthodox Christianity in Ethiopia, in their 
“local construction” (Tapper and Tapper 1986) or indigenized form, have 
forged and developed some food related cultures (popular proscriptions and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$%!!It may be interesting to quote here one Muslim informant’s recollection of the moment at 
which he said he realized for the first time the apparent uniqueness of the taboo to Ethiopian 
Muslims: “Some five years ago I was at Bole International Airport for my travel for Hajj. I was 
with many other fellow Muslim Africans from Senegal, Nigeria, etc who were on transit also 
for their Hajj. The airline offered us lunch due to flight delay. The lunch was all meat, chicken, 
beef, etc. Those who were from Nigeria, Senegal, etc started eating without any question. Guess 
who did not eat? Muslims from places like Gondar [northern Ethiopia]. They were even saying 
referring to the former, “How do they eat meat slaughtered by Christians?” Then, they asked 
the hostess to bring them other food, like vegetarian or fish.”  !
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taboos) taking presumably some aspects of the dietary rules of one religion as 
essential “other” with regard particularly to the culinary etiquettes of some 
specific food items.  
 
Wedding Feasts as Zones of Interreligious Encounters 
It is a customary trend in Ethiopia for people to invite their relatives35, 
neighbors and friends to a wedding feast regardless of their religious 
backgrounds. Even what could be regarded as a low-key wedding feast in 
Ethiopia has hundreds of invited guests. As space to accommodate such large 
size of guests is always a problem, a dass (temporary wooden shelter roofed 
with green leaves or sometimes with canvas mostly in rural areas), or tent 
(especially in urban areas) is erected usually outside the compound by blocking 
the narrow passageways between blocks of houses for a few days (see Molvaer 
1980, 152-3).  
What is probably unique is that the family of the bride or of the groom in 
both religious communities not only invites people from the other religion but 
also caters their Other guest with his or her “own” food. At a Christian 
wedding feast, the host buys a goat or a lamb for their Muslim guests and gives 
the animal to some assigned persons (usually the immediate Muslim neighbors) 
to slaughter it and prepare the food according to the latter’s own religious food 
etiquettes. The same goes for a Muslim wedding. As the Other guest is usually 
a numerical minority, a goat or a lamb is enough; but in some cases, an oxen or 
more than one lamb or goat could also be bought depending on the number of 
guests from the other religion. Sometimes the number of guests is used by the 
host family to brag about how lavish their wedding feast was, but I do not want 
to rehash here notions of extravagance and show-off in reciprocity that are well 
studied in anthropology (see Levi-Strauss 1949, 56; Mauss 1925 in Eriksen 
2004, 88; also ‘competitive feasting’ in Farb and Armelagos 1980, 148-153).  
What is more important here is that the Other guests use their own 
utensils, primarily their own knife and other culinary tools such as pan, plates, 
etc. The animal is slaughtered strictly according to the specific religious rituals. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$&!!Cross-religious marriages are also not uncommon in Ethiopia; thus, some people in one 
religion can have blood ties with people of the other faith.!
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Here, the knife as a quintessential culinary tool plays its role of changing the 
‘neutral’ animal into Halal (lawful) for Muslims and Kidus/yetebareke 
(sacred/blessed) for Christians. In fact, it is not the knife per se but the speech 
acts of “pronouncing the tasmiya” (Rodinson 1965, 1069), i.e. the invocation 
of: Bismillah al-rahman al-rahim (In the name of Allah, the passionate and the 
Merciful) and of BeSime Ab weWeld weMenfes Qidus Ahadu Amlak (In the 
name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, One God”. On the wedding day, 
each group of guests eats food that they have prepared according to their own 
food etiquette. Another notable phenomenon is that, in most cases, each group 
occupies separate geographical space. It is food now that is the main cause of 
the establishment of this divergence in physical boundary: inside vs. outside; 
here vs. there; left vs. right, front vs. back, etc (see Chapter 4, fig. 10).  
Except their difference in camel36 meat, which is Halal for Muslims, 
Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia share strikingly similar dietary rules when it 
comes to animal products. For instance, both Ethiopian Orthodox Christians 
and Ethiopian Muslims are averse to eating pork, reptiles, dogs, and cats37. 
They share the same ‘table’ of all food items except meat and that which has 
meat (Ficquet 2006, 45; Trimingham 1952, 103, footnote). But at wedding 
feasts individuals from both religious communities converge in virtue of the 
feast (food) but diverge again paradoxically because of food. It is worth noting 
that the linguistic usage at least among Amharic-speaking Ethiopians as 
observed by Donald N. Levine suggests that “eating” is central to any wedding 
in Ethiopia: “One expects to ‘eat at’, rather than dance at, somebody’s 
wedding” (Levine 1972, 224). I have also noticed a phrase: “One eats 
somebody’s wedding” to refer to one’s attendance at a wedding, or it is a 
common question thrown to a bachelor or a bachelorette: “When are we going !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$'!!While camel meat is allowed in Islam, it is prohibited in Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity. 
However, whether it is due to ecological or gastronomical reasons both camel and pig are not 
common in the research area. But, the country’s overall Christian-Muslim population 
distribution appears to look symmetric with the ecological rarity as well as the religious 
prohibition put on these two animals. For example, camel is rare in the highlands where many 
Christians settle but is abundant in the lowlands, which are predominantly occupied by 
Muslims (See Braukamper 1982, 440).     !$(! ! For extensive discussions on food taboos in Ethiopia, see NCTPE (2004); Braukamper 
(1982); Rodinson (1966). !
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to eat your wedding?” Thus, wedding necessarily involves food/eating that 
unites and gets individuals from the two religions together but separates them 
due to differences in their respective religious culinary/dietary rules.   
As regards wedding feasts in Ethiopia, it should not go unnoticed that 
there are people who come to the wedding feast ‘uninvited’. Included in this 
category of ‘attendants’ are neighborhood kids, vagabonds, beggars, etc who, 
though mostly given the leftovers from the feast, are also cautious about the 
food/meat they eat. That is, they make sure, depending on their religious 
identity, that the food is fit for them—not contaminated with meat slaughtered 
by people of the other religion. In Bahir Dar, recently, while this study was 
underway, there was one Christian wedding held in a Muslim compound where 
the bride’s family live as tenants of the Muslims. According to an informant, a 
kolo temari (student of traditional church education who, like his fellows, feeds 
himself by begging food from neighborhood households) refused to eat food 
that he was offered after he identified the person who offered him was a 
Muslim woman who was wearing hijab. Then, my informant, who noticed the 
“uneasy conversation” between the two, said he went up to the student and 
convinced him that it is a “Christian wedding in a Muslim compound” by 
assuring him that the food was a leftover from the Christian attendants. After a 
few minutes of reluctance, the student took the food.   
 
Reciprocal Hospitality 
In no other socio-cultural settings do Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia seem 
to negotiate their religious identity as well as at wedding feasts where one 
observes the role of food contexts as cultural spaces of reaffirming one’s 
religious adherence. More specifically, inviting one’s Muslim/Christian friends 
and then catering them with food that fulfills their own religious etiquette and 
culinary demands is more than sheer hospitality. It goes beyond one of Alan 
Page Fiske’s (1991 in Komter 2007, 97-8) human relationships models38 called 
“community sharing,” in which people exchange things like food based on 
feelings of connectedness and understanding of other’s need. The ‘need’ here is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$)!!Fiske has four fundamental models “Community sharing”; ‘authority ranking’, ‘equality 
matching’ and ‘market pricing’ (see Komter 2007, 97-98). !
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not quantitative, but a qualitative one that should be met in a meal that involves 
meat fit for consumption according to the Other’s religious culinary rules. It is 
a reciprocal accommodation and hospitality marked by an important 
intercultural quality - empathy. Hospitality is often viewed as a moral virtue 
particularly from the vantage point of a host (Telfer 2002). However, I 
maintain that the reciprocal hospitality built on this food taboo can be viewed 
as a moral virtue from the point of view of the host as well as of the guest (see 
further discussion in Chapter 4 & 6). 
In random Christian-Muslim encounters that involve food, the host 
shows more of his/her generosity than of his/her sense of duty. In other words, 
the guest, depending on the degree of intimacy with the host, is often 
entertained by vegetarian food. Or, if the guests, as Telfer (2002, 93) writes, 
“reach a stage when they can ‘drop in’ and ‘take pot luck’, they scarcely count 
as guests and become ‘almost part of the family’”. In this case hospitality is 
expressed through offering the guest Bet Yaferawun (literally what the house 
produces referring to any food item which the host can afford to offer). The 
commensality, nevertheless, is expressed by eating together any food save that 
has and is meat. However, wedding feasts are unique cultural spaces where the 
host has a duty to treat Christians and Muslims with their respective meat. 
Unlike the everyday encounter in food contexts, the one at wedding feasts is a 
planned and empathetic offering of food marked by an unusual readiness of the 
host to entertain (Telfer 2002) and a duty to meet the guest’s religious culinary 
demands. The guest will also do the same when she/he assumes a host role in 
another occasion. In contrast to some scholars (Ahmed 1992; see also 
Carmichael 1996; Ford 2008), I argue that the system established on the taboo 
of avoiding meat slaughtered by someone in the other faith, as Jon Abbink 
observes, is working perfectly well (Abbink 2007) and is a cause for 
reciprocity between the two religious groups.  
However, the reciprocity does not seem to work “perfectly” without any 
sacrifice, namely an affective sacrifice particularly from the Other guests’ point 
of view (see Chapter 4 & 6). That is, to take part in and eat food in the same 
space with someone who is eating the food that one does not even want to 
think about eating demands defying one’s “pedagogy of disgust” (Highmore 
2010, 130). The taboo of avoiding the “meat soaked in faith” (Fiquet 2006) is 
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charged with disgust and revulsion because of individuals’ upbringing. As 
Levine (1972, 104) writes of the people in this research area, “The taboos 
against pork and other unclean foods are taught at an early age and supported 
by references to unclean heathens ever after.” Writing precisely of the 
establishment and learning of (food) taboos, Farb and Armelagos (1980, 126) 
note the fact that taboos are often reinforced by “divine sanctions” and are also 
continually observed since one’s “impressionable years of childhood” inculcate 
in the individual a lifelong observance of the taboo. Similarly, Miller (1997, 
12), writing of the learning of the disgusting, says, “[i]f the capacity to be 
disgusted comes with being human, actual disgust needs developmental elbow 
room. Culture and nurture determine some of the timing and a large portion of 
the precise content and range of the disgusting.” As a result, at times even a 
food taboo that sounds ridiculous not only to an outsider but also to the 
observant him/herself can hardly be changed.  
Apart from the common symbolic and functionalist explanations of food 
taboos, Daniel M.T. Fessler and Carlos David Navarrete propose an alternative 
approach to food taboos, which they call “evolutionary approach”. According 
to these scholars, “meat has special salience as a stimulus for humans, as 
animal products are stronger elicitors of disgust and aversion than plant 
products” (Fessler and Navarrete 2003, 1). Miller (1997, 16) also notes, 
“[a]nimals and animal substances, we can safely assume, will figure more 
frequently as elicitors of disgust than plants or inanimate objects.” In 
connection with disgust, Sara Ahmed comments, “[t]o be disgusted is after all 
to be affected by what one has rejected” (Ahmed 2004, 86, emphasis in 
original). Wedding feasts, as temporary food contexts, thus, entail an aura of 
disgust for the Other guest. Therefore, the tabooed meat engenders disgust, and 
disgust in turn engenders boundary because it is “ is a recognition of danger to 
our purity,” (Miller 1997, 204) which we try to protect by bordering. The 
boundary, as noted before, at most wedding feasts is a physical one. Although 
the spatial demarcation between Christian and Muslim wedding attendants 
apparently helps allay the disgust, Other guests still have to pay some kind of 
affective price to fulfill their social obligations (see Chapter 4). 
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The Semiotics of the ‘Christian/Muslim’ Knife39 
 
Meaning, indeed many kinds of meaning, can be 
encapsulated in the simplest of objects. 
E. Frances King (2010, xi) 
 
… human religiosity is rarely separate from the material 
environment through which it is expressed, and that to 
conceive of material culture and religious culture as 
opposing or mutually exclusive spheres of human 
experience and activity is to limit our understanding of 
both fields. 
Julian Droogan (2013, 1)  
 
Karra (Knife): From a Folkloric “Magical” Tool to a 
Christian Schism Name   
As a hyponym of other cutleries par excellence, the knife is apparently one of 
the oldest utensils that mankind started to use - even older than fire (Wilson 
2012)—evolving from a hunting tool in the forest to an important household 
utensil on the table. This evolution made the knife “the primary tool for human 
survival and development” Cohan (2009, 49). Even for modern humans, in the 
culinary process, the knife is “the earliest utensil used for manipulating food” 
(Farb and Armelagos 1980, 206). Ancient Egyptians, well before mankind 
discovered smelting, used “Ethiopic”40 flint stones as knives. It is also worth 
noting that the flint was used for a religious purpose— to make the first 
incision in the dead bodies prior to embalming (Herodotus in Wilkinson 1878; !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$*!An earlier version of this chapter was accepted, while the whole research was underway, for 
publication in Signs and Society in August 2014 and appeared in vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 2015)!
Semiosis Research Center at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.!
40  Gardner Wilkinson (1878) surmises that “Ethiopic” signifies the blackness of the stone 
while admitting that such a flint stone, mentioned as “Ethiopic stone” by Herodotus, is granite 
common in Ethiopia.  
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King and Hall [1910] 2005). The first knives, which were crafted out of stone, 
are believed to date back as far as two and a half million years ago, and those 
made of copper about ten-thousand years ago while those made out of bronze 
date back five-thousand years ago, by craftsmen in the Near East (Ewalt 2005). 
Just as the use of iron was present in Abyssinia before the rest of Africa 
(Wainwright 1942 cited in Carlson 2011), it is not by coincidence that the 
oldest examples of stone-cutting tools also date back 2.6 million years to 
Ethiopia (Carlson 2011; Milkias 2011; Wilson 2012). 
Anthropological and ethno-archeological studies show that African 
knives not only have various forms, shapes and types (Thomas 1925) but also 
different symbolic, magical and sacrificial functions (McNaughton 1970). 
Before we delve into our semiotic investigation of the so-called “Christian 
knife” and “Muslim knife” in Ethiopia as regards food and inter-religious 
encounters, it is useful to have a brief look at two other functions of the knife 
in the country. The first one is a historical fact that takes us to the 16th and 17th 
centuries and subsequent history of Christianity in Ethiopia, and the second one 
is a folkloric practice of using the knife to ward off evil spirits. Both accounts 
will be important pieces of background information in understanding the 
“charisma” and semiotic functions of the knife as slaughtering tool and as an 
identity marker.  
After the mission of the Portuguese Jesuits in the Ethiopian highlands 
from 1536 to 1632 (Milkias 2011; Shabot and Alos-Moner 2006), the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Church faced an internal Christological debate. The EOTC 
(Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church—Tewahido means “union”) believes 
that Christ has two births, from His Father and from His mother St. Mary - a 
non-Chalcedonian Christological doctrine of One Incarnate Nature of God the 
Word (Ayenew 2009; Tamene 1998). But during the 16th and 17th Centuries, 
two other sects, The Qibat (Unction) and The Tsegga (Grace) or Sost Lidet 
(Three Births), emerged in the Church following the interference of Portuguese 
Jesuits (Ayenew 2009; Trimingham 1952, 98-99). While The Kibat (School of 
Anointing/Unction) believed in the anointing of Christ at Baptism and not in 
the incarnation of the Son, The Tsegga (School of Grace) maintained that 
Christ has three births: from the Father, from Virgin Mary; and from the Holy 
Spirit after the Incarnation in Baptism (Ayenew 2009; Milkias 2011, 186).  
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What is more relevant now for our discussion of knife is the fact that The 
Tsegga sect, which believed in three births, labeled The Tewahido (The 
Unionists) “Karra”, an Amharic word for “knife” to signify that the latter “cut 
off (rejected) the third birth” (Ayenew 2009, 290). However, there is no 
consensus among scholars whether karra (knife) refers only to Tewahido, for 
some believe that both the Tewahidos (unionists) and the Qibats (Unctionists) 
reject the third birth doctrine of the Tsegga (Grace/three birth sect) (Ayenew 
2009, 290, footnote, 885)41. Be that as it may, the knife as a symbol of religious 
marker works properly in either or both cases, the verification of which does 
not matter for the purpose of this study. But rather, how it was named so 
sounds literal to the very function of the knife – cutting, separating, dividing, 
splitting, etc. It is also interesting to note that like other religions such as 
Christianity itself, the Karra sect obtained its name from others. Hence, since 
this time the knife has served symbolically as a schism signifier in the history 
of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church although its use diminished as the debate 
itself has become subdued through time.  
Another important tradition in the country is using the knife to ward off 
evil spirits, which will help us later on to contemplate well its power of giving 
individuals disgust by virtue of its slaughtering functions accompanied by 
religious performative languages in Orthodox Christianity and in Islam in 
Ethiopia. Putting the knife under one’s bed to ward off evil spirits is a widely 
practiced folkloric tradition in many places in the world, such as in Greece and 
China (Hedley-Dent 2011). Especially in most rural and some traditional 
families in urban Ethiopia, to the present day, people use the knife for this 
purpose. They put it under the mattress or pillow to protect the sleeping person 
from evil spirits. It is believed that the evil spirits cause nightmares in the 
sleeping person. The knife, therefore, is an important instrument to repel them. 
It is also an important “magical” weapon to protect a confined woman from 
evil spirits after she gives birth, which goes parallel with what Ticky Hedley-
Dent writes: “A knife under the bed is meant to act as a painkiller during 
childbirth, and, in a pre-Health-and-Safety age, a knife in the cradle was !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%"!!For an alternative analysis on the origin of the Karra appellation, see d’Abbadie (1868).!
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thought to keep a baby from harm” (Hedley-Dent 2011). In similar vein, 
writing of the birth customs of the Amhara people in Shoa region (Ethiopia), 
Terrefe Raswork also remarks about the use of this custom as a way of 
protecting the newborn and its mother from evil spirits (Raswork 1959, 46). 
The knife has also always been an object that has affective consequences 
on its users. For example, according to Norbert Elias, in Europe until the 
Middle Ages and even beyond, the knife was an object that engndered affects 
of dread and fear as well as pleasure. It was also subject to prohibitions and 
taboos of various kinds while the manners and the taboos concerning knife 
ranged from how one holds it to what one should or should not to cut with it. 
The knife also appears to have gone through what Elias called the “civilizing 
curve” in the Western culture in that it came to table having replaced hand and 
teeth but, after becoming subject so many taboos and prohibitions, eventually 
came to accupy a minimized presence on the table following the preparation of 
food in the kitchen behind the scene (Elias [1939] 2000, 103-107).  
When it comes to the use of knife in the Ethiopian food culture, however, 
it was and is a tool that remains often behind the scene. That is, its principal 
use often terminates at slaughtering, which is a decisive factor for the culinary 
differences and commensality between Christians and Muslims. Except its use 
during cooking, breaking bread and eating raw meat, the latter being a common 
culture almost through out the country, the knife is not a common utensil on 
Ethiopian table. As noted in Chapter 2, the fact that Ethiopians do not often 
use/need knife on their table is perhaps ironically one of the distinct identities 
of the Ethiopian food culture. Given this fact one may reasonably wonder how 
the knife is then as such an important semiotic object in interreligious 
encounters in Ethiopia. However, a closer look at this culinary tool through a 
semiotic analysis will throw light on our understanding of the role of culinary 
tools and food in the realm of Christian-Muslim encounters in the country. In 
view of this, the seemingly banal material culture and everyday life have a lot 
to offer in understanding the dynamics of intergroup relations. As Judy Attfield 
(2000, 174) notes, “[t]he material culture of the everyday is largely unexplored 
territory because it lies too close at hand to intrigue, there is nothing 
tantalisingly exotic about the quotidian.” In what follows, I attempt to discuss 
the role of the knife, an important slaughtering tool, in the socio-cultural 
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spheres that involve food or eating. And I also explore the semiotic functions 
of the knife as a communicating tool and, broadly its concomitant force, i.e., 
the “transactional symbolysm42 of food” (Firth 1973, 253) in interreligious 
encounters between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia. 
By now there is abundant research on food and (religious) identity (see, 
for example, Barclay 2010; De Garine 2001; Farb and Armelagos 1980; Finger 
2007; Lyons 2007; McGee 2011; Meigs 1997; Mintz and Du Bois 
2002;Nukaga 2008; Rosenblum 2010). Whereas this chapter takes some of 
them as theoretical backdrop, it is particularly underpinned by notions 
surrounding speech act theory (John L. Austin 1962), specifically religious 
speech, whose most important aspect is what it accomplishes in contrast to its 
sheer content (Eller 2007, 104). In doing so, the religious speech together with 
other mandatory factors or “necessary conditions” (Austin 1962, 14) such as the 
identity of the slaughterer and the slaughtering tool/utensil are the most 
important factors that transform the “natural” animal into a “cultural” 
meat/food laden with religious identity.   
In speech act theory, for the speech to be effective, there are relevant 
cultural and situational conditions: the speech must be performed in the right 
way and by someone authorized to perform it (Austin 1962, 14-16; Eller 2007, 
106). For example, in Ethiopia, in a very unlikely scenario, if a Muslim 
slaughters the animal evoking the Holy Trinity: BaSeme Ab weWald waMenfes 
Qedus Ahadu Amlak (“In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, One 
God”, or a Christian performs the slaughtering uttering Bismillah al-rahman al-
rahim (“In the name of Allah, the passionate and the Merciful”), the speech acts 
are invalid, ineffective, or, according to J. L. Austin’s theory, result in 
“infelicity” which includes a misfire. That is, “[w]hen the utterance is a misfire, 
the procedure which we purport to invoke is disallowed or is botched: and our 
act […] is void or without effect […]” (Austin 1962, 16). In our case, the meat 
is conceivably not proper for either group. This simply implies that the right 
speech should be performed by the right person in the right context with the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%#! It is interesting to note that the “economic calculation” or the transactional symbolism of 
sacrifices was recognized by Plato who considered offerings, which may include food, as “‘an 
art which gods and men have of doing business with one another’” (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 
129).  !
! (+!
right conditions (see Chapter 4 for an informant’s narrative about a lamb 
slaughtered by a ‘wrong slaughterer’).     
 
The Semiotics of Knife and Meat 
“Our food is shaped by knives,” writes Bee Wilson (2012, 85). There is a great 
deal more truth in Wilson’s statement than the seemingly simple material 
relationship between the knife and food. Apart from their materiality, there are 
other intrinsic relationships between food and culinary tools in general. 
Broadly, objects, which appear simple and small, possess a “charisma” that 
affects the physical as well as emotional awareness of individuals (King 2010, 
xi). Thus, beyond their simple and seemingly banal materiality, objects are 
charged with other meanings and functions. The notion of narrative analysis, as 
a methodological tool, is an attempt to get meaning not only in linguistic 
elements such as sentences but also in all forms of semiotic signs. As Barthes 
(1975, 265) writes, “Just as linguistics stops at the sentence, the analysis of 
narrative stops at the analysis of discourse: from that point on, it is necessary to 
resort to another semiotics.” This is suggestive of the potentials of other 
semiotic signs as reservoirs of meaning. In other words, material objects can 
become signs signifying meanings and functions related not only to their 
“inherent” property but also to the meanings assigned to them. For example, 
apart from its nourishing properties, food is charged with meaning and 
functions; so are culinary tools. In one of her most commonly cited statements, 
Mary Douglas says, “[a] code affords a general set of possibilities for sending 
particular messages. If food is treated as a code, the messages it encodes will 
be found in the pattern of social relations being expressed. The message is 
about different degrees of hierarchy, inclusion and exclusion, boundaries and 
transactions across the boundaries” (Douglas 1972, 6). Marcel Danesi also 
writes: “Food codes, like all other kinds of social codes, are regulatory 
systems—they regulate what kinds of food are eaten, when they are eaten, who 
is allowed to eat them, and so on and so forth” (Danesi 2004, 199-200). 
Similarly, Rosenblum (2010, 8), for one, says, “meals (and their concomitant 
social rules) form a decipherable code or language.” In short, food and culinary 
materials serve functions other than just what their simple materiality affords 
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them to. They reveal power relations between groups. Writing of this 
phenomenon of African cuisines, Igor Cusack notes, “[l]ike most material 
culture, they [cuisines] are clearly products of dominant ideologies and related 
power structures” (Cusack 2000, 207). More specifically, in various parts of 
Africa, though their importance had been in decline since the late 1800s, the 
very materiality (the shapes, patterns, decorations, etc) of knives continued to 
have such symbolic functions as indicating the tribe, the production place of 
the knife and the bearer’s rank and ability until the twentieth century 
(McNaughton 1970). The semiotic functions of the knife that this study deals 
with, however, are concerned with narratives beyond the materiality of the 
knife.   
 
The Knife as a Synecdoche of Slaughtering 
 
Material culture does not have meaning unless through 
sets of specific relationships but, when such relationships 
are in place, even the most unpretentious of objects are 
neither neutral nor passive. 
E. Frances King (2010, xiii)  
 
An object as seemingly banal as knife becomes a cause of the separation for 
people across identity lines because of its relationship and attachment with 
slaughtering, which marks an important turning point for a neutral animal to be 
invested with identity of any kind. First of all, in general terms slaughtering 
enables the distinction of the carrion, which is killed by a predator animal or by 
ways other than slaughtering. It is also a moment that separates what is 
appropriate for Christians and what is for Muslim. For some, the cultural aspect 
of food starts at cooking. For example, Felipe Fernández-Armesto (quoted in 
McCann 2009, 1) says, “[c]ulture began when the raw got cooked.” However, 
food may start to be laden with cultural identities in earlier stages of food 
production and preparation, such as slaughtering, hunting, sowing, harvesting, 
grinding43 or milling, etc. Particularly, as regards meat, slaughtering is such an 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%$!!See Chapter 5 for some oral poems on the timing of food preparation and its implication for 
interreligious relations. !!
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important step in food preparation that marks the beginning of the 
transformation of the natural into the cultural. Or according to Claude Lévi-
Strauss, it is “the cultural moment when culture (cooked food) begins to exert 
its influence on nature (raw food)” making this step “a vital moment in which 
to insert an identity-based food prohibition” (Rosenblum 2010, 77). 
Slaughtering in Ethiopia is such a process that ushers in the notion of meat and 
religious identity by inducing separate spaces in not only slaughterhouses but 
also places of eating.     
The dogmatic foundation of the taboo and the resulting separate 
slaughtering in particular is a contentious subject among the different sects of 
Christianity and Islam in Ethiopia and is thus subject to multiple interpretations 
of biblical and qur’anic verses as well as of other canonical texts. For example, 
besides the Bible, the very body of the EOTC’s law, Fetha Negest (The Law of 
the Kings, Part II), in its The Food, Clothing, Dwelling-Place, and Trades 
Proper for Christians says: 
With regard to food, there is no prohibition in Christian 
law, with the exception of what the Apostles forbade in 
the book of the Acts and in their canons, by saying: “It is 
the Holy Spirit’s pleasure and ours that we should not lay 
upon you a burden heavier than that abstinence which is 
absolutely necessary, namely, that you abstain from eating 
blood, [meat] from strangled [animals], the sacrifice of 
idols, and [the residue of] what was eaten by animals (The 
Law of the Kings, Chapter XXIII, brackets in original) 
Abba Paulos Tzadua (1962, 125 footnote), the translator of Fetha Negest (The 
Law of the Kings), claims: ‘‘The prescription to abstain from the residue eaten 
by animals is not in the Acts of the Apostles. Although it has no basis in the 
scriptures, however, this prescription is still observed in many parts of 
Ethiopia’’ (Tzadua, 1962, 125 footnote). However, it does have scriptural 
foundations in the Old Testament and early rabbinic literatures, which once 
again proves the influence of Mosaic food norms in the country. In one of the 
sacramental books of the EOTC, Anketse Nisseha (Gateway of Repentance), 
there is this confessional statement said by the repentant: “… for I have eaten 
what was killed by a beast, …. I have sinned/wronged; forgive me44” (Anketse !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%%!!KL!%=s!Zt'8=-!44#7!L!t4*m!uIC9” (!"#$ "%& 1974, 8)!
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Nisseha 1974 E.C, 8, my translation). As observed by Rosenblum (2010, 69 
footnote), the carrion is known as Terefah, which “refers to meat that comes 
from an animal killed by another animal and is not the product of human 
slaughter. Biblically prohibited, this class of meat is often paired with carrion 
(e.g., Leviticus 7:24; 22:8 […]).” In Leviticus 7: 22 is also a direct prohibition 
of eating carrion: “And Yhwh spoke to Moses, saying: “Speak to the Israelite 
people as follows: ‘All fat from the ox or the sheep you shall not eat. And as 
for the fat from carrion or the fat from ter !efa !h, it may be put to any use, but 
you must not eat it […]” (Rosenblum 2010, 70). The Qur’an (Surat Al-Mai’dah 
5: 3) also clearly states, among other things, the prohibition of eating meat of 
dead animals, meat of animals killed by strangling as well as leftovers of 
animals killed and eaten by beasts – all of which suggesting the importance of 
proper slaughtering. It is interesting to note that there is a practice in many 
parts of Ethiopia of using the fat and skin of carrion for various purposes, but 
its meat is not eaten. Although the scriptural prohibition of eating carrion 
shows, if not confirms, the importance of proper slaughtering, the wide practice 
by Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and Ethiopian Muslims of avoiding meat 
slaughtered by people of the other faith can be explained arguably only by 
justifications that are subject to multiple and controversial interpretations of 
food-related verses in the Bible as well as in the Qur’an.  
The taboo results in the practice of separate slaughtering in Christian and 
Muslim ways in the country. The main public slaughterhouse in the capital, 
Addis Ababa, for example, has distinct sections labeled as Christian (fig. 5) 
and Muslim (fig. 6), and the public slaughterhouse in Bahir Dar, though not 
labeled (see pictures in Appendix 2), also has separate sections for slaughtering 
in Christian and Muslim ways. According to an informant who is an employee 
there, the ‘neutral’ animal, while on the hoof, is first labeled with ink as to 
know which one goes through the Christian side and which one through that of 
the Muslim. Then in each section, there are exclusive workers (slaughterers), 
i.e. Christian slaughterers for the Christian section and Muslim slaughterers for 
that of the Muslim. In addition, each section has its own manual slaughtering 
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tools45, which are kept separately in their own respective places (see pictures in 
Appendix 2). During my observation, the abattoir in Bahir Dar was not that 
active but it was giving service to institutions such as Bahir Dar University, 
which also has separate kitchens and dining halls for its Christian and Muslim 
students.    
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(Photo by the researcher, 08 September 2014)!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%&! !It is worthy of a brief note here about one Christian informant, who was the guard of the 
slaughterhouse in Bahir Dar during my visit. According to his words, he is very cautious of 
contamination, i.e. if he finds some slaughtering tools that belong to the Muslims, he would not 
touch them: “I would rather spend the night watching it than “touching” [putting it in its right 
place]. But if it is a Christian one, I’ll put it in its proper place.”  “!v7 "wQB %x187 !-y 
%NEK=$9 Z)*"+,- DzE _- %-"{ 4|I= %}&~879” !
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Whether meat is slaughtered in a slaughterhouse or at the household level, the 
so-called “Christian/Muslim knife” discourse, as a synecdoche of the 
slaughtering ritual of each religion in general, is an important semiotic sign that 
delineates the frontier between the two religions with regard to food/meat and 
religious identity in Ethiopia. Interestingly, Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre 
Vernant, in their “Cuisine du sacrifice en pays grec,” have brought to our 
attention the following account of Herodotus on what the knife, among other 
utensils, meant “at the heart of the difference [and] the otherness” between 
Egyptians and the Greeks: “[…] no Egyptian man or woman will kiss a Greek 
man, or use the knife, or a spit, or a cauldron belonging to a Greek, or taste the 
flesh of an unblemished ox that has been cut up with a Greek knife” (Herodotus 
1925, Histories, 2.41). What these two scholars write is worth quoting at length 
here in order to illuminate our discussion: 
Along with the knife, the spit and kettle together and 
separately constitute the instruments of a way of eating that 
Herodotus in his accounts of Egypt places at the heart of the 
difference, the otherness, that the Greeks perceive in 
themselves with respect to the Egyptians. By showing their 
repugnance at using a knife, spit, or kettle belonging to a 
Greek because he makes sacrifices and eats according to 
different rules, the Egyptians described by Herodotus reveal 
to the listeners of the histories an image of themselves in 
which their sacrificial practice, seen in its instrumental 
aspect, is circumscribed by its alimentary function (Detienne 
and Vernant 1979, 3).  
This account runs astonishingly parallel to the place that the knife has at the 
heart of the discurse of food/meat and religious identity for Christians and 
Muslims in Ethiopia. In Herodotus’ account, it is the knife (the slaughtering) 
that turns the “unblemished ox” into a blemished one. In Ethiopia, too, 
Muslims avoid meat of animals slaughtered by “Christian knife” and Christians 
do the same with the meat of animals slaughtered by “Muslim knife.” Among 
other culinary tools, the knife particularly seems to be charged with affective 
power so much so that it engenders disgust and repugnance even in the very 
thought of such meat, much less actually eating it.  
There appears to be no recorded history exactly when Muslims and 
Christians in Ethiopia started separate slaughtering practices and, conceivably, 
some religiously distinct culinary and dietary practices and habits of the two 
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religions. It might not be my task as well as competence to know when exactly 
Christians and Muslims started using “different knife,” i.e. slaughtering, and I 
will not thus venture to exhaustively treat that here. But one cannot overlook 
the importance of historical facts, which play significant part in every 
ethnographic study and whose careful consideration creates not only an 
adequate but also ideal platform for the understanding of a given problem 
under study (Fife 2005, 17). Thus, however scarce and patchy the historical 
evidences as regards this custom may be, I shall briefly look at the available 
ones. For example, John Spencer Trimingham’s Islam in Ethiopia (1952) gives 
us an indispensable account on the aftermath of the 16th century struggle 
between the highland Christian kingdom and the Muslim Adal sultanate, 
otherwise known as the Gragn war. Conceivably, the war between the two 
sides seriously affected the Muslim-Christian relations in the country (Desplat 
and Østebø 2013, 6; see also Trimingham 1952, 89-90).  
Although there had been territorial struggle between the Christian 
highlanders and the Muslim lowlanders centuries prior to the Gragn invasion, 
after the war, the EOTC maintained an isolationist and conservative ideology 
(Trimingham 1952, 60-91), which probably led to the introduction of this 
custom or the maintenance of the existing separate slaughtering of animals. 
The composition of a literary work titled Metshafe Keder that the Church uses 
still today “for the reception of apostates” (Trimingham 1952, 90, footnote) 
sheds light on this matter. As there was forced mass conversion to Islam during 
the war, the sacrament was crucial for receiving those apostates “who defiled 
their body with the infidels” (“%*Äb "67 $"8 Å$!G2-” Metshafe Keder 
1988 E.C, 3; see also Tekletsadik Mekuria 1966 E.C, 782). This suggests that 
immediately after the war the EOTC had to engage in maintaining and 
fortifying the existing boundaries (strict dietary rules could also be one) by 
broadening the breadth of religious and cultural distinctions against Islam 
through the isolationist stance. This might have helped the Church to police the 
impermeability of its boundary, emphasizing, among other measures, dietary 
laws as ‘ammunition’ to fight other faiths (Ullendroff 1968, 102, 107; also 
Trimingham 1952, 90) or rules such as separate slaughtering as a “boundary 
maintenance device”, to borrow Jack David Eller’s phrase (Eller 2007, 114).  
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However, that the EOTC became isolationist during this period does not 
mean that such a tradition had not already been practiced in earlier centuries. 
Religious questions concerning food purity in general and slaughtering of 
animals in particular are very old. Judaism, to which both the scriptures of 
Christianity and of Islam owe a great deal, has, since its earlier days, i.e. since 
after the Flood (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 112), has had a firm stance on 
purity concerns enshrined in dietary and culinary rules with questions such as 
who slaughters the animal, who prepares the meal, etc which made reciprocal 
accommodation with the non-Jew difficult (Barclay 2010; Rosenblum 2010; 
Meyer-Rochow and Benno 2009; Finger 2007). Particulalry early rabbinical 
literatures consider animal slaughtered by non-Jew or Gentiles as carrion and 
thus impure (Rosenblum 2010, 78). Therefore, “[i]n order for slaughter to be 
tannaitically valid for Jewish ingestion, the butcher must be a Jew” 
(Rosenblum 2010, 79). Given the history of the Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christianity with regard to its pre-Christian and Judaic elements (Pawlikowski 
1972; Rodinson 1964; Ullendorf 1968), this culinary law certainly is a pre-
Gragn one. It seems to have originated from Judaism. As Edward Ullendorff 
(1968, 102) precisely remarks on the dietary rules of the EOTC as follows: 
“Slaughtering and bleeding of the animal are performed according to 
Pentateuchal requirements (Gen. 9:4; Lev. 3:17, 4:6, etc).” One may ask why 
and how the EOTC in general and its food laws have Judaic elements. As to the 
question of how, there are three hypotheses as regards the unique Judaic 
elements in the EOTC in general and the Mosaic dietary rules in particular: (1) 
direct contact from Christian or early Christian times (Ullendorff 1956 in 
Beyene 1997, 9; Conti Rossini 1928, 144); (2) direct influence from Jewish 
Christians who came from Syria (Isaac 1972 in Beyene 1997, 9); and (3) an 
internal process that imitates the Bible (Robinson 2004; Rodinson 1964 in 
Beyene 1997, 9), when Ethiopia was isolated from external contacts (Robinson 
2004a; Shenk 1988, 261–262, 276; Tamerat 1977 in Beyene 1997, 10). 
“Though divergent in their speculations on the origins, each of these three 
hypotheses clearly suggests that the Judeo-Christian element is evident in the 
Church” (Zellelew 2014, 136). 
Although many hold with the third hypothesis above and surmise that the 
Mosaic elements in the Church could be adopted in veneration and/or imitation 
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of the Old Testament rather than of a Judaic cult (Beyene 1994, 212-14; 
Rodinson 1965; Ullendorf 1968, 100-03), one of the very reasons for imitation 
could also be seen as part of the process of the national saga of identifying the 
Abyssinian kingdom and its faith and culture with that of Israel after the year 
127046 (Rodinson 1964). Here mention should be made about King!Claudius 
(reign 1522-1559, locally known as Gelawdewos). In defending the faith and 
practice of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church against the accusations by Western 
Christianity of “the prevalence of Judaic elements” (Ullendorff 1968, 100) in 
the former, Claudius wrote a treaty famously known as Confessio Claudii. In 
this treaty, he maintains that the Ethiopian Church does not revere the Sabbath, 
or the Mosaic food laws, or practices circumcision, on account of observing the 
Pentateuchal laws as the Jews do, but rather in respect to the virtues of the New 
Testament (such as Paul’s account on circumcision and on food) and of the 
country’s customary habits (Ullendorff 1968; Tekletsadik Mekuria 1966 E.C.).     
One of the important questions in this study should concern how the 
taboo of meat slaughtered by people of other faith started to be observed by the 
two religious groups. The justification of this taboo in general appears to go 
beyond the simple halal/haram or “clean/unclean” dichotomy of animals in the 
notion of food in the Bible and in the Qur’an alike. Except their difference in 
camel products (lawful for Muslims only), both religions in Ethiopia have 
remarkable similarity in what they allow their followers to eat and to avoid, out 
of which pork, as indicated before, is a common taboo almost throughout the 
country. The Orthodox Christians, although they know that the meat (except 
that of camel) slaughtered by Muslims may not fail to fulfill what is prescribed 
in the Old Testament such as in Leviticus 11, they avoid eating meat 
slaughtered by Muslims. Similarly, while the basic question of food for 
Muslims is whether the meat is halal, with the exception of the difference in 
invocation of the religious formula during slaughtering (an argument by 
Muslims who observe the taboo), the meat slaughtered by Orthodox Christians 
may not be short of meeting the dietary rules in Islam because Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christians also avoid eating the flesh of animals that are haram !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%'! This is the year that the Solomonic Dynasty reclaimed power overthrowing the Zagwe 
Dynasty.    
! (*!
according to the Qur’an. The major difference appears to be the slaughtering 
rituals, which make the difference, thus, culinary rather than dietary.  
But, if looked at closely, even the slaughtering practices of the two 
religions have more similarities than differences. For example, both groups slit 
“the animal’s throat by cutting the jugular vein, the carotid and the esophagus 
without beheading it. The blood must be removed from the animal as it is 
considered the principle [sic] source of life and is unfit for human 
consumption” (Ficquet 2006, 46). The difference appears to be only in the 
invocation of the divine in speech acts and in the direction to which the head of 
the animal should be turned: Muslims towards Mecca and Christians often to 
the east47. Apart from this difference, the narrative of separate slaughtering 
maintained by both religious groups can hardly be explained by the broader 
long-standing debate over food prohibitions in Christianity and in Islam. This 
taboo, therefore, seems to have much less a theological justification than an 
ideological48 underpinning. That is, the taboo could have been used, if not 
invented, to maintain the border and power relations between the two religions 
in the country. In the following section this will be addressed in light of the 
historical encounters of the two religions and the role of food in the process.  
 
Separate Slaughtering: Difference Embedded in Similarity?  
To begin with, food was one of the fundamental questions ‘discussed’ during 
the first official49 Christian-Muslim encounter in the 7th century between !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%(! !Geographical directions also seem to be important markers of identity among the three 
Abrahamic religions. For example, Anqetse Amin (Gateway of Faith), a 15th century Muslim-
Christian polemical book (Trimingham 1952) has remarks, among other things, on the 
distinct geographical directions that Christians, Muslims, and the Jew face during prayer. 
“!"G %>7x >G>Ç tÉe G-t8 $P1Q c>ÑNÖ9 c)*"+,-Ü G-t8 $á1B9” (“The Jew turn 
their head to the west to pray, whereas Christians to the east.” my translation).   !%)! !The use of food as an ideological instrument is very old. For example, in Greek and 
Roman classical antiquities, food was used as an ideological device for constructing 
Otherness thereby dominant groups and cultures ensured the marking of their identity, 
singularity and superiority (Garnsey 1999). The Otherness built on food particularly on meat 
and knife between the Egyptians and the Greeks as reported by Herodotus has already been 
presented above.   !%*! !Here ‘official’ because the Christian Ethiopians presence in Arabia during the early 
years of Mohammed and that of Islam suggests that this ‘first encounter’ in Axum was not 
the first one between Ethiopian Christianity and Islam.  !!
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Muslim refugees from Arabia and the Christian King of Abyssinia. As was 
pointed out in Chapter I, during the very early days of Islam when Muslims 
were persecuted in Mecca by the Quraish oligarchy, a handful of them sought 
refuge in Abyssinia, in what is today Ethiopia. There happened to be a 
conversation, which bears on the question of food and particularly of meat. 
When asked by the Christian king to explain why they had forsaken their 
forefathers’ religion to follow the then new religion, one of the refugees, Ja’far 
b. Abu Talib, cousin of Mohammed, replied: “O King, we were a barbarous 
nation, worshiping idols, eating carrion, committing shameful deeds […] until 
God sent us an apostle” (Trimingham 1952, 45, my emphasis). Then the King 
replied, “Verily this and that which Moses brought emanate from one lamp” 
(Hablesellassie 1972, 184). The King appears to have been struck by the 
similarities of the two religions in the Mosaic laws, which obviously includes 
food proscription, so much so that he granted them the refuge they sought dire. 
Particularly ‘eating carrion’ essentially evokes slaughtering practice, which is at 
the heart of the very taboo we are dealing with.  
However, when we further make historical inquiry, we are tempted to 
believe that the Judaic customs of the Ethiopian Christianity might have had its 
own influence on the dietary laws adopted in early Islam. As Philip Jenkins 
(2008, 188) writes,  
Apart from Byzantine Syria, by far the most powerful 
Christian presence looming over the Arab world was Ethiopia, 
and when the first Muslims faced pagan persecution, Aksum 
was the natural place for them to take refuge. Recording one 
of the prophet’s early acquaintances, the early biographer Ibn 
Ishaq recorded the saying “The one who teaches Muhammad 
most of what he brings is Jabr the Christian”—who may have 
been Ethiopian. This Ethiopian presence was so important 
because it might explain many of the Jewish-seeming customs 
found in early Islam. 
More relevant to the issue of food, Jenkins further writes, “when Muslims 
encountered Ethiopian Christianity, as they must have done, they found a form 
of Christianity that included many Judaic customs, including circumcision and 
strict food regulations, which would become standard within Islam” (Jenkins 
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2008, 189)50. When Islam entered Ethiopia, too, as is presented above in the 
first encounter between the immigrants and the Ethiopian king, the notion of 
food norms might have served the earlier Muslims as one of the 
communication accommodation strategies which “may often be asymmetrical 
and unilateral toward the power source” (Giles, Coupland and Coupland 1991, 
21), a common strategy employed by immigrants to identify themselves with 
and converge to the host culture (Gallois and Callan 1991). That seems why the 
Christian Abyssinian kingdom was “initially accommodating” (Ahmed 2001). 
However, the history of the expansion and penetration of Islam in Ethiopia 
shows that the reaction of the Christian kingdom would gradually change. That 
is, during its early days, Islam took hold of coastal lowland areas meant its 
expansion success was mainly in such areas (Carmichael 2004, 221), and thus 
it was not a serious threat51 to Christianity whose main strongholds were the 
central highlands. However, as Islam took strong root in the country by 
penetrating inward into the central highlands, it appears to follow, more 
distinct and peculiar attributes would emerge to diverge from the host culture 
and for the host culture also to establish mechanisms of curbing the expansion 
of the former. In addition, as an official and well-established religion in 
Abyssinia almost three centuries ahead of Islam, Christianity seems to be the 
‘norm setter’ and a ‘preeminent’ religion rather than governed by norms of a 
religion viewed as essential ‘other’ and ‘newcomer’. Islam, on the other hand, 
as a minority religion, thus, might itself have emphasized the taboo “to rival 
the zeal of Christians”52 (Massignon 1954 in Rodinson 1965, 1070) and to 
mark difference.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&+! !Various scholars observe the several kinds of influence on early Islam by Christianity in 
general (Reynolds 2008) and by that of the Ethiopian in particular (Kropp 2008; Donner 2008; 
Jenkins 2008). David Robinson (2004b, 14) also notes that what is sometimes termed as the 
first hijra “demonstrates the presence at that time of Ethiopians, including Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christians, in Mecca …” For further discussions on the presence of Ethiopians including in pre-
Islam times, see Erlich (2002, 23-4), Hable Selassie (1972), and Serjeant (1966).!&"! ! Ayele (1975, 60) notes, “before and for quite some time after the rise of Islam, the 
consequences of these mutual misconceptions were minimal partly because the two groups of 
people inhabited geographically separate areas, each maintaining and living under its own 
political and social system and posing no serious cultural and political threat to the other.” 
52  Massignon uses this concept to explain the ancient practice of abstinence from meat by 
some ascetic Muslims, a mechanism that they “adopted in order to rival the zeal of 
Christians, Manicheans, etc” (Massignon 1954 cited in Rodinson 1965). And Rodinson 
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On the other hand, the striking dietary similarity between Ethiopian 
Christianity and Islam might also have ironically given birth to this food taboo. 
As mentioned before, EOTC followers, unlike other Christians, strictly observe 
the taboo against eating pork, one of the fundamental identities that gave 
earlier Islam “a point of clear distinction” (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 117). In 
fact, using food as a marker of distinct identity by religions is not unique to 
early Islam, for different religious as well as philosophical groups have used it 
since antiquity (Garnsey 1999). If Islam used pork as a “point of distinction” 
from Christianity, ironically early Christians also used eating meat of the same 
animal or abandoning Mosaic laws “to mark themselves off the Jews” 
(Garnsey 1999, 98). Aside from targeting the distinction against Christianity, 
Islam, at least in Medina, had to also define itself against Judaism as well as 
paganism (Rodinson 1965, 1061). As Rodinson (1965, 1065) further notes, 
“[v]ariations according to the different religious groups are of more importance 
ideologically. […] each group tended to mark itself off distinctly from the 
others by having its own series of rules concerning food.” Thus, Islam must 
have found a distinction in dietary terms that would make it different from its 
sister Abrahamic faiths because “[t]o eat just like other implied, generally 
speaking, that a group did not consider itself completely split off from them. In 
principle one should not eat with the kafir” (Goldziher 1920 cited in Rodinson 
1965, 1065). Even within the same religion, in the earlier days of Christianity 
in Europe, the conflict between the Celtic and the Roman churches seems to 
have been expressed by Celtic monks’ avoidance of prayer and food fellowship 
with Roman priests while the former considered utensils used by the latter as 
contaminated (Allen 2002, 12-13). Other similar cases can be mentioned of 
different sects’ use of seemingly reactionary dietary rules as a way of 
distinction from the religion that each sect purports to reform.     
However, when Islam came to Ethiopia, as noted above, the distinction in 
food appeared to have been “muted” at the beginning, for convergence was 
understandably more important for the persecuted early Muslims at this stage. 
Thus, when the two “opposing religions came to head-on collision” (Ayele !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(1965, 1070) describes such prohibitions as self-imposed by ascetics because scriptures do 
not prescribe them.  
! )$!
1975, 60) in the expansion and territorial struggle against each other at macro-
level and a growing day-to-day interaction at micro-level, a food taboo that 
became a distinctive identity for their interaction must have been later on 
“invented”. And this taboo, apart from being just an identity marker, seems to 
have thus been serving as a diverging element in their interaction and a 
barricade to the religious boarders. In other words, by way of conjecture, such 
a taboo seems to be one of the results of interactions and confrontations 
between the two religions. For instance, one should not rule out the possibility 
that Muslims for their part might also have underlined the difference in the 
slaughtering practice, adopting a counter-practice of avoiding meat of animal 
slaughtered by Christians as a gesture of resistance and reaffirmation of their 
religious identity: “If you don’t eat mine, I will not eat yours” or “if my food is 
unclean and impure for you, so is yours for me” kind of attitude. Without 
denying the essential scriptural basis – however debatable intra-religiously the 
verses may be – for the observance of this taboo, one might see the gesture as a 
counter-measure for Muslims against an ideology of “avoidance” by a 
dominant group, i.e., Christians. It is worth noting that by obscuring the power 
relations, which is at the heart of the dominating and the minority group, the 
former often uses “symbolic violence” to legitimize its own culture as superior, 
esthetic and distinguished and to denigrate that of the latter as vulgar and 
impure (Bourdieu and Passeron 1972 in Lamont and Molnar 2002, 172). 
Writing of the reaction of the Christian Abyssinian kingdom against the 
expansion of Islam, Tesfahun Ayele (1975, 56) says:  
Confronted by Islamic penetration, the forebearers [sic] of 
contemporary Abyssinians (Amhara-Tigre) began to identify 
themselves and their Christian oriented values as superior to 
all other peoples and values. As a result, religion and 
religious values became the primary determining factors for 
the everyday dichotomy of “we” and “they” as well as “ours” 
and “theirs”. 
It may be difficult to hypothesize here that this food taboo is a direct result53 of 
power relations between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia, for one cannot 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53  Space does not allow me to develop this hypothesis here, but I do not still want to rule out 
pursuing this line of argument given the function of food taboos as ideological instruments 
(Farb and Armelagos 1980, 117; Garnsey 1999). What is worthy of note here is the fact that the 
two religions in Ethiopia have very striking resemblance in their dietary rules so much so that it 
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altogether downplay its scriptural foundations. Nevertheless, it is possible at 
least to conjecture that the taboo could have been used: (1) to maintain and 
sustain power relations and thereby curb the expansion or infiltration of 
minority religions by the dominant group, on the one hand, and (2) to resist 
dominations and to affirm one’s own religious identity by the minority group, 
on the other. As noted before, the taboo was exploited by conquering rulers and 
warriors as a symbol of conquest and triumph over their new subjects while the 
conquered used it as a gesture of resistance as well as piety. Tekletsadik 
Mekuria, writing of the Church’s attempt in restoring Christianity and 
Christian norms right after the death of Gragn in 1543, suggests that this taboo 
had been observed by both Christians and Muslims and was also used as a 
coercive instrument in the process of forced conversion during the war: 
Even the clergy confessed Islam by force during the reign 
of Gragn, and some superficially accepted Islam though 
they remained Christians at heart. While forcibly living 
with the Muslims, they could not avoid eating what was 
slaughtered by the Muslims in disgust as before. Or else 
the consequence was a sword. In other times, Muslims 
would not eat what the Christians slaughter ‘In the name 
of the Father, the Son and the holy Spirit’, and Christians 
would never eat what the Muslims slaughter evoking 
‘Bismilahi’. But now, after confessing Islam, though by 
force, if they ate, they should be considered as Muslim or 
defiled. Since forced eating and forced conversion was 
inevitable, […] everyone was considered as they defiled 
their religion …  (Tekletsadik Mekuria 1966 E.C., 780-81, 
my translation)54         
During later centuries after the Gragn period, however, there is better evidence 
of the culinary/dietary differences between Christians and Muslims in the 
country. Both Charles Jaques Poncet, who came to Abyssinia at the end of 17th 
century to treat Iyasu I (1682-1706) for leprosy, and James Bruce, who traveled 
to the country to study the source of the Nile in 18th century, give account on 
the avoidance by Christians of meat slaughtered by Muslims (Trimingham 
1952, 102-3, footnote; see also Abdussamad H. Ahmad 2000; Levine 1972, 41; 
Love 2003; Bruce 1813 in Ullendorff 1968, 30). William Ian Miller (1997, 21) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
might ironically have forced both religions to look for or invent a food taboo that marks 
distinction between them.  
 &%!Original version in Appendix 5!!
! )&!
notes, “[d]isgust is an emotion that has large political and social theoretical 
consequences.” This explains the degree of affective experience of people who 
observe this taboo by the two religions in Ethiopia as regards eating meat 
slaughtered by people of the other faith. That is, most often, it is the Christians 
who look more sensitive about and show disgust toward the possible 
consumption of such meat55. This looks evident, as noted before, in the travel 
account on the town of Gondar by Poncet, who recounts that Muslims were 
“looked down on by the Christians, and meat slaughtered by one group would 
not be touched by the other” while the latter also salutes with a left hand as “a 
mark of contempt” (Poncet 1949 [1699] in Levine 1972, 41-42; see also Ford 
2008, 57; Abdussamad H. Ahmad 2000; Love 2003). To the present day, in my 
own lived experience in different parts of the country as well as the empirical 
data obtained through observation and interview in Bahir Dar, I have also come 
to understand that the strict observance of this taboo is more prevalent among 
Christians than Muslims. In other words, even if Muslims are very cautious 
about consuming halal meat, they appear to be lenient, for instance, when it 
comes to the very idea of trespassing and eating “Christian meat” 
unknowingly. Asked the same question: “what would you do if you 
unknowingly eat ‘Christian/Muslim meat’?” most of my Christian informants 
express disgust of some kind. Overall, literatures on food disgust affirm that 
disgust serves as a manifestation of power relations (Ahmed, 2004). The 
difference in the affective experience of eating or the very thought of eating the 
“wrong meat” among Christians and Muslims, therefore, is so big that one may 
be tempted by the above tentative assumption of mine about the historical 
residue of power relations56 between the two religious groups as reflected on 
crossing the religious boundary marked by “meat soaked in faith” (Ficquet 
2006).  
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&&!For discussion on the seemingly aesthetic reactions against and the appellations of Muslim 
meat/food, see chapter 4 & 5.!!&'!!The affective experiences of those who observe the taboo, and disgust and power 
relationship are discussed in fair depth in Chapter 4.!!
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Religious Signs in Ethiopia: Public and Private 
In the day-to-day Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia, it is the material 
objects (clothing, food, language and architecture) that mark their religious 
identity (Ficquet 2006). Based on how and where they serve their purpose, it is 
possible to classify the non-linguistic religious signs into two tentative 
categories: private and public, which is roughly equivalent to Firth’s (1973) 
classification of symbols. Along with the cross and the crescent, the two 
universal signs, there are two other non-linguistic signs that Christians and 
Muslims in Ethiopia use as religious identity markers. They are the “invisible” 
knife and the thread necklace called mateb57 (fig. 7), “a simple neck cord often 
holding a wrought silver cross” (Levine 1972, 82). This, however, is different 
from the talismanic amulets worn around one’s neck by Christians and 
Muslims and people of other faiths in the country. It is rather a thread necklace 
(usually in three colors, signifying the Trinity) that is tied around children’s 
neck on their baptism (girls on their 80th day after birth and boys on their 
40th)58. As one grows, they continue to put on a replica of this necklace when it 
is broken or worn out. In some legends about mixed-religious families or 
interfaith marriages, a thread is used to differentiate the “Christian meat” from 
the “Muslim meat”; i.e., while cooking the “two meats” in one pan, a thread is 
tied as a tag around the “Christian” one (Kemal 2004; see also a legend in 
Chapter 5).  
The knife appears to be an “invisible” sign because it is not observed 
until its resultant element, i.e. meat, plays its role as a dividing line between the 
two religious groups. It is the cross and the crescent moon that are used as 
more “visible” markers of religious identity in the public sphere. Other than on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
&(! Desta Teklewold (1962 E.C., 718), in his definition of identity or identity marker 
(melleya/metawekya) gives the following as an example: “The identity marker of a Christian is 
mateb and Cross, and of a Muslim is the Crescent.” (“Z);"+,- G8à ?LQ( G"AN . Z"#$ 
G8à /&h E=9”) The mateb for Christians is also so important that to break it means to be 
Muslim. As Desta Teklewold (1962 E.C., 1178) again defines the word ‘selleme” (one has 
confessed Islam), “He has broken his mateb; he has become Muslim” (b8G( ?Lâ- 4wb. 
!"#$ äE) and ‘aselleme’ (has Islamized), “has made one break his/her mateb” (%b8G( ?LQ 
%"4wb. !"#$ %'&_9) while his definition of  “Muslim” also reads, “one who believes in 
Mohammad and the Qur’an; one who has no mateb.” (!"#$( 4GãGx( 4d*å- Z`,$-. 
?LQ ZO8= …) !
&)!For discussion of the “Timing of Baptism” in the EOTC, see Pedersen 1999, 205. !
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the steeple of churches and on the minaret of mosques, they are also used in 
places such as abattoirs, butcheries and restaurants, signaling whether these 
places are “Christian” or “Muslim” (Ficquet 2006, 44-45), although in the case 
of restaurants only Muslim ones are marked as such (see Mains 2004, 346). In 
addition, although it seems not to be a tradition anymore today among 
Christians in Ethiopia, except in some rural areas, there is of course the cross 
tattoo that mainly Christian women and girls get inked on their forehead (fig. 
7), cheeks, chins, etc. Mention should also be made here that tattooing has a 
long history in Ethiopian Christianity: The Christian zealot King Zer’a Yakob 
(reign 1434-1468), for instance, “forced all his subjects to be tattooed with 
amulet affirming belief in the Trinity…” (Trimingham 1952, 76, footnote). 
Moreover, it is also common among Christians to have cross embroidery 
stitches on Ethiopian traditional and holiday attires.  
More important to the discussion of slaughtering, as we have seen above, 
is that in abattoirs animals are slaughtered in separate Orthodox Christian, 
Muslim and European slaughter facilities (Avery 2004) while government 
university canteens also have separate dinning halls for Christian and Muslim 
students. These signs can be seen as the public versions of the knife whose 
active role seems to terminate at slaughtering but whose effect still continues 
embodied in other signs. In other words, it is because of the knife, though it 
appears to remain in the kitchen or in slaughtering places, that the use of other 
signs such as the cross and the crescent in public spaces is eminently 
manifested.  
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!<76B>4!),'An Ethiopian Orthodox girl with cross tattoo and cross mateb '
Source: http://www.gophoto.us/key/ethiopian%20cross%20tattoo  
(Accessed: 10 December 2014) 
These two signs, especially on butcheries and restaurants, signify no other 
object than the meat slaughtered with the knife according to the specific 
religious ritual. As King (2010, xvii) notes, “we construct our own sense of 
who we are on the basis of difference. Initially this happens within our habitat 
but, moving into the public arena, it is shown that our notion of who we are is 
publicly confirmed through categorization.”  
 
!<76B>4!*: Somewhere in Ethiopia: “San’a Muslim Restaurant” (left) and “Kidus Yohannes 
Christian butchery” (right). (Source: uknown photographer, Facebook) 
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Interestingly, the knife seems to possess a transcendent power of crossing the 
private space to become a sign in public space enacted in other signs (cross or 
crescent), which make “categorization” of Christian and Muslim public spaces 
possible (fig. 8). Here, the knife is apparently an initial sign for other signs to 
follow in a seemingly Peircean model of signs as processual: “signs give rise to 
new signs, in an unending process of signification” (Keane 2003, 413). It is 
also important to note that material culture should not necessarily possess a 
visual sign to be considered as communicative tool. As Gottdiener argues, we 
should not “see only a world of signs” and “miss the material culture that acts 
as sign-vehicles for signification and its relation to everyday life” (cited 1995, 
49 in Thomas 1998, 100). Therefore, in Ethiopia, even if one does not see the 
knife, like cross or crescent, as a visual sign on restaurants or butcheries, it 
effectively serves as a sign-vehicle that signifies what is halal meat for 
Muslims and what is kidus (‘sacred’, ‘clean’) meat for Christians. As noted 
above, the more universal signs such as the Cross and the Crescent signs on 
restaurants and butcheries across the country necessarily conjure up the notion 
of slaughtering automatically evoking mandatory questions who slaughters 
what, with what kind of material, how, etc.  
    
The Role of Speech Acts: Charging the Knife and 
Circumscribing Space  
 
Words have power, not just to inform but also to transform. 
Speech is effective in transforming humans from one social or 
spiritual status to another (child to adult, single to married, 
profane to holy, alive to dead). […]  
Jack David Eller (2007, 106) 
 
A critical look into the role that the knife plays, especially in slaughtering, 
through speech act theory helps to enunciate two important notions in religion: 
“the sacred” and “the profane” (Durkheim [1912] 1995). Broadly speaking, 
individuals from either group show tolerance when it comes to food other than 
meat although there are even many from both sides who do not mind eating 
meat slaughtered by people in the other faith. It is important to note that during 
slaughtering it is not the knife itself per se but rather the speech acts— for 
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Christians the BaSeme Ab waWald waMenfes Qedus Ahadu Amlak (“In the 
name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, One God,” and for Muslims the 
Bismillah al-rahman al-rahim (“In the name of Allah, the passionate and the 
Merciful”)— that play a significant role in charging the neutral animal’s flesh 
with “Christian” or “Muslim” identity. Even for ancient Egyptians, the 
repugnance they showed to Greek knife emanates from the notion of the sacred 
and the profane. According to Herodotus (1925), the Greek knife and what it 
slaughters, which may include cows that are holy and venerated much more 
highly than any other animal, is taboo to Egyptians. That is why no Egyptian 
used the knife of a Greek or tasted the flesh of an ox slaughtered with a Greek 
knife.  
In quite a similar vein, especially for some Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christians, the knife or any other culinary tool itself can be considered erkus 
“defiled”, if it has been used by “others,” Here contact and fear of 
contamination with the object is what has much importance, which agrees with 
Kristeva’s definition of the “abject”: “It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health 
that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not 
respect borders, positions, rules” (Kristeva 1982, 4). Therefore, a culinary tool 
and a food item, particularly meat, that trespasses, so to say, the boundary 
marked by the knife’s power of transubstantiation at slaughtering results in 
abjection because it “does not respect borders, positions, rules” of the religion 
in question. This is because food purity is not always determined by its 
cleanliness in terms of hygienic conditions, rather by factors such as: who 
prepared it, in whose company it is eaten; whose utensil is used to prepare it 
(Rodinson, 1965, 1069). And, meat that has not gone through the slaughtering 
practices of one’s own religion is not pure, kidus (‘sacred,’ ‘holy,’ ‘clean’) or 
halal (‘lawful’) to eat. Thus, eating such meat is akin to defiling one’s body, 
giving individuals who observe this taboo feelings of repugnance and disgust, 
even in the very thought of eating it. In other words, food loathing, as a an 
elementary and most archaic form of abjection (Kristeva, 1982, 2) is, therefore, 
experienced as a result of the slaughtering ritual the meat has passed through.  
It is also important to note that apart from making “categorization” (King 
2010, xvii) of Christian and Muslim public spaces possible (restaurants and 
butcheries, for example), the knife just like its very nature of splitting things, 
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yet again circumscribes quite literally the geographical space between Muslims 
and Christians in socio-cultural settings such as wedding feasts. Most often, 
guests from the two groups do not occupy the same space. According to the 
custom, the host caters her/his Other guest with meat slaughtered according to 
the latter’s religious etiquette. There is often a clear territorial demarcation 
between the two groups. The knife as a synecdoche of the slaughtering 
practices of the two religions comes here to play its role of territorializing 
boundaries through its concomitant force now, i.e., food. Trespassing the 
precinct, so to speak, made by the knife gives individuals an uncanny feeling. 
Thus, the knife seems to be policing the boundary such that it seems to 
“punish” with disgust those who transgress the “line.” As a result, in socio-
cultural settings where Christians and Muslims meet involving food or eating 
(i.e. meat), there is an affective sacrifice that attendants should pay.  
In other words, in order to fulfill their social obligations, they appear to 
occupy a space that they might otherwise prefer to avoid, and to smell and see 
food that they might not prefer to smell and see. This all is because of the 
seemingly simple process of slaughtering ritual we have discussed above. That 
is, if transubstantiation changes the bread and wine into the flesh and blood of 
Christ in Christian theology, the knife is an important culinary tool charged 
with the immense power of religious performative languages (speech acts) that 
transform the neutral animal into a sacred or lawful object and that invest it 
with intense aura of disgust among followers of the other faith who observe 
this food taboo. In short, in food contexts that involve meat, disgust polices the 
spatial territory between the two religious groups understandably because what 
is regarded by one group as sacred is by another a profane and vise versa. 
 
Meat as a Proselytizing Instrument 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christians who observe this taboo disapprove not only 
Muslims but also Christians who eat meat slaughtered by Muslims. As Maxime 
Rodinson notes, “[t]he Christians of Ethiopia reproached Europeans with 
eating meat killed by Muslims, which they considered as amounting 
particularly to apostasy” (Rodinson 1965, 1066). But it is one of the most 
remarkable beliefs and traditions among Ethiopian Orthodox Christians and 
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Ethiopian Muslims that both believe they can be converted to the other religion 
by eating the meat of an animal slaughtered by people of the other faith. Eloi 
Ficquet has discussed the historical use of meat as “a method of forced 
conversion” (Ficquet 2006, 47-52). But forcing people to eat what they 
consider as taboo in order to ensure their submission is not unique to the 
history of conquest between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia. The Jews 
were forced to eat pork as a sign of submission to Antiochus IV, according to 
the apocryphal Old Testament book of Judas Maccabaeus (Farb and Armelagos 
1980). Here it is important to note that if Antiochus used pork to show his 
triumph and power over the Jew, they equally avoided it (117) affirming the 
avoidance of food “as an expression of resistance or rebellion” (Belasco 2008, 
37). Similarly, in the very early days of Islam, “Muhammad is said to have 
obliged two newly converted Dju‘fis to eat heart, taboo in their tribe, without 
which conversion would have been incomplete” (Ibn Sa‘d, i/2, 62, in Rodinson 
1965, 1061). In Ethiopia, too, conquering rulers of both sides used a similar 
strategy in ‘Christian/Muslim meat’ as an instrument to force religious 
conversion on the defeated one (Cecchi 1886 cited in Trimingham 1952, 202). 
In all these examples, it is possible to see broadly the ideological instrument of 
food both as a symbol of triumph by the conqueror and of resistance or 
rebellion by the conquered. In other words, eating or not eating certain foods 
serves as a political statement (Telfer 2002, 37), which also calls to mind the 
modern day boycotting of certain food products (or even hunger strike) as a 
gesture of politico-economic resistance.    
The belief in confessing another religion by breaking a food taboo exists 
in Ethiopia to the present day among many, given the great degree of 
evangelization by both religions today than ever before. Asked if eating 
“Muslim/Christian meat” engenders apostatizing for them, some of my 
informants said they do not believe that they apostatized, but they consider it as 
transgression and contamination anyway that requires some kind of remedy. 
According to Mary Douglas, “[t]here are two distinct ways of cancelling a 
pollution: one is the ritual which makes no enquiry into the cause of the 
pollution, and does not seek to place responsibility; the other is the 
confessional rite” (Douglas [1966] 2001, 138). The first way roughly describes 
what Muslims in Ethiopia do whereas the latter perfectly fits to the way 
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Orthodox Christians fix dietary trespassing. That is, though they do not have a 
comparable ritual or sacrament for cleansing dietary trespassing to the 
Christians, according to my Muslim-scholar informants, Muslims are expected 
to regret their action based on their own conscience and should try not to do it 
again. On the other hand, when the Christians commit dietary trespassing, they 
see a priest for confession and expiation. The Metshafe Keder (translated from 
Arabic to Ge’ez, Ethiopian classical language, in the 16th century) serves the 
church to receive apostates (Trimingham 1952; Tekletsadik Mekuria 1966 E.C) 
and is still used in general as sacrament of penance. The book explains that 
church fathers composed the prayers and sacraments for the sake of Christians 
who trespass and defile their body: “4!-L )ç' é>?}U %= %*Äb "67 
$"8 Å$PG2- %= LM!5 %= %-"5 %= GEÄ" %= […]” (Metshafe 
Keder 1988 E.C., 3), which roughly means “ … for those: male or female or 
monk or nun or […] who renounced their religion or defiled their body with the 
infidels59”. Dietary trespassing is one factor for defilement of the body while 
having sexual intercourse with “the infidels”60 is another; both of which are 
often viewed as “corporal sins” – lusts of the flesh. In Ethiopia, while avoiding 
foodsharing forms social distinction, the rejection and withdrawal of 
commesality is also a form of exclusion (Kifleyesus 2006, 38). More precisely, 
in the history of the EOTC, dietary trespassing has a serious consequence. The 
individual who breaks the taboo is not only considered as an aberration, but 
he/she also faces excommunication. “Orthodox Christians who deliberately eat 
‘impure’ meat, such as that of pigs and camels, are subject to excommunication 
with all its socio-religious consequences,” writes Braukamper (1982, 430). One 
of the reasons for Lij Iyassu (reign 1913-1927) to have been excommunicated !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!&*!!According to another book of sacrament, Anketse Nisseha (Gateway of Repentance), a male 
repentant, for example, confesses by saying, “By trespassing [having sex] with relatives, with 
Muslim, with pagan woman, I have sinned; forgive me” (Anketese Nisseha 1974 E.C, 6, my 
translation) (“DGx D!"#$ D%&?è5 ê5 6* 4ë57 t4*m uIC9”!"#$ "%&+1974, 6). !'+!!Even one of the popular legends about Gragn has something to do with a curious scandal 
that involves an apparent ‘defilement’. As the legend goes, Gragn’s father was thought to be a 
Christian priest who had an affair with a Muslim woman with whom he slept a night before an 
early morning prayer/mass in church. Unaware due to darkness, the priest made a fatal error of 
entering the church putting on his Muslim mistress’ gufta (headscarf) instead of his timtam (a 
turban-like cotton headdress worn by EOTC priests). Then the clergy killed this priest whose 
son, Gragn, rose to avenge the murder of his father by menacing Christian Abyssinia: killing 
priests and Christians, burning Churches, etc. !
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by the EOTC is because he was accused of eating ‘Muslim meat’ (Ficquet 
2006, 53). One explanation offered by Douglas (2001, 140) is that “[t]he 
polluter becomes a doubly wicked object of reprobation, first because he 
crossed the line and second because he endangered others.” In this connection, 
Sigmund Freud went as far as viewing excommunication as the beginning of 
penal code: “[T]he earliest human penal systems may be traced back to taboo” 
(Freud 1950, 23) while the very notion of taboo infringement itself invokes a 
penal tone.    ! 
Overall, as the common maxim “you are what you eat” goes, in this kind 
of belief, “you become what you eat.” That is, eating and religious identity are 
intricately intertwined so much so that you become what you are not supposed 
to become if/when you eat what you are not supposed to eat. In other words, 
eating, especially by trespassing the dietary border across religion, is 
equivalent to becoming Other as if the intake of food transforms someone into 
someone else, giving the person an “edible identity,” to borrow Rosenblum’s 
(2010) phrase, and conjuring up the original sin, which was in the shape of 
eating (Genesis: 2:16-17). Indeed, according to the Bible, Adam and Eve were 
not the same before and after they ate the forbidden apple since eating has 
transformed and engendered them to have a new identity that they were not 
meant to have. In addition, if eating the forbidden fruit resulted in the Fall from 
grace and thus brought about “the punitive consequence” (Garnsey 1999, 95) 
of expulsion from Paradise for Adam and Eve, the eating of certain forbidden 
foods or the breaking of food taboos in various societies does not pass without 
some kind of consequence. For example, it could result in a dire consequence 
of exclusion or excommunication from the membership of a certain group to 
which the individual belongs as in the example we noted above of Lij Iyassu. 
Therefore, the affective experience that the taboo-observant individuals go 
through after dietary trespassing, how it is dealt with, and what effects it has in 
inter-religious interaction with people of the other faith are points that merit 
further discussion, and they are addressed in the next chapter.  
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4 
 
Analyzing the Affective Experiences of the Taboo 
Observant  
 
In the previous chapters, I have briefly touched upon what I termed as “the 
affective sacrifice” incurred by the Other guest in a food context such as at 
wedding feast because of a religious food taboo that involves the notion of 
disgust. This chapter will further look into food, its socio-cultural settings and 
its role as an interreligious interface between Muslims and Christians in their 
encounters. It gives a short reflection on wedding feasts by analyzing the 
notion of space and boundary in relation to food taboo and the perceived 
disgust it entails upon the taboo-observant Christians and Muslims. The 
chapter also discusses personal narratives obtained from informants in 
connection with disgust elicited by the taboo under discussion.       
This study already maintains that wedding feasts are paradoxically 
converging and diverging spaces because of the dietary/culinary differences 
between Christians and Muslims. They are just one of the many socio-cultural 
settings for the encounters of the two communities. Among other things, they 
are settings for individuals who observe the religious food taboo (1) to show 
their act of piety (religious commitment) and (2) to show their solidarity with 
their religious Others (an act of social commitment). It is this dual purpose in 
the individual’s mind that seems to result in the paradoxical phenomena of 
‘convergence’ and ‘divergence’, unity and separation, like-guest and Other-
guest, etc. To wit, invited individuals from the other religion converge at a 
wedding feast because of their will to fulfill their duty of friendship and social 
relationship with their religious Other host. However, they diverge from their 
Other host because of the observance of the religious food taboo owing, 
unsurprisingly, to food’s role as a central medium of showing one’s religious 
commitment (Rouse and Hoskins 2004). In other words, by avoiding each 
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other’s food, the taboo observant individuals show an act of piety or 
commitment to their own religion.  
The role of food in identity is perhaps best captured in the commonly 
cited saying “you are what you eat”; however, we are not only what we eat but 
also what we do not eat (Ulrich 2007). In addition, food also plays a role in 
exclusion and inclusion by determining with whom one eats and with whom 
one does not, which is best expressed in Peter Garnsey’s adaptation of the same 
statement as in “[y]ou are with whom you eat” (Garnsey 1999, 128). In fact, at 
times, ‘what one eats’ is one central factor, but it is not a sufficient condition 
for determining inclusion or exclusion in a food context. Instead, ‘with whom 
one eats’ becomes a decisive factor of commensality in inter-group encounters 
in food contexts. Writing of the difficulty of commensality for the Jew with 
others, Jordan D. Rosenblum notes, “[d]espite the fact that the food is clearly 
kosher, the banquet at which it is consumed is not. The concern here is 
commensal in nature, and not culinary – it is about with whom you eat, and not 
what you eat” (Rosenblum 2010, 92). In the case of Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims in Ethiopia, however, it seems even more complex because the 
concern is both commensal and culinary in nature. It is a complex kind of 
commensality, which is affected by the taboo under discussion that effectively 
involves culinary questions: who cooks with what utensil, who slaughters what 
and how, etc.   
Perhaps every society has certain unifying events that involve food (Farb 
and Armelagos 1980). However, because “space is what simultaneously unites 
and separates us” (Lawson 2001, 6), the same event can be a cause for 
divergence. Due to this, an event like wedding feast becomes a diverging 
socio-cultural space. Therefore, not only who eats what and with whom but 
also where one sits and with whom, are important points of reflections in order 
to understand the unique commensality and difference between Christians and 
Muslims in food contexts in Ethiopia. One important key point is that the 
encounter in food contexts between the taboo-observant Christians and 
Muslims seems to be mediated by the affective experiences of individuals, 
namely by the disgust that they have developed since childhood toward the 
tabooed meat. 
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To begin with, it would be instructive to briefly look at the socio-cultural 
meaning and significance of weddings. Ronald L. Grimes views wedding 
ceremonies as focused, performative and social events (Grimes 2000, 156-
158). Particularly, he emphasizes their social nature: “weddings do not belong 
only to brides and grooms but to all who attend, watch, and fantasize” (160-1). 
Victor Turner also views rituals in general as “social drama” (Turner 1974 
cited in Bell 1997, 39) while wedding feasts can exemplify the classical notion 
of convivium61 or living together (i.e. con + vivere, Garnsey 1999; NOAD 
2008). Rosenblum (2010, 91), for one, precisely writes of the social importance 
of marriage and the meal served at wedding feasts: “Because marriage affirms 
and reaffirms social relations and order, the meal that celebrates this occasion 
is clearly laden with meaning. To share this particular table is to plug oneself 
into a network of social relationships.” In Bahir Dar as well as in most parts of 
Ethiopia, wedding as a social event involves gathering, which comes to effect 
usually after a careful selection by the host of friends, neighbors and relatives 
who will attend the wedding - tantamount to “casting of actors” for this salient 
“social drama”. It is an important occasion for parents or families of the bride 
or groom to requite the ‘debt’ and gratitude they owe to people whose 
weddings they had attended before. The ‘debt’ and gratitude individuals 
reciprocally pay to each other can build interpersonal and intergroup solidarity 
of communities that is cemented by food exchange. As Roberto Esposito notes 
of the notion of community: 
[…] the munus that the communitas shares isn't a property or 
a possession [appartenenza].11 It isn't having, but on the 
contrary, is a debt, a pledge, a gift that is to be given, and that 
therefore will establish a lack. The subjects of community are 
united by an “obligation,” in the sense that we say “I owe you 
something,” but not “you owe me something” (Esposito 
2010, 6).  
Therefore, wedding feast is an important event with which the host 
demonstrates, as an earlier chapter outlines, their reciprocal hospitality and 
accommodation to their religious Others. More importantly it serves as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'"!“It [convivium] was the obvious place for interaction, conversation and relaxation, the place 
and the occasion where friendship was strengthened and cultural attainment displayed.” 
(Garnsey 1999, 136) !
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organized, planned or consciously constructed zone of contact for Christians 
and Muslims in contrast to casual meetings between the two religious groups 
on daily basis. With this in mind, in the following sections I shall discuss the 
role that disgust plays in the overall dynamics of Christian and Muslim 
attendants’ encounters at wedding feasts in Ethiopia.    
 
Disgusting Border and Bordering disgust  
There is a certain truth in the apparently banal statement that 
borders are disgusting, while disgust engenders border 
objects.  
Sara Ahmed (2004, 87) 
  
A very important point one observes in the interaction between Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia in food contexts that involve meat is that 
disgust seems to be presupposed for Other guests by the host, that is, the hosts 
anticipate that their food context will engender disgust in the Other guest. But 
the empathetic understanding by the host to admit this fact, first of all, and then 
to do the necessary provisions and accommodations for the Other guest is 
worthy of consideration. Apart from providing food prepared according to the 
religious etiquette of the Other guest, it is also often part of the duty of the host 
to prepare a separate geographical space for this guest (fig. 10). But, no matter 
how presupposed the disgust of the Other guests is, the latter on their part seem 
to keep their disgust unknown so as presumably not to offend their host. What 
is worth noting here is that ironically the different geographic space people 
occupy seems to concretize the disgust. In this case, it appears that disgust 
itself becomes a ‘visible’ space, an interstice between two physical spaces, 
between bodies, between people, between attendants as Other-guest and like-
guest. In addition, it is very common to observe the extreme care people make 
to avoid contamination of Christian food and utensils with Muslim food and 
utensils and vice versa. Sara Ahmed writes: “Disgust does something, 
certainly: through disgust, bodies ‘recoil’ from their proximity, as a proximity 
that is felt as nakedness or as an exposure on the skin surface” (Ahmed 2004, 
83). Ahmed’s statement may refer to the disgust experience of an individual 
body against the disgusting object, but it is also expressive of a group of 
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individuals attempting to keep themselves aloof from disgust (from the 
disgusting object and area). It is in this process that disgust forces the 
establishment of border at wedding feasts in Ethiopia.  
!
Figure 10: Partial view of Christian and Muslim guests at a Christian wedding in Bahir Dar 
(19/04/2015). Behind the green plastic ribbon are sitting Muslim women attendants while in 
front are Christian women and men guests.  (Photo credit: Gulilat MenbereF 
Here, it is very crucial to note the apparent paradoxical phenomenon of disgust 
and border. That is, the separate space for Muslim and Christian attendants in 
common food contexts such as at wedding feasts seem to help allay disgust. 
Conversely, disgust itself seems to police the border because that area which 
people avoid to occupy has an aura of disgust that appears to repel and force 
them to occupy a space with their likes. Interestingly, Paul Rozin and April E. 
Fallon identify four key elements of the disgust experience: a characteristic 
facial expression; an appropriate action (distancing of the self from an 
offensive object); a distinctive physiological manifestation  (nausea); and a 
characteristic feeling state (revulsion) (Rozin and Fallon 1987 cited in Sara 
Ahmed 2004, 84). If most of these elemements are subject to the observer’s 
qualitative judgmenet, one particular element, i.e “distancing”, however, can be 
observed in wedding attendants, as it is often evident from the spatial layout of 
seatings in most weddings. The border that seems to be protected by disgust 
helps individuals take appropriate action by distancing themselves from the 
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threshold of the disgusting food. This seems to be working because disgust not 
only ‘punishes’ one when she/he transgresses the “line” but most importantly 
protects the body from contamination (Fessler 2005, 280).  
It is also impossible to conceive of disgust itself without the threat of 
defilement, pollution or contamination (Miller 1997, 17). Similarly, Sara 
Ahmed underscores, “[d]isgust pulls us always from the object, a pulling that 
feels almost involuntarily, as if our bodies were thinking for us, on behalf of 
us” (Ahmed 2014, 84) Apart from establishing a temporary physical border or 
boundary for the two guests (the like and the Other), attendants also appear to 
make their own empathetic gesture. For example, endayshetih/endayshetish, 
which literally means “May you not smell it” is one of the common 
expressions that individuals utter to their religious Other in an empathetic 
gesture, while the speaker her/himself may keep a good deal of distance from 
the food she/he avoids eating. This appears to go parallel with Sara Ahmed’s 
observation about disgust and the proximity of bodies and potentially 
disgusting objects/subjects:  
Disgust is clearly dependent upon contact: it involves a 
relationship of touch and proximity between the surfaces of 
bodies and objects. The contact is felt as an unpleasant 
intensity: it is not that the object, apart from the body, has the 
quality of ‘being offensive’, but the proximity of the object to 
the body is felt as offensive. The object must have got close 
enough to make us feel disgusted (Ahmed 2004, 85).  
One may argue by brushing off the importance of disgust in such a context on 
account of the apparently insignificant, if not completely absent, difference in 
texture, type (of the animal slaughtered), taste between the so-called 
‘Christian meat’ and ‘Muslim meat’. However, for attendants who strictly 
observe the taboo, the meat that does not fulfill the right slaughtering 
etiquette of their own religion does not taste and smell ‘right’ making the 
nexus between disgust and taste very crucial. For Sara Ahmed the relation 
between food disgust and taste seems to be a given phenomenon: “Food is 
significant not only because disgust is a matter of taste as well as touch – as 
senses that require proximity to that which is sensed – but also because food 
is ‘taken into’ the body”  (Ahmed 2004, 83). Therefore, although there 
appears to be no actual gustatory difference, except that of the attitude about, 
between the so-called ‘Christian meat’ and ‘Muslim meat’, the ingestion of 
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such meat induces disgust, for it involves breaking of what is rejected and 
regarded as taboo. In the case of individuals who are very susceptible or 
prone to revulsion, even the very smell of Other’s food is enough to occasion 
disgust. In other words, “[t]he very fear of contamination that provokes the 
nausea of disgust reactions hence makes food the very ‘stuff’ of disgust” 
(Sara Ahmed 2004, 83) although all disgust does not necessarily provoke 
nausea and all nausea does not necessarily come from disgust (Miller 1997, 
2). Ahmed’s reflection on the importance of ‘history’ prior to our encounter 
with the object we purport to be disgusting throws light on why the taste and 
smell of a food that we avoid tastes and smells bad and thus generates 
disgust: 
The way in which disgust is generated by ‘contact’ between 
objects is what makes the attribution of disgust dependent on 
a certain history, rather than being a necessary consequence 
of the nature of things. It is not that an object we might 
encounter is inherently disgusting; rather, an object becomes 
disgusting through its contact with other objects that have 
already, as it were, been designated as disgusting before the 
encounter has taken place (Ahmed 2004, 87, my emphasis). 
This seems to explain the different affective expereience of individuals who 
observe the taboo and those who do not. The rationalization of some non-
observant individuals’ goes parallel with Ahmed’s points. Being disgusted is 
“mediated by ideas that are already implicated in the very impressions we 
make of others and the way those impressions surface as bodies” (83). For 
example, Ulrich Braukamper (1984) has observed that some Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christians perceive ‘Muslim meat’ to be “dirty”. This is also 
closely related to the earlier point of Ahmed about disgusting objects being 
disgusting by virtue of association with other disgusting objects or attributes, 
in this case the association of the ‘wrong meat’ with “dirt”. This will now 
take us to the importance of the relationship between the disgusted and the 
disgusting in implicating power relations between the two religious groups. 
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Disgust as a manifestation of power relationship 
 
Some emotions, among which disgust and its close cousin 
contempt are the most prominent, have intensely political 
significance. They work to hierarchize our political order: in 
some settings they do the work of maintaining hierarchy; in 
other settings they constitute righteously presented claims for 
superiority; in yet other settings they are themselves elicited 
as an indication of one's proper placement in the social order.  
William Ian Miller (1997, 9-10) 
 
Various anthropologists in general and scholars of food studies in particular 
have observed the relationship between food and ideology (Belasco 2008; Farb 
and Armelagos 1980; Rouse and Hoskins 2004; Telfer 2002). Thomas Sankara 
(former president of Burkina Faso) said: “Do you not know where imperialism 
is to be found? … Just look at your plate!” (quoted in Cusack 2000, 207 who 
borrowed from Barrot 1994). This clearly suggests that the food we have on our 
plates is effectively a sign that may have various interpretations, one being 
ideological. In this connection, Louis Marin observes, ‘‘all cookery involves a 
theological, ideological, political, and economic operation by the means of 
which a non- signified edible foodstuff is transformed into a sign/body that is 
eaten’’ (1989 cited in McGee, 2002). In addition, not only what we have on our 
plate but also that which is missing in our menu is also potentially laden with 
meaning and various implications because the decision by an individual or a 
society to avoid a certain food item is also made by factors related to questions 
of ideology and power relations, which has already been discussed at various 
points in this study. As a result, as much as the food we crave for, the one we 
reject and show our utter disgust toward can similarly have its own implications 
for power relationship between consumers and producers, givers and receivers 
of food, and between hosts and guests alike.  
In Chapter 3, while discussing the possible historical cause and/or origin 
of the taboo under question, I have already conjectured that the food disgust 
manifested on the meat slaughtered by people of the other faith has implication 
for power relations. If we start with two individuals, one who disgusts and the 
other disgusted, we will see clearly how disgust is important to power relations. 
Sara Ahmed writes: 
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When thinking about how bodies become objects of disgust, 
we can see that disgust is crucial to power relations. Why is 
disgust so crucial to power? Does disgust work to maintain 
power relations through how it maintains bodily boundaries? 
The relation between disgust and power is evident when we 
consider the spatiality of disgust reactions, and their role in 
the hierarchising of spaces as well as bodies (Ahmed 2004, 
88).  
Particularly in Ahmed’s notion of “hierarchising of spaces” is what she refers 
to as “above-ness” which essentially calls to mind ‘below-ness’ position 
between the one who disgusts and the one who is disgusted: “Given the fact 
that the one who is disgusted is the one who feels disgust, then the position of 
‘above-ness’ is maintained […]”(89). Even more precisely, William Ian Miller 
notes that disgust plays a role in social hierarchy and political order (Miller 
1997) by making assessments of inferiority and superiority (Ngai 2005, 339). 
This appears to mean that for the one who is disgusted, disgust affords power 
or “above-ness” while the one who disgusts or the disgust-inducing 
object/subject assumes the position of ‘below-ness’. As Esposito would say, 
“power isn't measured except in relation to another's powerlessness 
[impotenza]” (Esposito 2010, 26, bracket in original). It is in this view that I 
already speculated on the apparent manifestation of the historical residue of 
power relations between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia built on the taboo 
of meat slaughtered by people of the other faith. Now, in this section I further 
attempt to see the “hierarchisation” in the context of food disgust particularly at 
wedding feasts between the host and the other guest and what it means for their 
relations.  
First of all, “the affective density of the scene” (Highmore 2010, 134) at 
wedding feasts is marked by ambivalent feelings created by the religious 
identity of guests that forces them to observe their religious food taboo and by 
their will to socialize with their religious Other host. As a result, these kinds of 
guests seem to be principal receivers of disgust when they attend a wedding 
feast of their Other host. This is because such a wedding feast has the 
atmosphere of the host’s cultural and religious aura. In the context of a 
wedding feast and the reciprocal accommodation by virtue of meat slaughtered 
according to a specific religious ritual, therefore, there are certain points of 
power relations that define the dynamics of the encounters of the two religious 
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groups. In other words, if we compare the host and the Other guest, the latter 
seems to be often the victim of disgust as he/she is the Other and the exception 
in a setting predominantly filled with the host’s (food) ‘culture’. Therefore, that 
is why the Other guest often occupies a separate physical space. This 
phenomenon seems to be best expressed in another recent study of Sara Ahmed 
(2010) in the following statement: 
Those things we do not like we move away from. Awayness 
might help establish the edges of our horizon; in rejecting the 
proximity of certain objects, we define the places that we 
know we do not wish to go, the things we do not wish to 
have, touch, taste, hear, feel, see, those things we do not want 
to keep within reach. 
Similarly, people who attend the wedding of a host in the other religion seem 
to achieve the “awayness” at least partially. That is, they do not totally move 
away, say, by declining the invitation to the wedding feast, but most of the time 
the Other guest, often a numerical minority, occupies space at the periphery62, 
away from the epicenter of the occasion, which is often unpleasant to him/her 
because of the food disgust it entails.  
Based on the notion of ‘hierarchisation’ in disgust and power relations 
(Sara Ahmed 2004), can we assume that the Other guest tends to maintain the 
position of ‘above-ness’ through disgust? In other words, does disgust afford 
the Other guest to take a superior position, however unconscious it may be? 
The answer, according to the notion of disgust vis-à-vis power, could be in the 
affirmative. However, a problem related to the virtue of hospitality appears to 
emerge. That is, the very virtue of attending the wedding of one’s religious 
Other seems to be at stake and thus results in a paradoxical outcome. But still, 
the reciprocal hospitality we have already discussed at fair length before seems 
to hold the key to solving this deadlock we have about the apparent paradox of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'#!!At some wedding feasts, however, Christian and Muslim guests attend the feast in the same 
tent, but even so there could still be some kind of demarcation (see fig. 10 above) by row of 
seats, or the Other guest could occupy a separate corner in the tent or outside the tent.!However, 
this is true often during eating. Once eating is completed, one could observe the atmposphere 
getting relaxed in that the two groups could sing, dance and enjoy together. Consequently, the 
disgusting aura also appears to dissipate. If the crowd does not react, it is then common to hear 
the popular sarcastic and motivating song “Eyebelu eyeteteu zim/yeGan wendim,” which 
literally means “To remain silent having drunk and eaten/makes one a brother of pot”. That is, 
not taking part in singing or at least in clapping and in replying chorus after eanjoying the feast 
will subject one to be compared to food/drink container/tanker.  !
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virtue, on the one hand, and the ‘above-ness’ or superiority by/of the Other 
guest, on the other. It must be noted that hospitality itself does not seem to take 
place without some paradoxical consequences. According to Jacques Derrida, 
the law of hospitality is paradoxical which appears to bring about a sort of role 
reversal between the host and the guest in an apparently ambiguous fashion: 
  So it is indeed the master, he one who invites, the 
inviting host, who becomes the hostage - and who really 
always has been […]  
   And the guest, the invited hostage, becomes the one 
who invites the one who invites, the master of the host. The 
guest becomes the host's host. The guest (hôte) becomes the 
host (hôte) of the host (hôte). 
   These substitutions make everyone into everyone 
else's hostage. Such are the laws of hospitality (Derrida 2000, 
123-5).  
The possible “above-ness” that Other guests appear to manifest through their 
disgust seems to be part of the paradox of the law of hospitality. However, it 
should be again remembered that when one assumes a superior position 
because of disgust, it is at the cost of certain affective vulnerability (Sara 
Ahmed 2004; see also Miller 1997, 9; 204). Perhaps contrary to the implicit 
sense of superiority involved, disgust is also an important affect that brings out 
the virtue of the Other guests. First, Other guests show virtue by holding on the 
temptation of their disgust not to offend their Other host. Second, even if 
disgust engenders superiority in such guests, the superiority is ‘achieved’ 
through an affective vulnerability, a sort of price or sacrifice for their 
superiority. Third and even more important is that there is a shift of role in this 
kind of “power relations” between the two religious groups in that one who is 
disgusted as Other guest today will become one who disgusts when taking the 
role of a host and take the position of ‘below-ness’. In short, because of the 
transactional function of food (Farb and Armelagos 1980; Firth 1973) between 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims at wedding feasts in Ethiopia, there is not 
only reciprocal hospitality but also an apparent pendulum of disgust that 
oscillates between the host and the Other guest giving the latter a seemingly 
unconscious ‘above-ness’ position over its host but at the cost of affective 
vulnerability. This will take us now to a further consideration of the two kinds 
! "+(!
of guests in order to better understand the Christian-Muslim encounters in food 
contexts in Ethiopia. 
  
The Other-guest vs. the Like-guest 
One needs to look at the two kinds of guests, i.e. the Other guest who attends 
the wedding of their religious Other host and the ‘like’ guest who attends a 
wedding of a fellow member of their own religion. This distinction helps us 
look at the virtues such as the empathetic offering of food by the host to his/her 
religious Other guest. In this section, I will briefly look at empathy, as an 
important virtue in intercultural and/or interreligious meetings, supported by 
narratives obtained from informants. First of all, the notion of empathy is a 
very broad and complex realm that has been named63 differently and studied by 
various scholars in sundry disciplines such as psychology, philosophy, 
cognitive science, neuroscience, primatology, etc (Batson 2009). Thus it will 
not be easy to pin it down into one sole definition. However, I use it here 
because of its notion of altruist motivation, which is a common aspect of 
empathy in most, if not all, of its definitions by different fields. More 
specifically, I use the ethical and affective dimensions of empathy to throw 
light on the reciprocal hospitality and the mutual trust built between Christians 
and Muslims so as to make sure that the food one offers meets the 
dietary/culinary demands of the Other guest.  
As noted before, the most remarkable point about the custom as regards 
the taboo under discussion is that at formal socio-cultural events such as 
wedding, the host’s duty is not treating only his likes, i.e. guests from his own 
religion but also Other guests who belong to the other religion. While 
hospitality as a notion is founded in essence on altruist motivation, the 
hospitality for one’s religious Other, however, seems to be marked by a high 
degree of Other-oriented motivation. One Christian respondent did not seem to 
like the very question I posed: “What would you do if you unknowingly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'$! ! For example, while some philosophers call it “sympathy”, some psychologists name it 
differently as “emotional contagion” and others “affective sympathy” and yet still others 
“automatic emotional empathy” (see Batson 2009, 6). !
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happened to eat meat slaughtered by Muslims?” Having given a grimace of 
unease, she said she does not even want to think about breaking this taboo:  
There is no if on this issue; I don’t even want to think about it 
[eating ‘Muslim meat’]. I can’t think about eating meat 
slaughtered other than in the name of Holy Trinity. It is a 
sin.64 
Asked if this attitude of hers might have any negative effect on her relationship 
with her Muslim neighbors and friends, she insists that it does not have any. 
For example, she said she takes an extreme care in separating food and culinary 
tools and utensils such as plates when she assumes a host role and invites her 
Muslim neighbors and friends. This shows the extreme care that the host takes 
as much as the guest does when it comes to making sure that there is no 
contamination of whatsoever. This extreme care is also reciprocal in that her 
Muslim friends also do the same not only in formal settings such as at 
weddings but also in casual encounters that involve food:  
When I [spontaneously] pay my Muslim friends a visit, they 
tell me, ‘this food is not fit for you; it has meat,’ or ‘it is 
contaminated’65. 
Similarly, a Muslim respondent also corroborates the empathetic 
accommodation that she receives from and gives to her Christian friends and 
“Christian families” (Kristian beteseboch) as she put it: 
We are brothers and sisters. They know what food is fit for 
me. If she [referring to her friend and neighbor] comes to my 
place, I won’t give her something that is contaminated with 
meat. If I go to her place, she too won’t give me food that is 
contaminated with [‘Christian’] meat. The mutual 
understanding and empathy is there.66   
It is this mutual trust that lubricates, so to say, the reciprocal understanding of 
each other’s dietary/culinary demands accompanied by an empathetic offering 
and an exchange of hospitality that marks the relationship between Christians 
and Muslims in Ethiopia. To put it another way, the Golden Rule or Ethical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'%!“4vç 3@> #> fz-" Qí Et* Z8$9 DU=-$ ?bQ %NìN_$9 4"G á#ê DI&' "6 
=î "8GQ#5 ?bQ %NVN$9 ïñ,5 E=9”!'&!“e"g$ c@ó{ ò5 "ôx ‘>ô %>z-q$ #-ö( "6 %8=’ c>$ ‘LEK)õN’ >úiN9” ''! !!i c-x$2 !ç5 E-9 Z?>zEC- $_Q %Eù ,=dIN !Ä9 !û$ !ü ò5 Q5G† "6 ZEK=- 
%Nb†5$. !ü$ !û ò5 "ôx [Z)*"+,-] "6 ZEK=- %5bwC$9 GL~cd2 GLëbâ %89 
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Reciprocity, which is enshrined in many philosophical thoughts and religions, 
seems to underlie the actions of the host in treating their guest in such a way 
they themselves want to be treated, or even more to the point, in not offering 
food that they do not wish to be offered. It is such altruism that guarantees the 
‘purity’ of the food to the Other guest. What is more, this altruist motivation is 
not limited only to formal occasions such as wedding feasts as is reported by 
another Christian respondent who gave the following narrative about his stay 
for two months in a Muslim family:     
I spent67 two months in a Muslim household. They used to 
tell me that the food was not contaminated with meat. We ate 
other foods together. But we made sure that the utensils were 
clean enough. Of course, if you are a fundamentalist, you 
would not even enter their house… the lady used to assure 
me that she washed the dishes very well before she even 
cooked nifro [boiled cereals]. She used to say, ‘ayzoh’ [Don’t 
worry!]. But, on formal occasions they borrow utensils from 
Christian neighbors instead of washing theirs to cook for their 
Christian guests.68    
Elizabet Telfer writes, “[d]uties to others in the sphere of food arise not only 
out of obligations to people at large and out of contracts, but also out of 
personal relationships. One such relationship is that between host and guest” 
(Telfer 2002, 64). From the above three respondents’ words quoted verbatim, it 
is fair to conclude that the lante ayhonihim (This food is not fit for you) is a 
sense of duty out of relationships. It is a duty underpinned by an empathetic 
understanding of the Other guest’s dietary/culinary demands. A good point that 
illuminates the virtues of the Other guest is to compare them with that of the 
like-guest. In a system where “like eats with like” (Finger 2007, 117) as at a 
wedding feast where the guests are only one’s religious fellow, there are of 
course the attributes of hospitality such as reciprocity and conviviality that are 
dispositions of social virtues. However, even greater virtue seems to be 
attained, as Philippa Foot notes, in a situation where it is not easy to be 
virtuous (Foot 2002, 10-12). For example, the Other guest experiences feelings 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'(!!The respondent used the Amharic verb “tekelibyalehu,” which means, “I was fed”.!!')!!Amharic version attached verbatim in Appendix 4!!
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of discomfort in attending the wedding feast of its religious Other. As one 
Christian respondent puts it: 
Honestly, it is only because it is an obligation of social life 
that I attend a Muslim wedding; it makes me cringe.69  
Such occasions test the virtues of attendants: first of all, whether to accept the 
invitation; and second, after accepting, how to behave in the face of disgust or 
disgust-inducing atmosphere. It is an event that demands tolerance and 
composure against the temptations of disgust, to say the least (Chapter 6 further 
discusses and summarizes the virtues and functions of the system in general).      
 
Dietary Trespassing: Defiled Bodies and Defiled Objects  
“The mind depends on the body; shame would be nothing 
without this dependency […] Which means that the mind is 
ashamed of the body in a very special manner; in fact, it is 
ashamed for the body. It is as if it were saying to the body: 
You make me ashamed, You ought to be ashamed … ‘A 
bodily weakness which mane my animal self crawl away and 
hide until the shame passed’”  
Gilles Deleuze (cited in Probyn 2010, 80). 
 
It is important to look at the notion of the body and the mind closely in order to 
see the affect of the participants as a result of their experience with regard to 
dietary trespassing or eating what is not theirs. Needless to say, those who 
observe the food taboo are careful no to break it. However, due to various 
circumstances they might break it and commit dietary trespassing, which often 
results in shame, regret, and spiritual as well as social compunction. As Ben 
Highmore writes, “[…] the bio-cultural arena of disgust (especially disgust of 
ingested or nearly ingested foods) simultaneously invokes a form of sensual 
perception, an affective register of shame and disdain, as well as bodily recoil” 
(Highmore 2010, 120). One informant, for example, said she ate a “meat 
samosa” (locally known as sambusa, a fried pastry stuffed with lentils, meat, 
etc.) in a restaurant she did not know is a “Muslim one.” However, as soon as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!'*! ! K!=E5 8G2t* Z?ç41è ç>c5 3@> z}QC !-y Z’"#$ b*_ Z$ô'= 4†$ E= 
Z`°)DC9” !
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she had savored the food, she saw “something written in Arab script” on the 
wall and realized she was in a “Muslim restaurant.” Then, she said, she rushed 
out to the bathroom to throw up. This might not be surprising given the fact 
that vomiting is one of the most common physical reactions upon discovering 
the breaking of a food taboo while even actual deaths70 have also been reported 
from almost all corners of the world after a person discovers that he/she has 
unknowingly eaten a tabooed food (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 124-5) or 
following, what Miller (1997, 2) calls, “the awareness of being defiled.” The 
physiological and psychosocial consequences and the remedies that individuals 
take upon breaking a food taboo, however, seem to be an important point to 
briefly look at.  
The regret and shame as well as other visible and undesirable 
physiological experiences like vomiting that individuals go through after 
having broken a taboo is a well-documented phenomenon in anthropological 
and psychological studies. In general, “[f]ood is also the object of major 
anxiety, for what and how we eat may be the single most important cause of 
disease and death. We can’t live without food, but food also kills us,” writes 
Belasco (2008, 2). Food kills us not only when it is lethally poisoned. A 
person, observant of a food prohibition, when breaking the taboo, may suffer 
from psychosomatic consequences or even actual death (Farb and Armelagos 
1980). Sigmund Freud also notes, “[a]n innocent wrong-doer, who may, for 
instance, have eaten a forbidden animal, falls into a deep depression, 
anticipates death and then dies in bitter earnest” (1950, 25). But here, it is more 
important to see the remedial actions that individuals take when they commit a 
dietary trespassing in their respective religions. Because of an apparent conflict 
between mind and body, adherents need a resolution to this conflict. So the 
Orthodox Christians, for example, cleanse their body with holy water and 
repent in order to cleanse their mind and attain a psychological relief, perhaps 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(+!!Farb and Armelagos (1980, 125) also note, “[a] devout man who has eaten a food prohibited 
in his society will feel a deepening sense of dread as he awaits the consequences, and this will 
be increased by his social isolation; such a man can expect no sympathy from kin and friends. 
The body's reaction to fear is to prepare for an emergency by producing increased amounts of 
sugar and adrenalin and by causing certain blood vessels to dilate.”!
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in a sort of placebo effect. The Metshafe Keder (1988 E.C., 3) orders the priest 
to perform the following sacrament:  
Fill water in jug and add oil onto it three times making the 
sign of Cross […] by saying: In the name of the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. […] May this water 
transubstantiate and be a canceller of the transgression of 
Your servant so-and-so (My translation).71 
Brett Williams, writing of taboos, says: “They [taboos] are absolutely binding 
for one’s whole life, and they are often self-punishing because violating them 
brings not only shame but also guilt” (Williams 2004, 427). Gilles Deleuze, for 
one, expresses the apparent surveillance that the mind makes on one’s body as 
if the former is a watchdog of the latter: “The mind begins by coldly and 
curiously regarding what the body does, it is first of all a witness; then it is 
affected, it becomes an impassioned witness, that is, it experiences for itself 
affects that are not simply effects of the body, but veritable critical entities that 
hover over the body and judge it” (Deleuze quoted in Probyn 2010, 80). In 
short, this whole apparent dialectical relationship between mind and body is 
best articulated in John van den Hengel’s study of Paul Ricoeur’s Oneself as 
Another in the following terms: “The first other of the self is found in the 
experience of one’s own body. The body is ‘my body’ or ‘ownmost body,’ that 
is, a non-objectifiable thing, which mediates between the self and the world. 
One’s own body is enigmatic: it participates both in the self and in the world” 
(Hengel 1994, 468). It seems to follow from this that those who break a food 
taboo appear to have been betrayed by their body so much so that they are 
punished by a bout of shame and regret which necessitate them taking 
appropriate remedies in apparent tripartite process of trespassing-punishment-
redemption. The remedial sacraments are necessary measures that appear not 
only to bridge the gulf between the self and the body within the individual but 
also to bring back the individual and/or the objects from the liminal state 
(Turner (1969) 1991) they were under into a full and normal status and 
membership in the community they belong to.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!("!!c5GNP!?Z!4Äs!¢£"!c5c£!#PO7!>L!§L!•¶!4%$ë8!?PLQ!RLS!!-!5QN!4"G!%Q!ccNx!
cG-ì"!Bß"!%:-9!RLS>5c8R!#P8!a-®!?>!c>m-!b†©!%4ë7!8tQ*D!PtO9 (Metshafe Keder 
1988 E.C., 3)  
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Mary Douglas writes, “[i]t would seem that whenever a people are aware 
of encroachment and danger, dietary rules controlling what goes into the body 
would serve as a vivid analogy of the corpus of their cultural categories at risk” 
(Douglas 2001, 79). When individuals, in rare case scenarios, trespass the 
dietary prohibitions, as it has already been pointed out, they take necessary 
measures to put things right. It should be noted that it is not only the food but 
also the culinary tools that undergo defilement, requiring some kind of remedy. 
According to Douglas, “Christian rules of holiness […] disregard the material 
circumstances and judge according to the motives and disposition of the 
agent”(10). This seems to go parallel with the New Testament (such as in 
Matthew 15: 11; Romans 14: 1-22) account on food norms for Christians. 
However, for the Ethiopian Orthodox Christians, “the material circumstances” 
are also very crucial to the sanctity of the food and of their body. That is, 
especially for the very pious ones, the cleaning with water of utensils that have 
been defiled is not sufficient to expunge the defilement. This is because the 
purity of the food item, especially meat, and the culinary tools is not about or 
does not depend solely on its hygienic cleanliness. As Maxime Rodinson aptly 
observes, “[f]ood can sometimes be affected by impurities which have nothing 
to do with the food itself […] the same applies to food prepared by infidels […] 
perhaps even to that eaten in their company […] or, in practice, that prepared in 
utensils which they have used” (Rodinson 1965, 1069; see also Allen 2002, 12). 
Therefore, not only meat that is slaughtered or contaminated by Others is taboo 
and engenders disgust, but culinary tools, which are known to be contaminated 
by Others are also subject to cleaning and rituals of expunging.  
In addition to utensils used by Others, Ethiopian Orthodox Christians also 
consider the use of utensils known to have been contaminated with even 
‘Christian meat’ or any other animal product except honey next to taboo during 
fasting seasons. Knutsson and Selinus (1970, 957) note, “[g]reat care is taken to 
avoid the slightest contamination of food and cooking utensils. Even touching 
the forbidden food or inhaling its smell is considered as a break in the fasting 
rules and must be followed by request for absolution by the church”. However, 
the remark by these authors, who already presented a few other erroneous facts 
in their article, is rather misleading because only actual eating of animal 
products except honey (i.e. neither touching nor smelling) during fasting equals 
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to dietary trespassing that needs absolution, as can one learn from the 
sacraments in Anqetse Nisseha (Gateway of Repentance) or Metshafe Keder. 
Apart from this, the overall observance of fasting, as I observed elsewhere 
(Zellelew 2014), as “periodical food taboo events” (Meyer-Rochow and Benno 
2009, 6) and the EOTC followers’ strict adherence to the rules is perhaps best 
captured by the lyric: “!*$ E= ,8=- $- f*4= !-™/Ée- !-@,ì*" E= 
Z´L= 8K9” which literally goes: “If he had regarded as taboo, no matter how 
hungry he was/he preferred dying to breaking his fast” (Balageru no. 2, my 
translation). 
Muslim informants, on the other hand, said they do not have a sacrament 
of penance if they commit a dietary trespassing unknowingly or being forced, 
which Allah forgives (referring to Surat An’nahi 16: 115), but they said they 
are careful not to. However, according to informants, because of the belief that 
eating ‘Christian meat’ equates to apostasy, some Muslims reportedly eat 
‘Muslim meat’ right away to expunge their body from defilement and to return 
to Islam, a practice that Muslim learned informants vehemently condemn as 
“un-Islamic”. On the other hand, even if the ritual and the purpose differ from 
that of the Christians, washing and water are also very important for Muslims 
to expunge utensils. As one Muslim informant recounts, “we do not wash it for 
its [hygienic] cleanliness; it is rather because it might be contaminated with 
[Christian] meat.”72 Of course, as stated in the Qur’an, the importance and 
purifying power of water is also evident among Muslims to such uses as 
making ablution, whose purpose is purification in its hygienic as well religious 
meaning, before prayer, showing readiness for prayer (Surat Al-Maidah 5: 6). 
Apart from this, there is apparently no known particular ritual or sacrament for 
expunging the defiled object or body for Muslims.    
However, for most EOTC followers ‘washing’ with and immersion in a 
holy water blessed by a sacrament recited by a priest, like the one we have seen 
above, is one remedy for rectifying and undoing the effect of defilement of 
one’s body while, for some pious ones, having defiled objects sanctified by a 
priest is another. This can be further explained by “the revivifying role of water !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(#!!K8-lç2=!Q8-!ë>z-!Z$2R4=(!"6!E)U!gz-!"8`VN!4'-Q!!2R4~8-9”!
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in religious symbolism” (Douglas 2001, 162). Similarly, Mircea Eliade 
expounds the power of water in the following text, which may be justifiably 
quoted at length:  
In water everything is “dissolved”, every “form” is broken up, 
everything that has happened ceases to exist; nothing that was 
before remains after immersion in water […] Breaking up all 
forms, doing away with the past, water possesses this power of 
purifying, of regenerating, of giving new birth. . . . Water 
purifies and regenerates because it nullifies the past, and 
restores –– even if only for a moment –– the integrity of the 
dawn of things (Eliade 1958 quoted in Douglas 2001, 162).  
From this statement, it is clear that water has such “power” of erasing past 
trespassing of individuals and objects and of affording a “break up” from the 
liminal identity (Turner [1969] 1991) in order to repossess former qualities 
anew. Among the most pious Orthodox Christians, according to informants and 
my own lived experience, it is common to have an object blessed by a priest if 
the tool is known to have been used by Others, mainly Muslims. More to the 
point, in situations where a culinary tool is not known as to who it belongs 
(Christian or Muslim), such pious people do not use it until they are sure that it 
is clean enough and sacred for use. One informant elaborated that even lost and 
found objects, most often knives, are not used automatically with out making 
sure that a priest blesses them, which reminds one once again of the notion of 
liminal identity by Victor Turner.  
 
Reflective Accounts on the Taboo    
As I indicated in the scope of the study, those who do not observe the taboo are 
not of primary concern in this study. However, among my informants who duly 
observe are those who gave an ambivalent account about the taboo. That is, 
while some believe in the principle of the taboo and thus strictly observe it, 
some others found it “absurd” but still observe it, for they apparently fail to 
defy their disgust. Below are some interesting narratives from a few Christian 
and Muslim informants. I have attempted to present the quotations verbatim 
through translation as direct as possible in order for readers to make their own 
interpretations in addition to and perhaps different from the one given by 
myself.   
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Ambivalence or rationalization?   
Some informants, especially the educated ones, tend to rationalize the 
“absurdity” of the taboo by downplaying its theological foundations. However, 
some keep on observing this taboo despite their belief against it. There are 
people like one of my Christian informants, who identify themselves with those 
who may not believe in the taboo but have never broken it, which suggests the 
importance of making inquiry about “the discrepancy between statements and 
actions” (Eriksen 2004, 51). It is thus important to see the reasons or 
justifications that people give when they do not believe in the importance of 
observing the taboo while they actually observe it. One informant makes an 
apparently outrageous remark that the food proscription as regards 
‘Christian/Muslim meat’ distinction is not, as Jacob Milgrom would say, a 
“divine fiat” (Milgrom 1991 in Yelle 2013, 142–143). The informant said: 
It is man-made. It is the invention of politicians especially 
during the time of the Atses [the emperors] … they 
deliberately invented to damage the relationship between 
different social groups like Muslims and Christians for the 
sake of easing their administration through division… but 
now I have come to understand that as we grow up, we tend 
to change that attitude.73     
Beyond the apparent inconsistency in belief and action, one can observe, 
among other things, the power of some taboos and the disgust attached to them 
in overriding the conscious decision of individuals who attempt to break them. 
As Belasco (2008, 8) precisely writes, “[d]eeply rooted in childhood, tradition, 
and group membership, the culinary dictates of identity are hard to change.” 
This kind of individual, who, on the one hand, does not believe in the principle 
of taboo, but could not succeed in breaking it and thus continues to observe it, 
on the other, shows that the strength of food taboos is beyond logical 
justification. Thus, it seems to leave individuals with ambivalent feelings: 
wanting to reject the taboo and failing to defy disgust. Another informant 
recounted the following anecdote of what he remembered from his experience 
in a national campaign called Idget Behibret Zemecha (Development through 
Cooperation Campaign) in 1976/77 in Ethiopia: !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!($!!Amharic version attached verbatim in Appendix 4!!
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Once we went to picnic on a weekend. When we returned to 
our camp, we found that the ‘Christian food’ was finished. 
Only ‘Muslim food’ was left. We were very starved. Some 
refused to eat the ‘Muslim food’ despite their hunger. Some 
of us dared to eat it. After a while, many students were sick. 
Some were vomiting. I was fine74.  
Having not only overcome his disgust but also been critical of the taboo, this 
informant went on to justify the irrelevance of it by pointing to the lack of 
proper teaching by religious institutions: 
It is lack of maturity in faith doctrines and of profound 
knowledge. And it is because people believe that something 
bad will happen to them if they eat this.75  
Of course, at the one end of the disgust spectrum are those (like this informant) 
who seem to resist the disgust, or who do not give in to the belief and fear that 
something bad would happen to them if they break the taboo. On the opposite 
end of the affective spectrum, however, are those, like the informant’s friends, 
who underwent what appears to be a psychosomatic reaction to breaking the 
food taboo. The latter’s experience is best described by the following statement: 
Sometimes, for one reason or another, individuals in the 
society will transgress a prohibition. If no consequences 
followed, the taboo would soon cease to operate. But usually 
something does happen: an upset stomach, an allergic 
reaction, or indeed any ill fortune that might be blamed upon 
the flouting of the taboo. Once a consequence has been paired 
with the breaking of a specific taboo, the evolutionary 
mechanism of bait shyness insures that the event will never 
be forgotten (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 126). 
It appears to follow from the opposite experiences noted above in my 
informant’s narratives that individuals from both sides take their own respective 
lessons as regards the taboo and their disgust. That is, while those who 
underwent psychosomatic upsets seem to prove their fear and disgust right, 
those to whom no “ill fortune” befell are likely to gain the courage to break the 
taboo in the future provided that they do not believe in the principle of the 
taboo anymore.    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(%!!Kq*q* ô'- "-G8" Z)*"+,- $_Q %NpN9 !ü 4†$ *|iN. [4*_R] 7#V-$ *|2N9 
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Memory of disgust or disgust of memory?  
In general terms, disgust involves history because it forces us to deal with what 
we have rejected (Sara Ahmed 2004). The nausea, the vomiting and other 
psychosomatic reactions that come after we realize that we have ingested food 
that we purport to be disgusting makes the notion of disgust depend on history. 
However, the very thought of a possible breaking of food taboo, say the thought 
of eating one’s revered totem animal, in the future may also induce disgust, 
which appears to make disgust not simply a thing of past experience that is 
mediated by memory of bad taste. Having these points into account, we have a 
seemingly unique narrative that has come from one Christian informant, whose 
experience points to the nexus between memory and disgust. 
When we were students at Bahir Dar University, on our bus 
journey at the end and beginning of every academic year 
between Addis Ababa and Bahir Dar, we used to often have 
lunch in one particular restaurant with no name. But after two 
years or so, someone said that the owner of the restaurant is a 
Muslim, which means the meat we used to eat there was a 
‘Muslim one’. I was utterly shocked. I was about to vomit 
just thinking about it in retrospect. Happily, it turned out that 
the boy was kidding. The owner is Christian! [laughter]76  
The experience of this informant may also bring up the question of how far in 
time a person has to be from the time of the actual ingestion of the disgusting 
food to be or not to be affected by disgust. This sounds to be a difficult question 
to answer but we have recourse to the notion of memory, which produces 
disgust (Miller 1997, 76). However, what does the informant remember here? Is 
it the smell and/or taste of the food? It does not seem so because, in the first 
place, to the neutral observer/eater, there is basically no difference in taste, 
texture or smell between the so-called ‘Christian meat’ or ‘Muslim meat’. 
Secondly and most importantly, it is not the memory of the sensations (smell 
and taste, for example) but the knowledge of eating Others’ food that induced 
disgust in this informant. He seems to have savored the food of that restaurant 
more than one time. In addition, as soon as this informant knew that his friend 
was kidding, he said he felt better. Therefore, the memory of sensations does !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!('!!Amharic version presented verbatim in Appendix 4!
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not seem to explain the disgust he experienced in retrospection with the dietary 
transgression that happened months or years ago. The informant seems to have 
undergone disgust of memory mediated by knowledge rather than memory of 
disgust mediated by sensation. In other words, he was disgusted by late 
realization of eating what he should not have eaten rather than by remembering 
a disgusting taste of food, which he had not experienced in the first place.  
  
“The goat is not Christian or Muslim. It is just goat!” 
I have pointed out earlier the relative difference in the affective experience as 
regards this taboo between Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia. That is, while 
most observant Christians show utter disgust even in the very thought of eating 
‘Muslim meat’, the taboo-observant Muslims, however, appear to be lenient in 
most cases, even knowing that they have eaten ‘Christian meat’. The following 
narratives obtained from Muslim informants prove that this is not just a 
speculative statement. A Muslim informant who bought a goat, which turned 
out to be unknowingly slaughtered by a Christian man is another interesting 
narrative to share as follows: 
One day I went to market to buy a goat and I had to hire araj 
[‘slaughterer’]. And he brought the goat home77. [But] I saw 
his mateb with cross on his neck after he finished the 
slaughtering. I asked him, ‘Are you Christian?’ He answered 
‘Yes’. I was shocked. Nothing had occurred to me about his 
religion whether he is Christian or Muslim at the beginning. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!((! !Home slaughtering is still practiced in Ethiopia while public slaughterhouses also provide 
meat mainly for butcheries, hotels, canteens, etc. It is interesting to note that to the present day 
in various Ethiopian societies, slaughtering, which involves such skills as killing, skinning, 
eviscerating, butchering of the animal, is a man’s task. In some rural areas or traditional 
societies, it is still one of the fundamental and mandatory skills that a gentleman needs to be 
equipped with in order to qualify for marriage. As recent as while this research was underway 
(April 26, 2014), Fana Broadcasting Corporation (FBC) reported that in Amhara Region, Wollo 
Zone, Jamma Woreda, a father has refused to allow his daughter to marry a man who reportedly 
failed to show his slaughtering skills and repertoires of dissecting the animal body parts 
according to the local culture.   
(http://www.fanabc.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8619%3A2014-04-
25-15-33-41&catid=137%3A90120-&Itemid=341 Accessed: 26 April 2014). The role of 
gender identity in food preparation is all the more evident in doro wat (chicken stew) 
preparation, which determines womanhood in Ethiopia. Though killing the chicken is still 
man’s responsibility, the remaining tasks, however, are left to women who show their skills by 
dissecting the chicken in 12 mandatory parts (see Seleshe, Jo and Lee 2013, 10). Failure to 
possess the right skills and repertoires subjects a woman/wife to criticism and mockery so much 
so that it may affect the life of a married couple while it could also cost a single one her 
potential husband.    !
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He had already slaughtered it. Once he had slaughtered it, I 
could do nothing. Since it happened unknowingly, we ate the 
meat. […] After all, the goat is not Christian or Muslim. It is 
just goat… [laughter]. But, I didn’t tell anyone about it. 
However, I was not happy, as I knew about it. I had a hard 
time convincing myself. But, my son, my husband and some 
other invited guests ate the lamb and nothing happened to 
them, and of course to me either.78   
This narrative yet again shows the different consequences, in terms of disgust, 
of actual eating of the tabooed meat and knowledge of the breaking of the 
taboo, which has already been discussed above. This lady kept the secret to 
herself by apparently disguising her disgust so that her family could enjoy the 
meat slaughtered by a ‘wrong slaughterer’. Judging by what happened to our 
Christian informant above who felt disgust in retrospect, there remains a 
concealed story in this family who might be subject to a certain degree of 
disgust one day when it is uncovered. It is impossible to know what the reaction 
of individuals from this family would be like upon discovering their 
trespassing. However, one thing seems clear: The affective reaction to the 
tabooed meat is often different between Christians and Muslims in that the 
latter appear to be lenient at least in the expression of their disgust. In addition, 
the kind of rationalization that the lady employed after having broken the taboo 
because of a ‘wrong slaughterer’ is also suggestive of the leniency on the part 
of Muslims as regards the degree of affective reaction upon possible breaking 
of this taboo.      
Apart from the analysis of the affective experiences of the taboo 
observant, looking at what individuals make of the taboo and the way they 
scrutinize their fellows and their religious Others as regards this taboo can be 
another important source of contemplation in order to understand the dynamics 
of Christian-Muslim encounters in Ethiopia. My imam informant shares the 
following personal account of his own: 
One day, when I was in Addet, on a very rainy one, a 
highlander priest and his three companions who were laymen 
had to drop in in my house to shelter from the rain. They 
were wet and shivering with cold. I asked my wife to offer 
them some injera be chew (injera with pepper). We didn’t 
even add butter as we thought they might be fasting. The !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!()!!Amharic version annexed verbatim in Appendix 4!
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three lads were happy and didn’t think twice. They were 
about to eat, but the so-called priest shouted at them 
instructing them to stop eating by saying 
“Gezichachihalehu!” (I forbid you!). Then they refrained 
from eating. When I asked, ‘why not?’ he replied, ‘It is 
Muslim injera’. ‘How about my house?’ I asked, he replied 
“It is a Muslim [house].” … ‘So what problem did you find in 
the injera? [if you entered a Muslim house] Isn’t the teff 
yours? We fetched the water from the same river [to make the 
injera]. It has no meat. … Since I had Bible, I asked him to 
show me the verse that forbids eating Muslim injera. He 
failed.79   
First of all, this story supports the degree of strictness that some pious 
Christians have toward avoiding Muslim food in general. Secondly, apart from 
the empathetic notions of hospitality demonstrated by the Mulsim host, his 
pragmatic questions essentially bring up discussions about the basic and 
fundamental differences between the categorization and distinction between 
the so-called ‘Muslim food’ and ‘Christian food’ in Ethiopia. For example, it 
helps us see that the difference is much less dietary than culinary. As regards 
dietary rules, in the strict sense of the term, the foods of Christians and of 
Muslims in Ethiopia more often than not are prepared from similar ingredients 
(to use the informant’s words: same injera, “same water,” “same teff flour”). 
Mostly only lowlander Muslims use camel products, which the Christians 
avoid. However, food is more than the composition of its ingredients. From its 
production to the moment we consume it as an edible meal, it goes through 
complex processes that invest identity. Besides to this, the fact that the priest’s 
reported failure to answer his Muslim host’s question by citing from the Bible 
does not make this food taboo or other popular customs practiced in the name 
of religion any less important. Without neglecting the scriptural justifications 
given by those who are capable of referring to scriptural verses, we can say 
that when people observe a taboo or practise a religious-oriented custom, it is 
not by checkmarking whether each and every of their practices are according 
to scriptural thruths. Religion and religious practices are more complex than 
textual and dogmatic truths or simple adherence to scriptures. Consequently, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!(*!Amharic version annexed verbatim in Appendix 4!
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the religious-oriented culinary and/or dietary identities are also more complex 
than simple rejection or consumption of food (Ulrich 2007, 229).  
 
“I have washed them well with Ajax and Omo” 
It would be illuminating to wrap up this chapter by having a brief look at one 
example from a recent television drama in order to see the representation of the 
taboo in popular culture as well as the place of this taboo in the collective 
consciousness of many Ethiopians. In a very popular weekly television soap 
opera titled Sew le Sew that ran on Ethiopian Television for over 36 months, 
while this study was underway, there is one particular episode (Episode 102) 
that depicts the empathetic dietary/culinary understanding between Christians 
and Muslims in their encounters with food in Ethiopia. I have presented its 
synopsis very briefly as follows: 
In this episode, one of the main characters, Mahlet, brings home a take-
away food to her bailed-out-of-jail Muslim guest. As she arrives home, she 
asks if the guest woman has eaten anything. The woman says she had eaten a 
very good Shiro [stew made of roasted and ground peas/beans/chickpeas, etc]. 
Unsatisfied by that, Mahlet takes out of her bag a take-away food and tells her 
guest that she has brought very good food. Then she asks the housekeeper to 
bring fork and plate. When the housekeeper brings the utensils, Mahlet 
demands to know if they are well washed. The housekeeper replies, “Yes, I 
have washed them very well with Ajax and Omo [names of detergents]”). Then 
Mahlet unpacks the food in front of the smiling and delighted guest who, 
having seen the food, got surprised presumably because the food is her favorite 
one, i.e. mendi, a popular food in the predominantly Islamic city of Harar and 
in Dire Dawa (Ethiopia). More interestingly, Mahlet tells the woman that she 
had brought the food from a very good Muslim Restaurant and jokingly adds, 
“if you don’t believe me I can show you the bill.” Laughing at Mahlet’s 
humorous remark, the Muslim guest asks if Mahlet joins her in the meal, but 
Mahlet, gesturing with her head toward the housekeeper, replies that the 
housekeeper is serving her another food – a ‘Christian’ one.  
This is a vivid representation of the custom of food and Christian-Muslim 
identities in Ethiopia and well elucidates the various themes we have been 
discussing about contamination and the notion of expunging. The empathy and 
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mutual understanding of dietary/culinary differences, to begin with, that Mahlet 
shows by bringing a take-away from “a Muslim restaurant” is worthy of 
consideration. Moreover, the housekeeper’s concern and preoccupation with 
washing the utensils with the detergents is also another point that reinforces 
what we have been discussing above the apparent absence of the rites or 
sacrament of expunging among Muslims.  
However, one may wonder what could happen if we had a different 
scenario with a role reversal in the characters in this episode. In other words, 
what reaction would there be if Mahlet plays the guest role in her Muslim 
friend’s house? Judging by experiences, trends as well as historical power 
relations expressed through food disgust, one would have seen a different 
outcome. That is, the cleaning of the utensils by the aforementioned detergents, 
more often than not, might not suffice for a strictly observant Christian guest to 
use an object that is known to have been contaminated by the so-called 
‘Muslim meat’. It should, however, be noted that one can not generalize about 
all Orthodox Christians’ reactions of defilement because individuals have their 
own way of dealing with disgust depending on their exposure to and 
socialization with their religious Others’ food culture.  
Furthermore, it is also important to note that the Christian character is 
depicted as a good-doing host who welcomes an apparently innocent bailed-out 
Muslim woman who came from another city. What is striking is that the 
relationship dynamics between the two characters goes parallel with the 
historical narrative of the reception of the first Muslims from Arabia by a kind 
Christian king of Abyssinia. Overall, the representation in this episode shows 
the place of food in the construction of religious identity in general and that of 
religious food taboo in particular in the collective consciousness of Christians 
and Muslims in Ethiopia. The notion of food and religious identity in the 
country, however, is even more evident and reflected in oral traditions and 
popular sayings, which the next chapter attempts to address.      
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5 
Food and Interreligious Discourse in Religious Texts 
and Oral Traditions  
 
 
Historical memory and experience are not the only factors 
that shape people’s ideas about Christian–Muslim relations. It 
is equally important to look at everyday human interaction 
and at discursive practices, which define people’s positions 
and acts.  
Mario Apostolov (2004, 120-121) 
 
“Life, after all, is at heart an act of eating and so when we make a dish taboo, 
there is usually an interesting story to tell,” writes Stewart Lee Allen (2002, 
xvi). Around the taboo of meat slaughtered by the so-called ‘Christian/Muslim 
knife’, there are stories that have various implications for interreligious 
encounters. This chapter attempts to analyze food discourse and polemics 
embedded in food metaphors, proverbs, sayings, etc and the representation of 
food and interreligious relations in general and of Christian-Muslim encounters 
in particular in Ethiopia by unraveling mainly oral literatures and religious 
texts.  
 
The Politics of Appellations  
Some linguistic usages and metaphoric expressions we take for granted in our 
day-to-day utterances may have implications for interpersonal and intergroup 
relationships. They may show political and historical relationships between 
peoples. What Richard Rorty writes of “cultural politics” in his Philosophy as 
Cultural Politics suggests that the seemingly simple decision to use or not to 
use some words that label others in certain ways makes difference in our socio-
political engagement with others:  
The term ‘cultural politics’ covers, among other things, 
arguments about what words to use. When we say that 
Frenchmen should stop referring to Germans as “Boches,” or 
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that white people should stop referring to black people as 
“niggers,” we are practicing cultural politics. For our socio-
political goals – increasing the degree of tolerance that 
certain groups of people have for one another – will be 
promoted by abandoning these linguistic practices (Rorty 
2007, 3).  
Rorty’s suggestion of “abandoning” politically or ethically inappropriate 
linguistic usages as a pragmatic exercise is one thing while deconstructing and 
demythologizing them could help understand the socio-political dynamics of 
groups embedded in such practices. In light of this, we can look at some 
linguistic usages related to food and religious identity, and their implication for 
interreligious encounters and relationships in Ethiopia.  
To begin with, it is interesting to see that sometimes one group accepts 
the name another group has labeled it simply to show that the latter does not 
belong to the former. A typical case can be the name “Hindu” that Muslims in 
India gave those native Indians who were unconverted to Islam. And later the 
Indians themselves started “to designate their religious affiliation as Hinduism” 
(Weber 1958, 4). Or the name “Pente” that Protestants have been called by 
Orthodox Christians in Ethiopia is today almost an accepted name by the 
Protestants themselves (Haustein and Østebo 2011). The same can be said of 
early Christians and of other religions. In relation to food and religious identity 
in Ethiopia, ‘appellation’ plays its own role in establishing as well as sustaining 
certain interreligious relationships. In this regard, food and food names have 
their own role in interreligious discourse. Diane McGee aptly describes this 
phenomenon: “Used by outsiders to define a group, food is a key part of a 
group’s self definition” (2002, 15). This helps us to see interreligious discourse 
of food, which is used stereotypically as a template for evaluating other people 
and other cultures (Danesi 2004). In the case of Ethiopia, one group not only 
names a diet, culinary tool, etc. according to the Otherness of another group: 
YeIslam Billa, YeIslam Siga, YeIslam Siga-Bet; YeKristian Billa, YeKirstian 
Siga, YeKristian Siga-Bet (a Muslim knife, Muslim meat, a Muslim butchery; a 
Christian knife, Christian Meat; a Christian butchery, respectively), but it also 
goes as far as naming the Other after the latter’s diet. In addition, the food taboo 
attached to religion and acknowledged by religious groups helps in the 
cohesion of that group and in asserting one’s identity in relation to others and in 
creating a feeling of belongingness (Meyer-Rochow and Benno 2009, 1). In 
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other words, the meal on our plate can be a sign that signifies our 
belongingness to a group making food a socio-cultural symbol or sign 
(Rosenblum 2010, 2).  
An informant in Bahir Dar, for example, said that some Christians 
disdainfully label Muslims as litalit/mukamuk bellita80 (roughly means 
“bland/insipid food eaters” in contrast to the presumably self-proclaimed “fine 
and spicy food eater” Christians. Ulrich Braukamper writes: “[i]t is common all 
over Ethiopia that Orthodox Christians also find it disgusting to eat meat 
slaughtered by members of another religion. […] they said for instance: 
‘Muslim meat is koshasha [‘dirty’] and can not be eaten by us’” (1982, 430, last 
bracket in original). Similarly, a relatively recent study in Jimma, Ethiopia, also 
reports Orthodox Christians’ claim about the perceived inferiority of Muslim 
cooking (Mains 2004, 346). Such a seemingly aesthetic reaction to food 
(Monroe 2007; Krautkramer 2007: 255; Telfer 2002, 41-60; Rodinson, 1965, 
1071-2) points to the power relations I have already discussed in previous 
chapters. Basically, the aesthetic reaction of people as to liking the taste and 
smell of a certain food may depend, among other factors, on whether the food is 
“produced by politically respectable regimes” (Telfer 2002, 44) precisely 
because at macro-sociological level, food serves as an instrument of power 
(Grassi 2013, 194). In view of these points, I discuss below the various 
appellations and interreligious food discourses encapsulated in religious texts, 
popular sayings and legends in the country in general in and in the research area 
in particular.  
 
Food Fellowship with Others in Religious Texts  
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church has produced (in original composition as well 
as through translation) many deuterocanonical and/or extracanonical texts that 
are used to the present day for the purpose of inculcating its the faith and 
customs in its followers. Some of these texts were produced as “ammunition in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)+!Another informant used an alternative derogatory epithet “muk lash” which literally means 
“soup leaker”: “Since Muslims like soup and porridge, they are called ‘soup leakers’. 
Consequently, soup-like foods are regarded as of Muslims.” (“e"g´V %R`52 t-± Z`cß 
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the fight against” (Ullendorff 1968, 102) accusations from other religions 
including Roman Catholicism and as responses to doctrinal questions in 
interfaith relations and polemics with religions such as Islam (see Tekletsadik 
Mekuria 1966 E.C., 782-3; Trimingham 1952). From Metshafe Keder, a book 
translated from Arabic into Ethiopic (Ge’ez) in the 16th century following the 
aftermath of the war between Christian highlanders and Muslim lowlanders, 
and Anketse Amin (Gateway of Faith), a “manual of anti-Muslim polemics” 
(Trimingham 1952) composed in the same period, to Anketse Nisseha (Gateway 
of Repentance), Fetha Negest (Law of Kings), Te’amire Maryam (Miracles of 
Mary) the latter two of which are translations from Arabic into Ethiopic in the 
15th century, are all very valuable texts for interreligious encounters in Ethiopia.  
In what follows, I will attempt to analyze excerpts from some of these texts in 
relation to their importance in elucidating the various themes I have discussed 
above. 
 
Anketse Nesseha (Gateway of Repentance) 
This is a confessional sacrament whose title is composed of two Ge’ez words 
Anketse (Gate) and Nesseha (Repentance). The book in its introductory part 
states how the sacrament is performed:  
Let the repentant read this book, contemplate his sins and 
repent/cry. If he[/she] is illiterate, let the priest read for 
him[/her] … When he[/she] says fitagn [literally ‘untie 
me’], let the priest say, ‘May God untie you,’ and the 
repentant would reply, ‘Amen’ (Anketse Nisseha 1974 
E.C).  
The book then goes on with a list of sins and their corresponding references to 
verse numbers and chapters from the Old Testament and the New. Among them 
are those concerned with dietary trespassing such as breaking fast, eating meat 
slaughtered by a ‘pagan’, eating meat of animal killed by a beast, as well as 
drinking excessively, etc. Eating as transgression is a common notion in both 
classical antiquity and in at least Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, 
Islam). Ancient Egyptians, for example, used to make a “negative confession” 
on Judgment Day to show that they did not sin against their religious laws that 
included food and farming: 
I have not mistreated cattle. 
I have not cut down on the food or income in the temples. 
I have not taken the loaves of the blessed dead. 
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I have not taken milk from the mouths of children. 
I have not built a dam against running water (Spodek 1998 in 
Civitello 2008, 14).  
Food or eating seems to be a foundational myth in Jewish, Christianity as well 
as in Islam (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 112; Garnsey 1999, 95). Evidently, 
according to the Bible, the fate of Adam and Eve was determined by eating the 
forbidden fruit. If the fate of humans was kick-started with the error of having 
eaten the forbidden food in the Garden of Eden, the end of this world, on 
Judgment Day, also involves questions related to food, i.e. feeding: “For I was 
an hungred, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink” 
(Mathew 25: 42). This verse suggests that the question of food yet again 
appears to haunt humans even in their afterlife, making food a decisive factor in 
the divine-human relationship from the first Fall in the Garden of Eden to the 
end of the world on Doomsday. In other words, the implication of religious 
food prohibitions is thus not limited to the mundane interpersonal relationship 
among humans but also between humans and God. One of the sacraments of 
penance in the EOTC also has confession that involves the consumption of 
inappropriate food, particularly meat that is slaughtered by Others: 
For I have eaten what was slaughtered by Aremene81 [pagan], I 
wronged; forgive me (Anketse Nesseha 1974 E.C., 7, my 
translation)82.  
It should be noted that this sacrament is still used in the EOTC for the purpose 
of repentance. Although the Church shows its apparently lenient position over 
food for Christians as to putting no further burden other than which the 
Apostles ordered (The Law of the Kings 1962), other sacramental texts such as 
this one seem to make food a bone of contention against other neighboring 
religions. Although such sacraments themselves allude to and have scriptural 
basis, the possible source of motivation for their very composition, however, 
appear to have ideological implication in that the Church had to use such !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)"!!This word has a lot of meanings. It refers to pagans, idol worshipers, uncivilized and savage 
people as well as non-Christians including Muslims. As Ayele (1975, 59) notes, “in the eyes of 
traditional Christians, all non-Coptic Christians, pagans, and Muslims were despised and 
labeled ‘Aremene,’ which simply means cruel and un-Christian” (see also Muhammad Ali Idris 
2004 E.C, 64-5). !)#!“4%&Gü !¥ ZI&' 44#7 t4*m uIC9” (Anketse Nisseha 1974, 7)!
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protective apparatus to bulwark against the influence and infiltration of 
neighboring religions, which looks evident in another important religious text 
below.  
 
Te’amre Maryam (Miracles of Mary) 
Translated in the fifteenth century during the reign of Zer’a Yakob (1434-1468) 
from Arabic83 to Ethiopic, Te’amre Maryam is one of the most important texts 
in the Church to the present day. It contains narratives worthy of consideration 
for the study of interreligious encounters in general and of Christian-Muslim 
relations in particular in Ethiopia, if not beyond. In this book, there are 
considerable number of miracles showing the struggle between not only Islam 
and Christianity (see Muhammad Ali Idris 2004 E.C) but also between Judaism 
and Christianity, and the triumph of Christians and Christianity “through the 
help and miraculous intercession of St. Mary.” Here, however, a look at an 
excerpt of a miracle in relation only to the discussion of food and interreligious 
encounters in general demonstrates the problematic relationship of the 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christians’ food-fellowship with followers of other 
religions:      
May Her prayer and grace be truly forever upon us, this is the 
miracle that Our Blessed Lady did: There was a Jewish man 
who had a herd of cows that were looked after by his son. 
One day the son brought his bread having wanted to join 
Christian shepherds who were gathered to eat their lunch. 
[But] They said unto him, “You are the son of a Jew whereas 
we are Christian, so until you become Christian, you will not 
eat with us.” [The Jewish boy said:] Convert me to 
Christianity so I can eat with you. One of the shepherds rose 
and took water from their drinks and sprinkled it on the Jew’s 
head. Saying, “I baptize you in the name of the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit and may your name be Gerinan.” 
Then he joined them and ate with them. […]84  
(Te’amre Mariam 1988 E.C, 246-249, Miracle 67: 1-8, About 
a Jewish baptized by children, my translation)  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)$!!Many of the miracles in this book are believed to have been popular in earlier centuries 
in Europe such as in France and in Spain before they were translated from Latin to Arabic 
and reached Ethiopia via Coptic monks from Egypt (Berzock 2002; Yohannes 1988).!!!)%!!Amharic version in Appendix 5!!
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To the devout Ethiopian Orthodox Christian, this book is “a tribute to the 
wondrous virtues and life of the Holy Virgin … an exaltation of the tender-
heartedness, the purity, and the holiness of the blessed Virgin  …” (Yohannes 
1988, 103). However, the book, as some of the miracles it contains imply, can 
also be seen as a subtle instrument to inculcate the distinct identities of 
Christianity in sharp contrast to other religions, on the one hand, and to 
reinforce its border against other religions, which might infiltrate through day-
to-day encounters such as meal fellowship, on the other. Today, this miracle 
may be read mainly in terms of its value as “an exaltation of […] the Virgin” 
(Yohannes 1988, 103). However, in the past, as is evident from the above 
excerpt, the EOTC had maintained the restriction of food fellowship with not 
only Muslims but also Jews (Felashas) in spite of the presence of significant 
Judaic elements in the Church’s food laws. In addition, at some historical 
moments, Jews and Muslims had been treated similarly by being socially 
excluded such as in their separate settlement85 from Christians (see Tekletsadik 
Mekuria 1966 E.C.). The food fellowship discourse that is enveloped in the 
above miracle seems, therefore, to support the hypothesis I suggested above as 
regards the Church’s strategy of maintaining and fortifying its border against 
other religions by setting restrictive food norms.       
  
Food and Religious Narratives in Legends and Popular Sayings 
Food is one of the ubiquitous subjects in oral legends. Popular accounts in 
Ethiopia on the ancestral convergence and divergence between Christians and 
Muslims use narratives that range from the biblical figures like Isaac and 
Ishmael (Abraham’s sons) to Jacob and Esau (Isaac’s sons) to that of legendary 
biographical accounts of some local saints. In this section we shall briefly look 
at two popular legends that contain important accounts of food and 
interreligious encounters between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia. In 
addition to being corpora for diverse interpretations of the historical Christian-
Muslim relations at micro-level, such legends can also have implication in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)&!!Following religious controversy during the reigns of his predecessors,!Yohannes Tsadeku, 
one of the 17th century kings, decreed that Muslims and Felashas (Ethiopian Jews) should 
“establish their own village separate from Christians” (Tekletsadik Mekuria 1966 E.C, 541, my 
translation) !!
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showing the historical-political relationship or the power balance between the 
two religions at macro-level.  
 
The legend of “Christian and Muslim meat in one pan”  
The following is a popular legend, which may have different versions, but I 
retell it here as I heard it from informants by focusing on important points 
relevant to this study.   
Once upon a time Muslim and Christian 
travelers/merchants/soldiers ran out of food and had thus to 
hunt to eat. Both groups got meat but they had only one pan. 
They decided to cook ‘the Christian and the Muslim meat’ at 
the same time in the same pan. But they had to know which 
meat is ‘Christian’ and which one ‘Muslim’. So they came up 
with a solution: tying cords/thread around the Christian meat. 
Then they cooked ‘the two meats’ and enjoyed their 
respective meals ‘together’ (my translation)86.   
Perhaps, as ridiculous and exaggerated as it may sound even from the 
standpoint of the taboo observant individual, this oral legend overall embodies 
the narrative of meat taboo and the symbolic meaning it signifies in religious 
identity. However, it would be crucial to see when or in which contexts such 
kinds of legends are used, and what kind of purpose they serve. Like any 
exemplary story or legend, it seems to have its own special moments and 
contexts either to transmit a positive or a negative implication of the taboo. In 
certain contexts, one may use this legend as to show how 
religiously/scripturally baseless and secularly stupid the taboo is, whereas in 
another context, the same legend can be used to elaborate and exemplify the 
symbolic meaning of ‘commensality’ and convivium that such a legend has for 
the two religious groups. But, in this legend, it is interesting to look at the 
“pan”, as a culinary object, playing its double role as a “pan” in its literal sense 
as well as an object that “unites” its contents – the Christian and the Muslim 
meat together, by marking the “identity” of its content. It can be an allegory of 
the Ethiopian society and culture that embraces different groups with their 
identities and norms.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)'!!Amharic version in Appendix 5!
! "$$!
It must be noted, among other points, that the notion of sharing is at the 
heart of this legend. Whether they really mean it from their heart or not, it is de 
rigueur for most Ethiopians, while they eat, to say enibla (literally means ‘let’s 
eat’) to encourage the other person to join in. This is also evident in the 
common quip Bichawun yebela bichawun yimotal (One who eats alone dies 
alone), making sharing and commensality essential social norms. In other 
words, commensality seems to be an antithesis of selfishness or extreme 
individualism because it has a “magical property” of transforming the “self-
seeking individuals into collaborative group” (Belasco 2008, 19). Therefore, 
food sharing is a common social practice between Christians and Muslims even 
in a situation, as in the legend, where actually partaking food from the same 
plate appears to be impossible. In fact, given the disgust attributed to the taboo, 
the above legend might sound not only like an exaggeration but also far from 
describing the actual state of affairs when it comes to the salience of meat in the 
Christian-Muslim encounters in the country. However, there are some practical 
cases reported (see Braukamper 1982). It should be noted that the 
‘commensality’ in this legend is driven by the scarcity of utensils, but the 
individuals did at least a symbolic gesture of observing the taboo by marking 
their respective meat in the pan. An informant who dares to defy her disgust by 
dining ‘together’ with her Muslim guests at her daughter’s wedding also 
reflects similar attitude. She recalled: 
We did not attend in different tent or dass. Both the Muslim 
and the Christian guests ate together in one dass. We looked 
like children of the same father and the same mother87. 
To put what she meant by eating “together” in perspective, it should be said that 
she does not mean eating the same food. She is rather interested in describing 
the spatial aspect of the wedding: who sits where while eating. For this woman, 
daring to shatter the border is tantamount to the sublimation of religious 
difference in food context even if each group was served its own proper food 
prepared according to its own religious etiquette. As we discussed in previous 
sections about commensality between Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)(!K!i!4L8,Z!@"!c>$!x-™-!%NE4&$!ZI'$E=9!Z"#e$!Z)*"+,H$!!-_@!M-x!#>!E=!ZLGt4=!
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notion of space vis-à-vis meat is important. The likes of the above woman, 
however, try to break the physical boundary to sit physically close to the other. 
One common point between the individuals in the legend and the account from 
this woman is that both appear to equate defying their disgust to a sublimation 
of religious border not by breaking the taboo but the border that the taboo often 
engenders. Finally, apart from the details of the commensality performance in 
the story, based on the right time and context, the totality of the above legend is 
an instrumental example used by some people to show the extent of 
commensality and the culture of understanding differences between the two 
religious groups even at times of inconvenience as the individuals are depicted 
in the legend. Moreover, it also shows the will to keep the balance between 
religious commitment (at least at symbolic level) and social relations. In short, 
if the social fabric of Christian and Muslim societies in Ethiopia necessitates 
creative ways of dealing with food taboos that would otherwise make 
commensality difficult, the solution that the individuals in the above legend 
come up with – no matter how naïve it may appear – can at least be interpreted 
as a tentative remedy in the face of difficult circumstances and seemingly 
irreconcilable differences.          
 
The legend of “the ox that was slaughtered twice”  
The following legend that is thought to have happened during the reign of 
Emperor Yohannes IV needs to be recounted here, for it reveals the political 
and historical weight that the notions of commensality and difference carry in 
Christians-Muslim relations in Ethiopia. First of all, the Emperor is known to 
have taken harsh measures in a seemingly draconian style of nation building 
that included forced conversion of Muslims into Christianity in his 1878 edict 
of Boru Meda (see Ahmed 2006b). As a characteristic of many other oral 
legends, the legend of “the ox that was slaughtered twice” might have many 
variants, but the one I heard from informants is briefly presented below:  
In a bid to unite Christians and Muslims in one lemat/ma’id, 
Emperor Yohannes was forcing both sides to eat meat from 
the same animal. At this time in Wollo, one day, people locked 
horns over who would slaughter the ox, which led to bitter 
debate that forced the locals to find a solution by bringing 
authorities from both sides who would decide as to who would 
slaughter the ox. The two authorities - the priest from the 
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Christian side and the sheikh from that of the Muslim - 
appeared before the public to solve the deadlock. A curious 
thing, however, happened when the priest graciously allowed 
the sheikh to slaughter the ox. The sheikh did slaughter the ox. 
But the act of the priest disappointed, if not angered, the 
Christian public who complained, “Is he going to have us eat 
meat slaughtered by a Muslim?” The priest who saw the 
disgruntled Christian public slaughtered the victim again out 
of which blood miraculously gushed out anew. […] Then, both 
the Christians and the Muslims happily savored the meat 
exchanging gursha (mouthful) from this same beef (my 
translation)88.  
To begin with, for some, this legend is regarded not only as an epitome of the 
peaceful coexistence of Christians and Muslims in Wollo but also an important 
lesson for interreligious co-existence in Ethiopia. In this spirit, some people 
say, “We shared the same meat from one ox,” showing the degree of 
commensality and conviviality especially in this area despite the taboo.  But for 
others, it is wrong and theologically unacceptable. A Muslim learned informant 
(from the so-called ‘old Muslims’89 camp), for example, amidst our 
conversation about slaughtering, brought up this legend and denounced it as an 
“un-Islamic practice”:  
There is this talk of an animal slaughtered by a priest and a 
qalicha, which Islam does not allow. They ate after the priest 
slaughtered it in the name of the Father and the qalicha 
saying ‘Bismilahi’. But this does not go with Islam90.        
However, the legend can also be interpreted as that which confirms the 
perceived superiority of Christianity as a true religion vis-à-vis Islam. The 
apparent bullishness of the priest on letting the sheikh slaughter the ox and then 
to slaughter it himself again, which is followed by the miraculous gushing out 
of blood anew from the victim, suggests a divine intervention in favor of 
Christianity. In other words, the slaughtering by the priest seems to cancel the 
‘defilement’ of the animal through the earlier slaughtering by the sheikh, and 
above all, to evoke a divine intervention that would affirm the truthfulness of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!))!!Amharic version in Appendix 5. !)*! ! I use here what some Muslim informants themselves use. Such distinction comes to 
discussion because of the strict observance of the taboo by the so-called ‘old Muslims’ and the 
rejection of the taboo by the ‘new’ ones (See Chapter 6). !*+!K>ô!µù2!hNn=!M-xE5!zE=!!-"ë=-!%*'=!4ú.!µù!T4"?Q’!Qí!hNn=$!Tf"`#∂’!Qí!
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the faith of the former. The order in the performance of the slaughtering by the 
two individuals, i.e. the sheikh’s slaughtering being followed by the priest, is 
also another important point to note. For example, given the historical power 
relationship between the two religious groups as reflected even to the present 
day over the supposed disgust that the taboo entails, if the slaughtering had 
happened in a reverse order, it would have been less likely for the Christian 
congregation to share the meat that was known to have been ‘defiled’ by a 
person of the other faith (as is confirmed by their disappointment when the 
priest allowed the sheikh to slaughter). In short, even if such kind of legends 
show seemingly outrageous commensality— forced or otherwise— in sharing 
meat of one animal, a closer look at the details of the performances reveals that 
an attempt to officially break the taboo seems to have happened in a remarkably 
symmetrical pattern with the official power balance between the two religious 
groups in the country and with the taboo’s role in the equation. It should be 
noted that while for some, from an orthodox perspective, such legends are 
unscriptural and thus have no theological justification, for others they are 
viewed as testimonies of coexistence and unity between the two religions in the 
country in a win-win situation without giving up one’s religious belief/custom. 
In a nutshell, such seemingly banal legend demonstrates the power of food in 
general and that of this taboo not only in the micro-level encounters but also in 
the macro-level historical political relationships between Christians and 
Muslims in the country. Ulrich Braukamper has given an account on some 
taboo observant individuals’ compromising solution, which effectively shows 
that the above two legends hold some truth:  
A compromise is sometimes made when workers or members 
of mutual assistance associations made up of both Christians 
and Muslims are given an animal to slaughter. When killing it, 
a representative of both groups says the words prescribed by 
his respective faith, and then the meat can be consumed by 
everybody. Pious and dogmatic people, however, will not 
accept such a solution (Braukamper 1984, 430). 
Although “pious and dogmatic” people may not accept this kind of solution, the 
observance of this taboo, however, is more than being pious or dogmatic. 
Individuals who no more believe in the taboo also find it hard to break it. As I 
have pointed out throughout and as some informants’ narratives show (Chapter 
4), the influence of “pedagogy of disgust” (Highmore 2010, 130) that one 
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acquires since childhood seems to override one’s rationalization of any kind 
(religious or secular) to break the taboo. However, Braukamper’s report shows 
that the two legends reflect actual state of affairs as regards some individuals’ 
attempt to find “a solution” by keeping the balance between religious 
commitment and food fellowship with people of the other faith.  
In addition to legends, day-to-day linguistic usages do also have 
potentials for understanding interreligious relationships. As stated in fair depth 
in Chapter 3, the knife, as a synecdoche of slaughtering and beyond its function 
of cutting, and meat, beyond its goodness in nourishing, serve as “articles of 
faith” in all sense of the term in interreligious encounters in Ethiopia. The 
following discussions on “eating with two knives” and “only the knife separates 
us” discourses show the place of food and culinary tools in Christian-Muslim 
relations. The taboo is a deep and unshakable belief held by the observant 
individual so much so that food and culinary tools become “articles of faith” by 
marking a dividing line between the two religious groups in various socio-
cultural spheres.  
 
“Eating with two knives” 
Apart from practice, particularly the place of the knife in food and religious 
identity discourse in the country is well documented in proverbial statements. 
Perhaps no other phrase better captures the concept of the knife and the 
religious identity it marks than the Amharic idiomatic expression: “Egele 
beHulet Bilawa Yibelal (“So-and-so eats with two knives”), which 
idiomatically refers to someone who is not trustworthy. While defining the 
phrase é>?}L f" Haimanote bis, which roughly means “irreligious,” Desta 
Teklewold, in his Amharic dictionary, gives the following meanings: G2uB 
menafik heretic; é>?}L GR± haimanote metfo one who has a bad religion, 
and more important to us here, 4∑ f#~ Z`4# BeHulet Bilawa Yemibela one 
who eats with two knives (Desta Teklewold 1962 E.C.). Whereas those who 
eat only meat slaughtered by their “own knife” (i.e., according to their religious 
slaughtering ritual/etiquette) show fidelity to their faith, those who are 
indifferent to the distinct meat or eat both ‘Christian and Muslim meat’ are not 
only “infidel” to their religion in food contexts but also “infidel” and 
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untrustworthy in other aspects of social life. In short, “eating with two knives” 
is equated with having no religion, which amounts to being untrustworthy.  
In addition, in relation to slaughtering and the resultant 
‘Christian/Muslim meat’, one imam informant who denounces the taboo as 
scripturally baseless has the following to say about how the taboo has achieved 
a proverbial status in the collective consciousness of the Christian and the 
Muslim societies in Ethiopia:   
It [the taboo] has become statement of vow: If I do this, 
consider me as I have eaten ‘Muslim meat’; if I do that, 
consider me as I have eaten ‘Christian meat’. It has no 
theological basis. But the so-called old Muslims — when we 
ask them why they don’t eat what is slaughtered by 
Christians — say, ‘It is the custom that our forefathers taught 
us.’ However, there is no better father than our Prophet. If we 
do not eat what he allowed us to eat, it means he is wrong. 
[…] In the past, I myself had to vomit having seen someone 
eating ‘Christian meat’ in Bure [a district in Gojjam Zone].91    
This study, as noted from the outset, is not interested in verifying the dogmatic 
veracity of this taboo in Islam or in Christianity. However, among the points 
that the informant mentioned, the point that the taboo’s status in being a 
“statement of vow” as an article of faith is worth noting. That is, it shows the 
place of the taboo in the mind of those who tenaciously observe it, or how 
unbreakable this taboo is for such individuals. The importance of the taboo as 
“unambiguous dividing line” (Abbink 2007, 72) between Christians and 
Muslims in Ethiopia seems to be even more significant than any other major 
and fundamental dividing lines between the two religions, the implication of 
which is further discussed below.   
 
“Bila bicha new yemileyen” (“Only the knife separates us”) 
It is worth looking at a statement that some people use to emphasize the 
commonalities of the two religions: “only the knife separates us; aside from the 
knife [slaughtering] that separates us, we [Christians and Muslims] are one.” 
Through this statement, we can, on the one hand, see the importance of food !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*"! ! “G??, z∏N9 >ç- K&mC Z"#$ "6 !-'4#7 dw&=. >ç-- M&_ Z)*"+,- "6 
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and culinary tools, i.e., knife, in the religious identity consciousness of people, 
and the apparently almost-insignificant role of the theological differences 
between the two religions, on the other. In other words, the other differences 
between Christianity and Islam do not seem to have as much weight as 
dietary/culinary differences for their encounters. In the eye of certain religious 
elites, such a saying might be reproachable and viewed as lack of knowledge of 
one’s own as well as the other religion (Ford 2008, 61). But, not surprisingly, 
what sounds irrational from the point of view of religion can be rational from 
that of the secular and vice versa. In short, the knife, as a quintessential 
slaughtering tool embodies narratives related to slaughtering and 
dietary/culinary differences and is charged with significations that determine 
not only the relationship between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in specific 
socio-cultural settings but also the categorization of space with other semiotic 
signs on broader public spheres in Ethiopia.    
 
Food and Religious Stereotypes: Polemics in Oral Poetry  
My main point of interest in this study indeed is food and religion. But as 
much as one hears negative stereotypes encapsulated in food names and food 
metaphors against one religion, there are also some general positive 
stereotypes. For example, one particular positive stereotype about Muslims in 
the Amharic language is worthy of our attention, for it could have its own role 
in the trust built between the ‘transaction’ of food in the Christian-Muslim 
hospitality. The positive stereotype is literally proverbial as is reported by one 
of my local elite informants “Islam Kabele; ken agodele,”92 which roughly 
literally goes, “If a Muslim lies, the day fails”. This is to mean that if a Muslim 
lies, it is a bad sign that the period/epoch is an adverse one. This saying, apart 
from the positive image of trustworthiness it invokes about Muslims, also 
seems to play in the day-to-day transaction and communication between the 
two religious groups. The role this kind of stereotypical saying plays in their 
encounters in food contexts, which demands trustworthiness on the part of the 
host as to meeting the dietary/culinary demands of the guest, is very vital.    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*#!!K!"#$!K48(!A-!%º'8”!
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Although food and food contexts, as we have seen in this study, are used 
to express the positive interactions and the mutual respect for one another, food 
is also used as a polemical tool between Christians and Muslims in the study 
area. There are some food-related stereotypes, food metaphors, sayings, etc that 
are, for example, used as markers of one’s superiority in contrast to the 
inferiority of the other group. Some of them are popular sayings with 
apparently teasing remarks about the Other group’s dietary or drink habits 
which are stereotypical of the religious group that the saying targets. The 
following poetic sayings exemplify this point:  
%#ç Zc''= '("( 
t-â- ìW= 4â-9 
Allah yewededew Momin, 
Genzebun fejew bebun. 
A Momin93 who is loved by Allah, 
Wasted his money on bunna (coffee).  
Told from the standpoint of Christians, this saying refers to the association of 
coffee with Muslims94. While the first line appears to sarcastically remark that 
Muslims are “loved by Allah,” the second sounds as a disapproval of the 
consumption of coffee, which in some cases is discouraged by pious Christians 
and some church authorities. In doing so, there appears to underlie a theme of 
associating coffee with others, i.e. with Muslims, perhaps as a strategy of 
discouraging Christians not to drink coffee. In sharp response, it seems, to the 
above one is the one below, which is told by Muslims who stereotypically 
associate the Christians with tella — locally brewed alcoholic ale.         
%#ç Zw#= c'#( 
t-â- ìW= 4w#9 
Allah yetelaw wedella, 
Genzebun fejew betella. 
A wedella hated by Allah, 
Wasted his money on tella. 
This one seems to target mainly Christians who are referred here as wedella 
(apparently means an undisciplined, unrestrained) hated by Allah although it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*$!!Momin means Muslim in the area. 
*%!!This appears to be different from one historical case in Harar (eastern Ethiopia). That is, as 
reported by Waldron (1980 cited in Carmichael 2004, 223) after the era of Emperor Yohannes 
some Harari Muslims avoided coffee as a sign of rejecting the Christian norms as they 
considered coffee as a Christian drink.!!
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may be equally used to refer to some fellow Muslims who do not abstain from 
alcohol according to Islamic prohibition of an intoxicating drink. If Muslims 
throw the above poem at the Christians, the latter also have yet another oral 
poem that is laden with remarks that target the abstinence by Muslims of 
alcoholic beverages such as tej (mead): 
!"#$ ,#M® [,#Be?]?- w† %8= w¥. 
c5X$ 8G4R4R 8?c) E= !-¥9 
Islam yalakimu man teta alew tej, 
Wetrom lemebetbet lemawek new enji. 
Why the hell did a Muslim drink mead, 
Except for disturbing and troubling as usual.  
Using one of the drink prohibitions that make Muslims distinct from other 
religions and cultural groups, the poem/poet attacks Muslims for disturbing or 
being notorious. The first line disdainfully poses a seemingly rhetorical 
question that suggests there is no good reason for a Muslim to drink alcohol. 
The second line answers the question by implying that there is no good reason, 
but if there is one, it is just “for disturbing and troubling.” However, a holistic 
reading of the poem appears to disparage Muslims for not handling (potent) 
alcohol, which they are not used to thereby implying a sort of impotence and 
lack of manliness and prowess. This squares with another food and religious 
stereotype we have seen before about the litalit/mukamuk (bland/insipid food) 
that some Christians associate with Muslims. According to popular belief, 
eating spicy food is associated with bravery while avoiding spicy food “makes 
one coward”. As an informant puts it: 
Since Muslims do not [often] add berbere (chili) and salt, 
their food is often defined as alicha95 [insipid]. This habit of 
eating alicha is believed to make people coward96.       
Overall, the disdain that one group shows over the other as regards the 
consumption of certain drinks or food between Christians and Muslims as 
reflected in the above oral poems is primarily a way of marking difference 
through stereotypes mediated by food or drink. In addition, both religious !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*&! !Alicha is a sauce made often of turmeric and other spices but not berbere (chili). Often 
contrasted with sauces made of chili, which is associated with bravery and potency, alicha 
signifies impotence and cowardice. It is common to insult a coward man as yewend alicha 
(alicha of a man).  !
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groups seem to disapprove a certain form of social pathology97 namely wasting 
money on a drink whose consumption each group disapproves while the 
Christians particularly seem to stereotype Muslims as if they had propensity for 
violence (“disturbing and troubling as usual”).  
The following two oral poems also have implication for the preparation of 
food, particularly on the Sabbath, which is one of the Mosaic characteristics of 
dietary customs of the EOTC in general and of their distinct quality as opposed 
to the Islamic dietary/culinary culture. 
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Endet yitaftal yeIslam Injera; 
Be’Ihud beKdame bebal yetesra.  
How delicious is a Muslim Injera, 
Which is prepared on Saturday and on Sunday!/? 
If Friday is important for Muslims so is the Sabbath for Christians. The EOTC 
revers the Sabbath of the Old Testament and that of the New (see Haile 1988). 
This is also reflected in the second line of the poem, which lends itself to 
various interpretations and contexts depending on how the speaker intends to 
use it. For example, it can be read: (a) as exclamation, (b) as sarcasm, and (c) as 
question because of the word how (endet). If we read it as exclamation, it may 
sound positive because the poet is admiring the injera of a Muslim. The late 
Ethiopian singer Mary Armde’s rendition of this lyric with her famous Kirar 
(five- or six-stringed musical instrument) can be an example of the positive 
meaning. But, it can most likely be a sarcastic remark in Amharic language to 
show an indirect disapproval of something. Moreover, one may read it as 
question that tacitly suggests the unlikelihood of the ‘Muslim injera’ made on 
the Sabbath to be delicious. Or, it may also imply that it is tastier because it is 
fresher but also not because it is prepared at the improper time. In a nutshell, 
however, aside from the various possible interpretations, the fact that it has 
captured the notion of time in religion and the role of time in food and food 
preparation both of which have an implication in religious identity discourse. 
Another musho (a folk poetry roughly similar to dirge) also holds the notion of 
time as regards food preparation for the Orthodox Christians and thus their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*(! ! I made this analysis based on Jon Abbink’s study of the drinking culture in Southern 
Ethiopia (see Abbink 1997, 19-20). !
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disapproval of food prepared at wrong time — on Sabbath or on holidays — by 
Muslims.   
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Ay kunjina kentu (Egele) bakenech, 
Bebal yetefeche y’slam duket honech. 
Oh the vanity of beauty! (So-and-so) is wasted, 
She became ‘Muslim-flour’ ground on Sabbath.  
Like the previous poem, this one too holds another distinct notion of food and 
religion in the EOTC, which reveres the Mosaic food laws, especially as 
regards food preparation and time. As I noted in an earlier chapter, the question 
of identity related to food is not simply directed at who prepares the food alone 
but also when the food is prepared. This means that food which is prepared at 
the right time is believed to have blessings (bereket) whereas food prepared on 
holidays, on a Saint’s day, and most of all on Sabbath (Saturday and Sunday) 
does not have bereket means it does not last long, which the poet alludes the 
vanity of beauty to. As it has already been noted, perhaps because of the 
veneration and/or imitation of the Old Testament or of the Judaic influence, 
some pious and ascetic Orthodox Christians observe the Sabbath (see Haile 
1988) by avoiding grinding flour, fetching water, plowing, weeding, etc. 
Therefore, the poet has exploited this marked difference to allude to and 
compare the diseased with flour that is ground on a holiday. As the so-called 
Muslim-meat in this study goes, food that is prepared by Muslims in a manner 
that differs from the Christians can thus be regarded as an identity marker as 
reflected in the poem.  
Finally, one oral poem captures the taboo under question and the notions 
of commensality, defilement, dietary trespassing, etc that this study dealt with. 
More precisely, it shows the difficulty of commensality between Christians and 
Muslims in Ethiopia and the regrets that an individual goes through after a 
dietary trespassing. The poem goes:      
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Beliche metahu ke’slam gara, 
Engedih miné Amara.  
I have come back having eaten with a Muslim; 
What is now my identity of Amhara [Christian]! 
(Source: Desta Teklewold 1962 E.C., 110, my translation) 
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Leaving the poetic license aside, the poem first of all demonstrates yet again the 
commonly used misnomer that takes all Christians as synonymous with the 
Amhara ethnic group and vice versa, and that depicts Islam almost as an 
antithesis of this ethnic group despite the fact that there are Amharas who have 
different faiths other than Christianity. Above all, it brings us to the notion of 
dietary transgression and the question of religious identity attached to food. The 
poem has a monologue voice that a person who realized her/his dietary 
trespassing questions the status of his/her Christian identity. That is, eating the 
wrong food or communing with Muslims seems to have defiled the sacred self 
and body of the speaker who should make some kind of remedy in order to 
return to the previous status of his/her Christian identity, the details of which 
have already been discussed in Chapter 4.            
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Synthesizing the Paradox of Commensality and 
Difference  
 
As I indicated from the outset, food contexts in Ethiopia, because of the taboo 
under study, are paradoxical cultural spaces of convergence and divergence 
between Christians and Muslims. The role of this taboo in engendering disgust 
in the observant Christian and Muslim is a point worthy of consideration. Also 
the overall system around the taboo should be re-interpreted as to see its 
implications for interreligious contact. Theology, as a “systematic 
rationalization of customs and of the fragmentary, uncriticized ideas carried 
along in the practice of religion” (Ames 1928, 16), is one but not the only way 
of interpreting religious cultural elements. Thus, this custom should not simply 
be dismissed as sheer prejudice or a barrier based only on scriptural bases or on 
some non-religious reasonings. Rather, a cultural analysis of religious practices 
can help in the understanding of religions’ and religious institutions’ 
contribution to and power of shaping the cultural dynamics of a society (Wood 
1999). It is in this spirit that I have synthesized the following tentative virtues 
out of the system built on the taboo and the affective experiences of the taboo 
observant by exploring the role of the host and of the guest at wedding feasts, 
for example.      
 
Beyond Taboo 
The following section sets out some of the latent functions that the religious 
taboo affords thanks to the system of reciprocal hospitality, mutual 
accommodation, empathy, friendship, etc built on it. While some of the 
functions attained by observing the taboo are moral virtues (such as 
temperance), others like group solidarity have social functions in binding 
people together by affirming group identity.  
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Observing religious food taboo as a sign of temperance 
Temperance is considered to be one of the cardinal moral virtues (Foot 2002). 
It is an important quality of a person who shows moderation and self-restraint 
in eating and drinking. It involves abstinence from certain kind of food or is a 
moderate intake of food and drink. It is thus an important moral virtue in the 
Abrahamic and other Oriental religions while it is also a moral virtue in 
classical philosophies such as in Stoicism. In the case of Orthodox Christians 
and Muslims in Ethiopia, whoever assumes the guest role (Christian or 
Muslim) seems to demonstrate this important virtue owing to their religious 
commitment of observing food taboo. We can see this more clearly by looking 
at the reaction of people who observe this taboo against those who break the 
taboo. Christians or Muslims who do not observe or who are indifferent to the 
‘Christian/Muslim meat’ are often given various derogatory epithets. Some of 
the most common are: agases (equine), jib (hyena), asama (pig), metaphors 
used to describe people who eat immoderately and without any restriction. 
While the first two show the immoderate intake of food, the latter specially 
shows the intake of food without any choice. The manner in which a person 
eats without being selective is called ‘magbesbes’ (amassing) or the person 
‘agbesbash’ (amasser) that shows gluttony98, which is the antithesis of 
temperance and is thus a vice. As Donald Levine writes of the people in this 
research area, “[t]he Amhara learns step by step how to chasten his stomach in 
the traditional way” (Levine 1972, 104; see also Molvaer 1980, 67). 
Chastening one’s stomach might be seen as a form of temperance. A Muslim 
authority, for his part, also underscores the importance of temperance:   
Even among what is halal, we should not eat too much. 
Eating 1/3 of what our stomach is capable of holding is ideal, 
as we learnt from our Prophet … 
Yet more to the point of disgust is the apparent positive attitude expressed in 
the Amharic adjective tseyuf referring to someone who shuns some food in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!*)! ! In Christianity,!gluttony, as a temptation of the appetite to consumption including of 
what is forbidden, is viewed as vice that led the first man, Adam, to Fall while Proverbs 
23:2 also commands, “Put a knife to thy throat if thou be a man given to appetite” (Belasco 
2008, 2; see also Garnsey 1999, 95-6) 
  !!
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disgust and who does not eat whatever she/he finds available to eat. It may also 
refer to an immaculate person who is not only physically clean but also 
uninterested in other people’s properties or to a person who shuns the 
temptations of corruption and other forms of malfeasance such as bribery. 
Therefore, not only is a certain degree of disgust against some food items 
viewed positively but pickiness in general also appears to be tantamount to 
temperance. Therefore, as much as the observance of this taboo is considered 
as a sign of one’s purity and religious commitment, breaking it would occasion 
disapproval, if not excommunication, which is discussed in Chapter 3 and 4.   
 
Secular and religious commitments in harmony 
This taboo can be seen as how individuals for whom such meat is an issue duly 
interact by not only respecting but also by providing accommodative treatment 
of differences related to the religious-oriented dietary demands of the Other 
group. As Mary Douglas writes boundary is more than a negative barrier of 
exclusion, rather “it bounds the area of structured relations. Within that area 
rules apply. Outside it, anything goes” (Douglas 1972, 79). Therefore, such a 
system of reciprocal hospitality established au tour this food taboo is 
effectively working without compromising one’s religious identity. Individuals 
should not forsake their religious values and dietary commitments to please 
their religious Others, nor do they offend them by declining the invitation to 
the latter’s wedding feast only clinging to observing the religious food taboo 
that makes commensality very hard. It is no exaggeration that in this system, to 
borrow Cornel West’s proposition, the secular is religiously musical and the 
religious secularly musical (West 2011, 93). In other words, the mundane and 
the religious seem to be harmonized without one necessarily disenchanting the 
other because, as Catherine Bell (1997) notes, periodic rituals are capable of 
refreshing the experiences of the sacred and the profane selves of individuals 
and of “embedding these […] experiences in their sense of community and 
self” (Bell 1997, 25). In short, when people who observe the religious food 
taboo are engaged in such secular settings, the context does not force them to 
compromise their religious commitment, and conversely and more importantly, 
their religious commitment also does not deter them from fulfilling their socio-
cultural responsibilities.    
! "%*!
Observing taboo as a manifestation of group solidarity  
The observance of this taboo in general can also be seen as a means of group 
solidarity (Meyer-Rochow and Benno 2009). For example, even those who are 
often lenient on the taboo tend to observe it on formal occasions such as at 
wedding feasts where other fellow members of the same religion are present. 
Apart from observing the taboo related to meat, it should also be noted that 
Muslims show an important aspect of temperance, i.e. abstinence from alcohol. 
It might sound pretence or hypocrisy from the point of view of truly practicing 
religious people, but temporary observance of the taboo anyway is instrumental 
in giving assurance to members of a religious community who might otherwise 
have been offended by seeing their fellow member breaking the religious 
dietary taboo. However, rituals by their nature are capable of not only 
reanimating the sacred selves of individuals (Bell 1997) but also “strengthen 
the bonds attaching the individual to the society of which he is a member” 
(Durkheim 1965 cited in Bell 1997, 25). From another theoretical perspective, 
the system built around this food taboo on interreligious encounters serves 
members of one religious group as a communication accommodation 
instrument according to Communication Accommodation Theory (CAT). 
Although this theory concerns mainly language and speech behaviors, its 
pattern has also been applied to other forms and norms of communication in 
interethnic and cross-cultural communications (Gallois and Callan, 1991), and 
thus its theoretical model can also be extended to non-verbal features including 
food, which effectively is “a system of communication” (Barthes [1961] 1997). 
This theory sheds light on the understanding of meat taboo as a cause of 
convergence and divergence between the two religious groups in food contexts 
in Ethiopia. As Lamont and Molnar (2002, 181) observe, “boundaries are 
conditions not only for separation and exclusion, but also for communication, 
exchange, bridging, and inclusion”. Evidently, although the physical boundary 
is notable in food contexts that involve meat, the taboo under discussion 
basically plays an important role by being a converging agent for people of 
common element of identity to identify themselves in one group while it 
simultaneously becomes a cause for members of one religious group to diverge 
and assert their distinct religious identity vis-à-vis members of the other 
religious group, say, the host. Mention should also be made here about the role 
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of disgust, as noted before, in creating border thereby one group separates itself 
from the other, which is best expressed by Miller (1997, 194-5) as: “Disgust 
has other powerful communalizing capacities […]. It performs this function 
obviously by helping define and locate the boundary separating our group from 
their group, purity from pollution, the violable from the inviolable.” This very 
well chimes with the central thesis that this study is pursuing: food effectively 
serves as a uniting and a separating agent in Christian-Muslim encounters in 
Ethiopia.  
 
Resistance against or alternative interpretation to scriptures?  
It is very difficult to reduce the dietary differences connected particularly to 
meat between Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia simply to prejudice. For it 
engenders many questions and/or controversies: where do we position 
ourselves when labeling this custom as prejudice, irrational, or scripturally 
baseless? Or, are we accusing such a custom from the standpoint of a non-
religious person? Are we assuming a Christian or Muslim position? If so, to 
which sect or denomination do we belong? In any case, as Louis Brenner notes, 
“neither ‘Christianity’ nor ‘Islam’ is in itself an analytic concept; neither 
concept can act as a point of reference for identifying and analyzing the actual 
diversity and variation of what social actors might perceive or experience as 
Christian or as Islamic in any specific context” (Brenner 2000, 143). 
Accordingly, failure to recognize the distinction between “abstract doctrinal 
positions” of religious institutions and “the actual state of affairs” practiced in 
the wider society (Ullendorff 1968, 100; see also Brenner 2000, 144) will lead 
to a wrong conclusion such that some dietary customs in Ethiopia are irrelevant 
because they apparently have no scriptural basis, a position one witnesses in 
those who reject the custom under discussion as barrier. One might reasonably 
argue that there is apparently no explicit dictate of scripture, nor an 
authoritative interpretation of the oft-disputed scriptural verses in both 
religions in Ethiopia as to clearly and explicitly sanction the observance or the 
disapproval of this taboo. Therefore, if the non-observant finds scriptural basis 
for his/her rejection of the taboo, so would the observant for his observance.  
However, beyond such apparent flexibility of scriptural warrant to 
observe or not to observe food laws, some of the ‘unwritten’ food taboos, such 
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as the one we are discussing here, might also be viewed as an alternative 
interpretation for or against the food laws prescribed in both Muslim and 
Christian scriptures and laws. Accordingly, the separate slaughtering practice 
can be viewed either as a resistance to scripture or as an alternative 
interpretation to the scant verses in scriptures about food fellowship with non-
Jews in the Old Testament and with non-Christians in the New. For example, 
some Christians interpret certain biblical verses (e.g. 1 Corinthians 8: 1-13; 2 
Corinthians 6: 14; Jeremiah 16: 899) in such a way that makes food fellowship 
with Others difficult which appears to give many Ethiopian Orthodox 
Christians an apparent biblical justification for their separation with their 
religious Others on account of food in general and of meat in particular. 
Similarly, in the Qur’an (Surat Al-Mai’dah 5: 5), even more clearly, there is a 
reference to people of the book (ahl al kitabi — Jews and Christians) with 
whom food fellowship for Muslims is possible: “This day [all] good foods have 
been made lawful, and the food of those who were given the Scripture is lawful 
for you and your food is lawful for them.” However, this verse of the Qur’an, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, has different interpretations among different sects of 
Islam (see Rodinson 1965) whereas in the same chapter (Surat An’nahi 5: 51) 
it reads: “O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as 
allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them 
among you - then indeed, he is of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the 
wrongdoing people.” Some Muslims interpret such a verse as reason enough 
not to socialize with their religious Others while others take it as a justification 
for rejecting the food of Jews or Christians. It is, however, not uncommon that 
people often make their own interpretations to generate a local version of world 
religions; as a result, the world religions become “congeries of local variants, 
of which none can be said sensibly to be the ‘correct’ or ‘real’ one” (Eller 
2007, 204). Overall, in a country where world religions have been indigenized 
and marked by an intricate syncretism for centuries, it is hardly possible to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!**! !“Thou shalt not also go into the house of feasting, to sit with them to eat and to drink.” 
(Jeremiah 16:8)  !
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distinguish which aspect of a certain custom is purely cultural and which one 
strictly scriptural.  
 
Food polemics as buffer against fundamental interreligious chasm?  
As indicated earlier, despite some sporadic but at times very severe conflicts, 
the general Christian-Muslim relations in Ethiopia are often described as 
relatively peaceful. When attempts were made in the past to reconcile 
differences between the two religions, food polemics almost always came to 
the forefront on the dialogue table, to the extent of eclipsing other ‘basic’ 
polemics and theological chasms between the two religions. All Ethiopian 
kings and rulers who reigned in the second half of the 19th century and early 
20th century: Tewodros II, Yohannes IV, Menilik II, Ras Ali and Lij Iyassu 
attempted to reconcile the two religions (Ficquet 2006) by targeting elements 
presumably of micro-level interactions. In doing so, abolishing the taboo 
related to meat seems to have been not only a means but also an end in their 
reconciliation effort although none of them succeeded in scraping this long-
enduring custom. For instance, Emperor Menelik II is said to have vowed to 
make the two religious groups dine on meat at the same gebeta/ma’id (roughly 
table) while Emperor Tewodors also was determined to make the two religious 
groups share food from the same lemat. Eloi Ficquet has discussed the attempt 
of these rulers in relation to this taboo (Ficquet 2006). However, the top-down 
effort to unite Christians and Muslims in the name of avoiding fanaticism 
continued also during Emperor Hailesellasie I as was evident, for example, 
from a symbolic “communal feasting” between Christians and Muslims in 
Harar town following his coronation in 1930 (Carmichael 2004, 225). What is 
remarkable in all these rulers’ attempts to unite Christians and Muslims 
primarily in a food context is that their apparent success, unfortunately, comes 
more often than not at the expense of one group, namely that of Muslims. In 
other words, it seems that the Muslims were supposed to give up their food 
identity in order to conform to the preponderant influence of the Christian 
norms. However, any party that attempted to forcibly abolish this taboo 
appeared to have missed the fact that the taboo is an important marker of 
religious identity by serving, among other purposes, as an affirmation of one’s 
religious identity and as a gesture of resistance against the dietary and power 
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discourse of the dominant group. As a result it has served both religions as a 
protective discourse by muting the more fundamental interreligious differences 
between the two religions. As is evident from the attempt by Ethiopian 
Christian rulers/kings, solving the difference between the two religions 
primarily aimed at reconciling their dietary differences. This means other 
fundamental theological differences were either thought as ‘irreconcilable’ and 
thus ‘untouchable’ or relegated as ‘secondary’ compared to the almost day-to-
day polemics of food. Ironically, the fact that the taboo has always been a 
primary target suggests that it effectively proves itself as a buffer and a cushion 
protecting other more fundamental differences from coming into play.  
Today, the seemingly banal day-to-day expressions like “only knife 
separates us” in the mass consciousness appear to mute the fundamental and 
often volatile theological differences so much so that individuals from both 
religious groups focus on the rather seemingly relatively ‘trivial’ religious 
matter – food taboo. The polemics that are built around food taboo, however, 
seem to be a blessing in disguise by being a discursive buffer against polemics 
on fundamental and perpetually irreconcilable, if not precarious, theological 
differences. Although some argue that this custom is a barrier for Christian-
Muslim encounters, I rather further hypothesize that, unless the culture itself 
abolishes it or amends it (which may happen as a result of the advent of buffet 
serving, as discussed in concluding chapter), the apparent imposition from 
religious and secular elites perhaps would make the Christian-Muslim polemics 
to go down to more fundamental and sensitive differences, which are hardly 
reconcilable. Today especially religious elites who tend to trivialize and reject 
this custom are allegedly emphasizing more fundamental differences that 
would do little except upsetting the status quo of the peaceful day-to-day 
encounters between Christians and Muslims in the country.    
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Reciprocal hospitality as an index of Christian-Muslim relations100   
If one asks any passerby in Ethiopia of what the latter makes of the relationship 
between Christians and Muslims in the country, the most likely response would 
be “We live peacefully; we eat and drink together.” As it has already been 
pointed out abro meblat, abro metetat (‘eating and drinking together’) is 
regarded as an epitome of the peaceful co-existence of Christians and Muslims 
in Ethiopia. The reciprocal hospitality built on this religious food taboo is thus 
often taken as an indicator of the degree of peaceful relationships and contact 
between the two religious groups. Evidently, people who observe this food 
taboo get together in food contexts and express their social responsibilities. 
However, as much as peaceful coexistence is exemplified in “eating and 
drinking together”, the lack of or the reported decreasing trend in “eating and 
drinking together” between Christians and Muslims is equally regarded as a 
decrease in and an endangerment against the peaceful coexistence between the 
two religious groups. A few informants from both sides lamented over and 
showed their concern over the gradual decrease in socializing between 
Christians and Muslims. According to informants, in recent times, those groups 
who claim that such food taboo is theologically unjustifiable are reported to 
ironically avoid converging in food contexts as well as in various other socio-
cultural settings.  
In Ethiopia, today, as a result of the inter-Islam rivalry between Ahbash 
and Wahhabism (Kabha and Erlich 2006, 519), there is a recent distinction 
between Muslims as “the old” and “the new”, which may correspond to the 
indigenized Islam and the political Islam respectively. “The old” ones are 
known for their avoidance of eating meat slaughtered by Christians but still 
converge in food contexts with Christians. “The new” ones, however, are said 
to reject this taboo as dogmatically baseless, but ironically avoid converging in 
food contexts with Christians. These groups are also accused of not taking part 
in many social activities with Christians. Some even allegedly avoid buying 
items from ‘Christian shops’. This might sound congruent with and reflect the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"++!An earlier version of this section with other sub-sections of this study made an article that 
appeared in Food Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Volume 5, Issue 2, 2015, www.food-
studies.com, ISSN 2160-1933.   
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current politico-religious atmosphere in the country and with the consequences 
of the “global [reformist] Islamic movement” (Eriksen 2004, 46).  
It must be noted that even in “those good old days” as well as today there 
have been Christians who do not share food with Muslims, decline invitations 
to a Muslim wedding, or avoid many social relations in general. But, these 
kinds of attitudes among such Christians more often than not were down to 
individuals’ level of consciousness and exposure to living with Others. In other 
words, there appears to be no evidence that it came as a movement (Abbink 
1999) capable of jeopardizing the broader Christian-Muslim-relationship. As 
result, today, the downward trend in the degree of convergence in food 
contexts such as at wedding feasts, especially in urban areas, is being taken as 
an index of the decreasing degree of contact and perhaps as a source of fear 
and suspicion between the two religious groups. In view of this, one can be 
forced to predict that, in the future, the custom itself might be reported in the 
past tense as a roughly similar custom in Java (Indonesia) is reported as such 
by Kim (1998).  
 
Beyond Disgust 
Taboos are forbidden partly because people find them 
disgusting and reprehensible or even unspeakable and 
unimaginable. However, taboos involve more than simple 
disgust. 
Brett Williams (2004, 427) 
 
Disgust, to be sure, paints the world in a particular way, a 
distinctly misanthropic and melancholic way. But disgust is 
also a necessary partner in the positive: love, as we know it, 
would make little sense without disgust being there to 
overcome. Our own commitment to virtues of moral and 
bodily cleanliness, to the loathing of cruelty and hypocrisy, 
depends upon it. 
William Ian Miller (1997, 18) 
 
Anthropologists have studied the social, psychological and economic 
implications of alimentary reciprocity (Levi-Strauss 1945; Farb and Armelagos 
1980; Eriksen 2004). Not many have studied the philosophical implications of 
food in general, and of reciprocity and hospitality in particular. A few scholars, 
however, have seen the ethical aspects of food, particularly the moral virtues in 
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relation to food (see Allhoff and Monroe 2007; Telfer 2002). Elizabet Tefler 
(2002), for example, has observed the moral virtues of hospitableness in terms 
of the duty of the host in treating others in the context of food. However, when 
hospitality involves entertaining the dietary demands of a guest that includes 
taboo, there is also a side that can be appreciated as a moral virtue from the 
point of view of the guest as well as of the host. It looks straightforward that 
hosts have a duty to meet the dietary demands of the guest even if, as Tefler 
notes, they have a duty to entertain their friends without necessarily thinking of 
duty when they do so (Telfer 2002, 94). But when the guest has a specific 
dietary demand, there is duty and responsibility that the host shoulders to meet 
even if the taboo observed by the guest is irrelevant, irrational, and 
unacceptable in the eyes of the host. The duty might be relatively easier if, for 
example, the guest’s dietary demand is of avoidance of some kind of food 
items. In this case the host carries out his duty by subtraction or exclusion – by 
excluding the food items the guest does not eat. A good example for this would 
be a meat-eater hosting a vegetarian whom the host entertains with anything 
but meat (or animal products, depending on the kind of vegetarian the guest is).     
However, the issue will be all the more problematic when the host 
observes a taboo that is likely to be irrelevant in the eyes of the guest, who 
perhaps cherishes the food that is avoided by the host. For instance, a 
vegetarian host, while entertaining meat-eater guests, might have to push 
against his/her will and most of all against his/her dietary principle for the sake 
of entertaining such guests. This, however, might be very controversial 
especially if the host is an ethical vegetarian compared to health or religious 
one. As Telfer (2002, 81) observes:  
Some vegetarians do cook meat for others, and they are 
subject to a conflict of principles. On the one hand if people 
think it wrong to eat meat, they are bound to think it wrong to 
cook and serve it. But they might also think it wrong to give a 
meat-eating guest less than the best— not what is morally best, 
but what will give the guest most pleasure. 
Now Telfer’s interesting example of the difficulty of maintaining reciprocity 
between vegetarians and non-vegetarian can help us in the discussion of the 
hesitation among some Christians and Muslims concerning the duty of meeting 
the religious dietary demands of the other guest on formal occasions such as at 
wedding feasts. As regards the Christian-Muslim hospitality, some of the 
! "&(!
possible questions that might arise could be: Does a Muslim host have a duty to 
entertain his/her Christian guest with alcohol? Or does a Christian host have to 
entertain his/her Muslim guests with the latter’s meat and vice versa? Some 
Muslims go as far as providing their Christian guests with alcoholic drinks 
although the absence of alcohol at a Muslim wedding may not be necessarily 
disappointing for the Christian guests as it is after all of refreshment rather than 
of nourishment. The common emphasis and the cultural duty of the host rather 
lies in providing meat slaughtered according to the religious dietary demands 
of the Other guest. But still with meeting the dietary demands of the Other 
guest are principles that appear to be compromised on the eye of the most pious 
or dogmatic religious individuals. In other words, if it were not for the sake of 
social life and sense of solidarity, entertaining the Other guest with his/her own 
meat would be problematic from the standpoint of a strict taboo observant. 
According to a taboo-observant learned Muslim informant, never mind 
breaking the food taboo, it is wrong even for Muslim hosts to entertain their 
religious Other guests with something that they themselves reject or that they 
do not believe in. He said:   
One should not eat food forbidden in Islam or drink alcohol in 
order to please one’s [non-Muslim] neighbor. Gift exchange, be 
it sheep or cloth or anything is OK […] You can invite them 
Shiro or vegetables [i.e. vegetarian food]. But giving a sheep or 
a goat to your Christian guests and letting them slaughter it in a 
name other than of Allah is also like telling them ‘make it 
carrion or haram.’ This [the custom] may be cultural, but if we 
weigh it from Islamic perspective it is wrong [because] the host 
is letting others do what he condemns. […] Similarly, if alohol 
is forbidden for you, inviting others alcoholic drink is wrong.101   
Telfer (2004) observed only the possible sense of duty on the part of the host, 
but in the case of hospitality that involves tabooed food, the onus is as well put 
on a guest who observes that taboo. In light of the above informant’s 
apparently dogmatic interpretation of the taboo and of the overall custom under 
study, one can see a taboo-observant host’s attempt and will to balance his/her !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"+"! KÅ"#$! ZD8D8=-!$_Q! º&ò5! 8?"'b5!Qí!GQ#5! c>$! %NÄN!Gw†5! %>tM$9 "√I 
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socio-cultural commitment with that of his/her religious. This in turn concurs 
with my previous discussion on resistence against certain interpretations of 
scriptural verses as regards food. However, when hospitality is reciprocal, or 
when there is an exchange of food, the duty lies not only in the host but also in 
the guest to accept the invitation and to be entertained, first of all. The question 
Telfer poses looks more illuminating here to see the duty of guests who “have 
to” be entertained in a food context or space wherein there is a food item that 
they avoid. That is, when a guest who observes taboo is expected to cross (not 
to break) some kind of dietary boarder (religious, moral, cultural, etc), this 
guest is carrying out an obligation to honor the hospitality of his/her host. 
Think of an ardent ethical vegetarian in the house of a meet-eater host, or take 
a guest whose most revered totem animal is a culinary delight of his/her host. 
We might ask: How much is the affective cost for a guest of this kind to be 
entertained by such a host? The Other guest, even while knowing that he/she is 
served with his/her own food, has to defy some level of disgust that is induced 
by the food aura of the host and of fear of contamination. Such a guest accepts 
the invitation but out of sense of duty because of the reciprocity of hospitality 
with a friend in the other religion. My point here is that although the degree 
might differ depending on circumstances and the dietary demands of each 
party, the question of moral virtue in the context of food is not limited to the 
host per se but it can also equally be a question on the part of the guest. Thus, 
the following brief discussion further clarifies how holding on to one’s disgust 
is a moral virtue that a guest manifests for the sake of others.  
 
Holding on one’s disgust as a manifestation of Stoicism?  
Beyond the disgust and the possible affective sacrifice they may incur, such 
individuals who observe this taboo appear to give priority to virtue over 
happiness, which has something of a Stoicism air to it. Bertrand Russell’s 
expression of the doctrine of stoicism sounds fitting here: “We can’t be happy, 
but we can be good; let us therefore pretend that, so long as we are good, it 
doesn’t matter being unhappy” (Russell 1945, 269 in Eller 2007, 257). 
Accordingly, these two religious communities not simply show fidelity to their 
respective religious identities but seem to also sacrifice their comfort and 
repress their disgust. Obviously, those who are disgusted cannot be happy, but 
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they know that they are good socially. From the point of view of the host, 
“[h]ospitableness resembles charity more than it resembles courage in that it 
benefits others rather than oneself” (Telfer 2002, 95). According to Foot (1978 
quoted in Telfer 2002, 95) “moral virtues are qualities which ‘a human being 
needs to have, for his own sake and that of his fellows’.” As indicated in the 
above epigraph, Miller (1997) also underscores the nexus between overcoming 
disgust and one’s commitment to moral virtues. Following this, we might give 
‘courage’ - one of the cardinal moral virtues (Foot 2002) - to the guests who 
have to defy their disgust to look happy. The courage to hold on their disgust 
might not benefit them, but others – particularly the host. In reciprocity the 
parties involved can of course have psychological motivations like personal 
gain and social acceptability; however, reciprocity is also determined by 
consideration for others (Eriksen 2004). It is the thought of friendship and 
mutual respect that counts most. In the case of Christians and Muslims in 
Ethiopia, too, it is more than the provision of food. The hospitality is a gesture 
of kindness and accommodation and above all of empathizing the Other by 
understanding her/his dietary demands. In reciprocity “there is much more in 
the exchange itself than in the things exchanged” (Levi-Strauss 1949, 59). 
Food exchange, more than a simple act of generosity, is a complex transaction 
that entails obligation (Farb and Armelagos 1980). Even if wedding entails 
eating, the guest goes to the wedding primarily in virtue of social obligations, 
i.e. respecting the invitation and sharing the happiness of the host.  
Although the social etiquette of being invited and accepting the invitation 
is basically given much weight by both the invitee and the inviter, for people 
who attend a wedding of the other religion, their attendance more often than 
not is “a matter of etiquette than of nourishment” (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 
160). This is mainly because such a guest is often on the receiving end of 
disgust, for host’s wedding feast is technically a “bio-cultural arena of disgust” 
(Highmore 2010, 120). Entering such “arena” can, thus, be an onerous duty for 
this guest. It is important to note here that those who yield to their disgust do 
not attend the wedding of the other religion at all even though those who attend 
are not totally free of disgust. The latter show virtue not only by demonstrating 
their will for social life through simple attendance but also by holding on their 
disgust. The degree of disgust seems to differ from individuals in one religion 
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to those in another as well as from individual to individual within the same 
religion. It appears to follow from this that the more disgusted one is, the more 
sacrifice one pays in defying one’s disgust to fulfill this affect-wise demanding 
socio-cultural commitment. In other words, their readiness to take part in a 
food context that they do not fully enjoy and their will to overcome their 
disgust to at least symbolically attain “one-food-community” is a virtuous 
decision and act. That is, they sacrifice their emotional comfort to become 
“man” enough (“vir-tuous) toward a common good, i.e. toward a commonly 
shared convivial festivity marked by a food-induced unity. The unity or 
convergence of the two groups on such occasions, apart from the apparent fun 
and joy, demands of such guests an emotional strength to deal with the host’s 
food aura. However, one may regard the commitment of these guests as a 
pretentious effort to please others, which brings the place of sincerity in the 
general notions hospitality and virtue into play.        
 
Is hospitality-out-of-duty insincere and defying disgust pretence?   
In the eye of those who do not observe the taboo, be it out of sectarian 
polemics or that of secular reasoning, the virtues that I outlined above might 
be seen as insincere, or even pretence at worst. This can be seen from the 
perspective of the host as well as of the guest. Telfer asks an intriguing and 
important question whether we are being deceitful when we entertain our 
friends out of duty and how much this matters. Though she admits that it is 
difficult to give a complete answer, she tries to answer that we do not 
entertain just anyone with a motive of duty; thus we should not feel 
hypocritical of our hospitality even if it lacks “spontaneity which normally 
goes with friendship proper” (Telfer 2002, 95). The point here is that if 
hospitality is done as an onerous duty, it tends to lack its natural and 
spontaneous nature. That is why Telfer is very critical about duty as a motive 
for hospitality: “there might be doubt about duty as a motive for 
hospitableness, not because it is ulterior but because it seems to be at odds 
with the idea of warmth contained in hospitality. If people entertain out of a 
sense of duty, are they being hospitable or merely dutiful?” (Telfer 2002, 89). 
She, however, suggests that people are “hospitable provided that what I called 
the spirit of the hospitality is generous” (Telfer 2002, 89-90). In this sense, it 
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seems that the very sense of duty and responsibility comes partly out of the 
will to entertain and please one’s guests. Therefore, that one has duty as a 
motive for hospitality does not mean that the person is pretending to entertain 
people while he/she is not enjoying doing so. It rather shows the host’s 
commitment to sociality and friendship. The duty is not an unwanted one; it 
rather embraces such qualities as care and preoccupation for the pleasure of 
others. This is best expressed by Telfer (2002, 90) as follows:     
Hospitable motives, then, are those in which concern for the 
guests’ pleasure and welfare, for its own sake, is 
predominant. These can include entertaining for pleasure 
where that pleasure largely depends on knowing that one is 
pleasing the guests, and sense of duty where there is also 
concern for the guests themselves. And hospitable people, 
those who possess the trait of hospitableness, are those who 
often entertain from one or more of these motives, or from 
mixed motives in which one of these motives is predominant. 
Therefore, the sense of duty a host has toward entertaining his/her guests 
should not be seen as insincere only because it has a motive of duty, nor does 
it contradict with the essences of conviviality, pleasure and happiness that are 
embraced in hospitality.  
On the part of the guest as well, taking the previous discussion on 
‘hiding’ ones disgust into account, one might object here that the guests who 
hold on their disgust pretend to be happy while they truly are not. However, 
compared to those who prioritize their religious commitment over their social 
one or to those who succumb to the disgust that the taboo might engender, the 
ones who attend the wedding of the other by holding on their disgust are 
people with virtue and sense of duty as community members. Instead of 
pretention, their act is rather comparable to the function of the platonic “noble 
lie”. If the platonic noble lie served the citizens’ solidarity, the “insincerity”, if 
it is so in the first place, must be a noble one in order to maintain the two 
communities sense of solidarity and friendship enshrined in the reciprocal 
hospitality. Above all, according to Derrida (2000, 151) the law of hospitality 
is at times above morality and ethics. Having invoked Kant’s “On a supposed 
right to lie out of humanity,” St. Augustine’s treaties on lying, and the Biblical 
Lot’s (Genesis 19) priority to the law of hospitality, Derrida analyzes the 
dilemma one faces between the law of hospitality and that of ethics: “not only 
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is hospitality coextensive with ethics itself, but where it can seem that some 
people, as it has been said, place the law of hospitality above a ‘morality’ or a 
certain ‘ethics’” (Derrida 2001, 151). In short, following Derrida’s analysis, 
the law of hospitality seems to afford one the “right” to lie but a “noble lie”.     
It should be noted that those who succumb, so to speak, to their disgust 
do not take part in the reciprocal hospitality at wedding feasts of the Other 
religion in the first place. But individuals who come to the wedding feast of 
their religious Other host appear to have tamed their disgust. Their hidden 
disgust, thus, emanates not from insincerity in expressing true emotions or 
feelings but rather from the corrective nature of virtues (Foot 2002, 8) where 
they make a “prudent suppression” of their disgust (Ngai 2005, 333). Rather 
more to the point, according to Foot, virtues are corrective because “there is 
some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good” 
(Foot 2002, 8). Or even better, as Melville suggests, “tolerance is always, in 
some fundamental way, a negation of disgust” (Melville cited in Ngai 2005, 
333). Therefore, one might not help feeling disgust, but the difference that the 
person can make is to hold on the expressions of disgust to be virtuous in a 
situation where it is difficult to be so. 
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Conclusion  
 
The Ethiopian commensality on lemat, on the one hand, and the peculiar taboo 
of avoiding meat slaughtered by people of the other faith, on the other, makes 
the commensality between the taboo observant Orthodox Christians and 
Muslims far too complex. On top of this, the nature of the taboo seen from the 
vantage point of various interpretations of scriptures by different sects and that 
of secular reasoning is again another difficult subject to grapple with. Some of 
the analyses I have made almost throughout this study are a functionalist 
attempt of interpreting cultural practices rather than a dogmatic comparison 
between religions or sects. Particularly, my attempt has been to see the often 
taken-for-granted “latent functions” (Merton 1968) of socio-cultural practices 
and customs rather than what they are often primarily meant for. In other 
words, it is a pursuit of alternative meaning and function out of the broader 
semiotic system built around this religious food taboo, which serves as a 
system of communication between the two religious groups for many centuries 
in the country. I have argued that apart from its sheer religious functions for the 
taboo observant individuals, and beyond its perceived “prejudice” and “cause 
of mutual aversion” for the non-observant and non-religious individuals, the 
taboo has considerable socio-cultural and politico-religious virtues with 
implications for contemporary interreligious encounters. If the relative peaceful 
co-existence of the two religions in Ethiopia has survived the test of 
devastating wars and conflicts in the country’s history, so has this popular 
custom endured a continuous battle against pressures from religious and 
secular forces. It is against and/or between these two forces that such socio-
cultural and religious norms and practices continue to exist, struggle to survive 
and at times surrender to extinction. So this study has attempted to dig out the 
values and virtues of the system built around the taboo.  
First, despite their diversity and many local variants, world religions 
claim, aim and try to impose orthodoxy and consistency in their area of 
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influence (Eller 2007, 216). However, except for its own followers, it is hardly 
possible to regard one religion as absolute and only its values and norms as 
truly scriptural. The conflicting doctrinal positions of certain sects of a world 
religion as regards food in general and this taboo in particular seems to be part 
of this diversity. For example, both the individual who observes this taboo and 
the one who does not can potentially defend their respective position by citing 
verses from scriptures. In other words, some reject the food taboo on the basis 
of their interpretations of scriptures that suits their position while others 
observe it by taking certain other scriptural verses as warrant for their 
observance. On the other hand, secularism and modernization impose their 
disenchanting ideals to apparently liberate societies from the yoke of allegedly 
outdated religious and superstitious illusions. However, religions also seem to 
be adaptive to the demand of the day while “religious practices and identities 
are contested, made, unmade, and remade continuously” (Eller 2007, 217). It is 
by now very clear in social sciences that the theory of secularization of the 
world (i.e. the assumption and prediction quite a few decades ago about the 
world being increasingly secularized) has proved little to be true. Instead, 
religion seems to have surprisingly continued to be a social as well as political 
force in many contemporary societies around the world. As Roger Trigg writes, 
“[r]eligion, in many forms, has a growing influence not just on private belief 
but on public policy” (Trigg 2007, 9), which sounds to be an echo of the notion 
of “the religious return.” Thus, a simple rejection of religious practices on the 
basis of secular or modern ideals as irrational or superstitious cannot be a 
viable option today in the face of a growing revival of religious identities and 
beliefs. The observance of the taboo under study should also be seen from this 
perspective.  
Second, those who reject or denounce this custom as prejudice have not 
proved if the breaking of this taboo may foster the relationship between 
Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia. Various kings and rulers of Ethiopia such 
as Tewodros II, Yohannes IV, Menelik II, Ras Ali, Lij Iyassu (Ficquet 2006) 
attempted to scrap this taboo in a bid to unite, by fair means or foul, the two 
religious groups. But none of them succeeded. Although the roots of the taboo 
look less obvious, it has survived to the present day. A custom or a belief 
survives for two reasons, according to Claude Levi-Strauss: The first one is by 
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mere chance or by some extrinsic causes; and the second is because it still 
plays some kind of role that was a cause for its very creation (Levi-Strauss 
1949). Even more precisely, “no religious teaching can long survive if it is 
maladaptive. Whether a religious belief is rational or irrational is beside the 
point” (Farb and Armelagos 1980, 120). It is my contention that this custom 
traversed many centuries because it has served such a purpose as a conscious or 
unconscious mechanism of maintaining the religious border. But its latent 
function is a collective treasure for both religious groups as a practical example 
for their peaceful co-existence and mutual understanding of differences. 
Among other things, the reciprocal hospitality and the empathetic 
accommodative treatment offered to one’s religious Other in formal food 
contexts transforms the otherwise irreconcilable difference between the two 
religions into a compatible one. Thus, if approached in a non-judgmental spirit, 
such religious-oriented food culture can be viewed as a source of positive 
implications for peaceful interreligious relations and sense of pluralism.  
Third, the indigenization processes in the two religions are so firm that 
the frontier between Islamic and non-Islamic; Christian and non-Christian 
etiquettes and practices in Ethiopian Islam and Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity 
respectively appear to be blurred. As a result, which practices are scripturally 
justified and unjustified are so unclear that the borderline between cultural and 
religious, or between mundane and spiritual are almost unidentifiable because 
religion is not only a belief system but also a cultural system (Geertz 1973). 
The bottom line, however, is that the taboo has not been an obstacle for 
Christian-Muslim encounters because of the mass’s creative way of dealing 
with dietary differences. The custom resulted in an innovative system that 
harmonizes the religious and mundane selves of the taboo observant.  
Fourth, it seems that when a cultural practice fails to fit into scriptural 
doctrine or vice versa, either one is customized, adapted or shaped to fit into 
the other. It is one of the characteristics of world religions in general to “be 
‘refracted’ by local conditions, including but not limited to the traditional 
religion upon which it intrudes, the specific sects or denominations that arrive, 
and the other world religion(s) nearby” (Eller 2007, 204) in order to be in 
harmony with the socio-cultural realities at local level. A characteristic in 
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general of African societies to accommodate religious pluralism (Soares and 
Otayek 2007), such flexibility or ‘refraction’ has allowed the Christian and 
Muslim societies in Ethiopia to maintain, barring some sporadic 
misunderstandings and conflicts, their centuries-long peaceful co-existence and 
sense of religious pluralism at least at their micro-level encounters. As Jon 
Abbink rightly comments, “[t]he Ethiopian societal context has, so to speak, 
forced the idea of ‘pluralism’ not only on the minds of the country's Christians 
but also on that of its Muslims” (Abbink 1998, 120). The encounter of the two 
religious groups in food contexts that is mediated by the taboo under discussion 
is ironically part of this flexibility rather than rigidity.    
Fifth, the taboo usually receives criticism for creating a ‘mutual aversion’ 
between the two religious groups. And at the heart of this accusation is often 
the blame on religious fanaticism (see Carmichael 1996 and 2004) and, 
according to some informants, the role of Christian kings as a means of 
dividing their subjects for their own political advantages. I, however, argued 
that if the taboo was ‘invented’ by religious fanatics or exploited by political 
elites, it has served both Christianity as well as Islam as a point of distinction 
from one another based on the notion of food and its role in interreligious 
relations. Above all, if the taboo, as dubbed by some, is a prejudice or barrier, 
it owes as much to the failure of religious institutions and political elites as it 
does to the ignorance of ‘innocent’ Christians or Muslims. The latter, however, 
managed to invent creative ways of dealing with dietary differences, which has 
become a manifestation of their mutual understating and empathy. It can thus 
be seen as a creativity born out of difficulty in food fellowship.      
Finally, the prejudice or barrier discourse should not be a blinder from 
seeing the virtues of the system. However, in discussing the possible virtues of 
the system built on the custom in this study, I do not mean to imply that 
Christians and Muslims in Ethiopia have lived perfectly well in their entire 
history or that there are no prejudices in their communications and encounters 
in general and with regard to food (contexts) in particular. Nor should the 
attempt to re-interpret some customs be misconstrued as blindly accepting all 
apparently out-dated religious or other customs on account of some perceived 
functions, which have no actual use for modern society (see Bernhardt 1947), 
or on account of sheer relativism that has no common ground or framework for 
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rejecting what is not relevant for the common good of modern societies. What I 
have attempted to do in this study is that I made a conscious effort to give 
alternative interpretations to the oft-overlooked latent functions of indigenous 
customs and practices that, unfortunately, are (being) rejected only according 
to certain truths in sectarian interpretations of religious dietary rules or at times 
under the pretext of apparent scientific or secular reasoning. Therefore, this 
study does not suggest a conscious policy based on secular ideals, or an 
intervention from certain sectarian angle. Rather, the tradition should be left for 
itself either to continue to survive or to make itself adaptive to what the 
interreligious and/or socio-cultural encounters of the current as well as future 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christian and Muslim societies demand. For instance, the 
recent advent and reception of buffet serving in the relatively urban part of 
Ethiopia can be seen as one symptom of the culture or society’s gesture in 
embracing ‘natural’ change based, not on imposition, but on the demand of the 
day. However, as an endeavor in the realm of cultural studies, the study is 
hoped to have its contribution by being an input for cultural policy making and 
cultural political decisions as regards the relationship between established 
religious and traditional norms vis-à-vis secular and sectarian views in the face 
of an ever-increasing change and transformation of societies, cultures and 
religions.  
 
Future research 
The custom built around the taboo under discussion has seen changes over the 
last few years. The advent of buffet that is briefly discussed below explains the 
change, which I view as ‘natural’ compared to the rejection of this custom only 
on the basis of sectarian or secular grounds. Such changes one witnesses today 
suggest that food taboos as well as the system built around them are not 
necessarily inveterate practices. As Adel P. den Hartog notes, “[f]ood taboos 
may seem rather stable, but they are often under pressure because the society is 
changing” (Hartog 2003, web). They change, adapt and readapt themselves to 
the changing state of the society that observes and practices them. Evidently, a 
noticeable development one may observe in the manner of serving food at 
weddings feasts and other occasions that involve eating especially in urban 
Ethiopia in the present times is the catering of guests with food served on 
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buffet. This new practice seems to be changing the long-established norm 
related to the taboo and the dynamics of the interaction of the two religious 
groups in food contexts that this study dealt with.  
The wind of change, so to speak, in the serving style at wedding feasts 
may show, among other things, the advent of Western culture and its influence 
in local customs, but a closer look at the change in performance of this 
particular custom under question may also reveal the decreasing degree of 
accommodative treatment of dietary/culinary differences. Today, especially in 
urban areas, including the research site, some hosts entertain their guests with a 
buffet or in a manner different from the way they do traditionally. At some 
wedding feasts, hosts provide meat for their like-guests and vegetarian food for 
their Other guests. It will be up to the Other-taboo-observant guest to entertain 
her/himself from the list of food items provided on the buffet table. It may be 
important to pose questions over such a change that has come to be embraced in 
recent years: Is it because the taboo is getting less popular over time? If so, how 
and why? Or, is it because “the vegetarian diet” has neutralized the distinction 
that the taboo engenders in the traditional serving style? The reason may lie in 
answering one or more of these or even other questions. However, in light of 
the current study, one element attached to the taboo, i.e. the empathetic 
hospitality in the traditional style, seems to elude the buffet style of food 
offering. Finally, future research is needed to be done on such new food 
practices in order to keep up with the changes and/or adaptations that the 
current Ethiopian societies are manifesting in food contexts, which in turn help 
gauge the degree of interaction and socialization between and among religious 
groups in the country.   
 
Limitations 
One possible lens to look into the relation between food and religious identity is 
a review of religious scriptures in terms of their respective rules concerning 
dietary and culinary practices for their respective followers. In this regard, I 
made a reasonable attempt, but making an exhaustive comparison between 
religious texts in the country about what each religion says on food to its 
respective believers can, of course, be a daunting task partly because of 
language barrier. Thus, I depended heavily on Christian texts due to my 
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acquaintance and linguistic familiarity with them (Ge’ez and Amharic 
languages). As a result, the analysis I made based on the religious texts in 
Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity shows the interreligious food discourse from 
the point of view of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. As far as Islamic texts are 
concerned, this study used verses from the Qur’an only. The same kind of 
analysis could not be made in the scope of this study based on what Islamic 
texts other than the Qur’an make of Christianity and Christians in relation to 
food. In addition, the very limited research visits I managed to make in Ethiopia 
during semester breaks or in-between mobilities from one university, country 
and/or continent to another allowed me to generate data through interview as 
well as observation of relevant loci of data (abattoirs, restaurants, butcheries, 
etc). Unfortunately, these visits did not coincide with actual wedding feasts, the 
observation of which would have refreshed my lived experiences and previous 
observations, which I used in this study to put the data generated from various 
sources into perspective. Finally, as Warren Belasco notes, “while food studies 
is now ‘respectable,’ it is also inherently subversive. To study food often 
requires us to cross disciplinary boundaries and to ask inconvenient questions” 
(Belasco 2008, 6). Some of the questions that this study pursued might have led 
to inconvenient questions and answers, which may upset the belief and “truth” 
(religious or otherwise) that some individuals/readers uphold in connection 
with the taboo under question. The intention, however, was purely an 
intellectual exercise to understand religion and religious practices as “cultural 
systems”.  
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Interview guide items 
 
      Local elites 
1. How do you describe the common rhetoric of “abro meblat 
abro metetat” (“eating and drinking together”) between 
Christians & Muslims in Ethiopia? 
2. How much is food important for your religious identity? 
3. Tell me what you think about “the Christian/the Muslim knife” 
i.e. about the separate slaughtering and eating culture. 
4. What do you feel about eating food other than made/prepared 
through your religious etiquette? 
5. Which food items are you very careful about whether they are 
prepared according to your religious food proscription/culinary 
rules? 
6. How much are you aware of the food proscriptions of your 
religion? 
7. How much are you aware of the food proscriptions of the other 
religion (Islam/Christianity)? 
8. When/If you are invited to a Muslim/Christian wedding feast 
what do you feel about food?  
9. Have you ever gone to a wedding of a person in the other faith 
where you just attended without partaking of food? If yes, 
why? 
10. Where did you sit? What did you eat? With whom did you eat? 
11. Tell me if you know any popular saying or proverb or legend or 
even personal anecdotes related to food/meat/knife with regard 
to Islam and Christianity in Ethiopia 
 
       Families/parents who previously organized wedding feasts 
1. Who are/were your guests (e.g. Christian, Muslim, etc.) at your 
son’s/daughter’s wedding? 
2. Did/Do you cater your Christian/Muslim guests with “their 
own” food? Why/why not? If yes, who prepares/d it? 
3. How do you prepare food for your Christian/Muslim guests? 
! "*#!
(e.g. Materials/utensils, whose utensils do you use? What do 
you do with the utensils?) 
4. If you borrow a utensil from your Muslim/Christian neighbors, 
how do you use them? Or, if you have a utensil previously lent 
to your Christian/Muslim neighbor back, how do use/reuse it? 
What do you do with it? 
5. What is your opinion about “the Christian/Muslim knife” i.e. 
about separate slaughtering and eating? 
6. Do you mind eating food/meat prepared/slaughtered by 
Muslims/Christians? Why/why not? 
7. Tell me if you know any popular (or personal/familial) sayings 
or proverbs or legends or anecdotes related to food/meat/knife 
with regard to Islam and Christianity in Ethiopia 
 
       Religious Fathers/learned men  
1. Tell me about the theological foundations of the food 
proscriptions that mark Muslim-Christian food dichotomy. 
(How and why food/meat has become a separating factor?) 
2. Since when did Muslims and Christians in Ethiopia start 
diverging because of food/meat?  
3. How do you explain the role of the knife in serving as a 
religious identity marker with regard to food?  
4. Tell me if you know any historical account of separate 
slaughtering in relation to Muslims and Christians? i.e. Since 
when do you think slaughtering has become such an important 
separating factor? 
5. What is the use of Metshafe Keder in EOTC related to dietary 
trespassing? What is its (theological) foundation? (To Muslim 
interviewees: Is there any religious ‘ritual’ you do about if a 
Muslim commit dietary trespassing? (If there is any trespassing 
at all?) 
6. Tell me if you know any popular (or scriptural, if any) saying 
or proverb or legend or anecdotes related to food/meat/knife 
with regard to Islam and Christianity in Ethiopia 
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         Other informants from different walks of life 
1. What does it feel to attend a wedding ceremony across 
religion? 
2. How do you feel about the food served to you there? 
3. How did you occupy space in the tent/house of the wedding? 
4. What does it feel like eating beside someone eating food from 
the other religion?  
5. Tell me what you will do if you find yourself eating 
(unknowingly) food/meat from the other religion? 
6. How do you know that a certain food is OK to eat according to 
your religion? 
7. Which food items are you most careful about in its preparation? 
Why? 
8. Which food items you don’t mind eating while knowing that 
they were prepared by Muslim/Christian? Why? 
9. Tell me if you know any popular saying or proverb or legend or 
personal or popular anecdotes related to food/meat/knife with 
regard to Islam and Christianity in Ethiopia 
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Pictures of public slaughterhouses in Ethiopia !
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Appendix 3 
 
 Population of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE)  
by religion, 2007 
 
Population  
 
Religion 
 
No. 
 
% 
Orthodox 32,138,126 43.5 
Protestant 13,746,787 18.6 
Catholic 536,827 0.7 
Christian sub-total 46,421,740 62.8 
Muslim/Islam 25,045,550 33.9 
Traditional 1,957,944 2.6 
Others 471,861 0.6 
All persons total 73,918,505 100 
 
Source: Summary and Statistical Report of the 2007 Population and Housing 
Census (Population Census Commission 2008).  
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Appendix 4 
 
Amharic interviews quoted verbatim   
Chapter 3, page 55: 
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=i4? 8j ?kl !%ifm V1e B4: .Bl !/E !8d9J0n !8dIJ0n !8'50n 
!8M#90 ."U1 !83I0 A(75? .o WT%X1YG .ND!6gT A0"I4 3N' M4 
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Chapter 4, page 111: 
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Chapter 4, page 121-22 
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Chapter 4, page 123: 
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Appendix 5 
 
Amharic texts translated by the researcher into English and 
quoted at length in the dissertation  
 
Chapter 3, page 86: 
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Chapter 5, page 135: 
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